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Abstract
The research work presented in this thesis is based on the concept and defintion of network that can
spread in several and different real world contexts. Indeed, we can refer to a network in a telecommu-
nications sense considering a collection of transmitters, receivers, and communication channels that
send or are used to send information to one another. However, as a matter of fact, in nature there
are other several examples of networks: the human brain is one of them. The relationship between
the actors in Hollywood can be studied in terms of network as well, a generic social community can
be compared to a network, eco-systems are networks of species. The recent Network Science aims
at studying all these systems using a set of common mathematical methods. In the following of
the thesis, we will focus on some of well known telecommunications networks issues using standard
telecommunications procedures to address them, with relevant reference to video flow transmissions
and management of electric vehicles networks. At the same time, different models aiming at reach the
same goals in contexts that may differ from a telecommunications setup can be used. In more details,
we will evaluate queueing systems, jamming problems, groups recognition in networks, and mobile
computing using game theoretic approaches. It is worth noting that this aspect can be also seen in
a reverse order. Indeed, we will discuss how standard telecommunications analysis can be used to
investigate on problems not directly related to a telecommunications background. In particular, one
of our future purposes is to investigate on the brain connectivity that is raising significant interest in
the recent scientific society.
Il lavoro di ricerca presentato in questa tesi e` basato sul concetto e definizione di rete che puo`
spaziare in diversi contesti del mondo reale. Infatti, facciamo riferimento ad una rete di telecomu-
nicazioni se consideriamo una collezione di trasmettitori, ricevitori e canali di comunicazione che
trasmettono o vengono usati per trasmettere informazioni. Tuttavia, anche in natura si possono
trovare diversi esempi di rete: ad esempio il cervello umano e` uno di questi. O ancora le relazioni
tra gli attori ad Hollywood puo` essere studiato in termini di rete, una generica comunita` sociale puo`
essere comparata ad una rete, gli eco-sistemi sono da considerare come reti di specie. Network Science
e` la disciplina scientifica che si propone di studiare tutti questi sistemi usando un insieme comune
di modelli matematici. In questa tesi ci focalizzeremo su alcune ben note problematiche relative a
reti di telecomunicazioni usando classici metodi e modelli nati nell’ambito delle telecomunicazioni per
analizzarle; in particolare, valuteremo trasmissioni video e la gestione di reti di veicoli elettrici. Allo
stesso tempo, si puo` pensare di applicare a queste, o simili, tematiche modelli diversi che si pro-
pongono di raggiungere gli stessi obiettivi ma in contesti che possono differire da quelli propri delle
telecomunicazioni. Piu` approfonditamente, valuteremo per mezzo di approcci basati sulla teoria dei
giochi sistemi a coda, problemi di jamming, riconoscimento di gruppi nelle reti e il mobile computing.
E’ bene notare che il punto di vista di quanto appena discusso puo` essere invertito. Infatti, discuter-
emo inoltre come sia possibile applicare una classica analisi nell’ambito delle telecomunicazioni per
investigare su problemi che non sono direttamente collegati ad un ambiente delle telecomunicazioni.
In particolare, uno dei nostri futuri obiettivi e` quello di valutare la connettivita` tra le varie aree che
si possono definire nel cervello, tematica che recentemente sta acquistando un significativo interesse
nella societa` scientifica.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recently one of the scientific areas that is raising significant attractiveness in the research community
is the Network Science. Consider the society requiring cooperation between billions of individuals, or
communications infrastructure integrating billions of cell phones with computer and satellites. Con-
sider for example the ability to reason and comprehend our world requiring the coherent activity of
billions of neurons in our brain, or the fact that our biological existence is based on the interactions
between thousands of genes and metabolites within our cells. All these surronding systems are hope-
lessly complicated and are collectively called complex systems, catching the difficulty to derive their
collective behavior from a knowledge of their components. Given the significant role of complex sys-
tems in our daily life, in science and in economy, their understanding, mathematical description and
prediciton, and lastly control are some of the major intellectual and scientific challenges of the 21st
century. Indeed, the network that encodes the interactions between genes, metabolites, and proteins
integrating these elements into live cells, called cellular network, is a prerequisite for our life. The
neural network capturing the connections between neurons holds the key of our understanding of how
the brain works and to our consciousness. The social network, as the sum of all professional, friend-
ship, and family ties, is the fabric of the society determining the spread of knowledge, behavior, and
resources. Communications networks describing the interactions between communication devices are
the heart of the modern communication system. The network of generators and transmission lines,
named power grid, provides energy virtually to all modern technology.
Networks are further at the heart of some of the most innovative technologies of the 21st century,
empowering everything from Google to CISCO, Facebook, and Twitter. Networks dominate science,
technology, nature, and business to a much higher degree than it may be highlighted through a casual
inspection. Therefore, we will not understand complex systems around us if we do not develop a deep
understanding of the networks behind them. Despite the obvious diversity of complex systems, the
evolution and structure of the networks behind each system is driven by a common set of laws and
principles. Consequently, even if form, size, nature, age, and scope of real networks may differ, most
networks are based on common organizing principles and, once we overlooked the components nature
and the precise character of their interactions, the resulting networks are more similar than different
from each other.
The key discovery of Network Science on which this thesis is based is that “the architecture of
networks emerging in various domains of science, nature, and technology are similar to each other, a
consequence of being governed by the same organizing principles. Consequently we can use a common
set of mathematical tools to explore these systems [1].”
Several issues might characterize complex systems and the role of the Network Science is to deal
with them [1]. For example, to fully understand how our cells work and the origin of disease, a
complete list of genes is not enough. Indeed, we further need an accurate map of how genes, proteins,
metabolites and other cellular entities interact with each other. Most cellular processes, from food
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processing to sensing changes in the environment, rely on molecular networks and the breakdown of
these networks is responsible for human diseases. As a consequence, the increasing awareness of the
relevance of molecular networks has led to the development of network biology aiming at understanding
the behavior of cellular networks. A parallel movement, called network medicine, aims to uncover the
role of networks in human disease. Moreover, networks play an important role in drug development.
The ultimate purpose of network pharmacology is to develop drugs that can cure diseases without
significant side effects.
Another example of Network Science application is related to the terrorism, an aﬄiction of our
days requiring significant resources to combat it worldwide. Network thinking is increasingly used in
the arsenal of various law enforcement agencies in charge of responding to terrorism. The aims are to
disrupt the financial network of terrorist organizations and to map adversarial networks, allowing to
uncover the role of their members and their capabilities. In the military doctrine, network concepts,
leading to the so-called network-centric warfare, aim at fighting low intensity conflicts against terrorist
and criminal networks employing decentralized flexible network organization.
A network perspective can be used also dealing with epidemic spread. While the H1N1 pandemic
was not as devastating as it was feared at the beginning of the outbreak in 2009, it has a special
role in the history of epidemics. Indeed, it is the first pandemic whose course and time evolution
was accurately predicted months before the pandemic reached its peak. Understanding the role of
transportation networks in the spread of viruses was the key factor that made its prediction possible. In
general, before 2000 epidemic modeling was dominated by compartment-based models, which assume
that everyone can infect everyone else in the same socio-physical compartment. A fundamental change
has been brought by the emergence of a network-based framework, offering a new level of predictability.
Nowadays, epidemic prediction is one of the most active applications of Network Science.
The human brain, made of hundreds of billions of interlinked neurons, is one of the least understood
networks from the Network Science perspective. Indeed, we are interested in maps telling us which
neurons are linked together. The only fully mapped brain available for research is that of the C.
elegans worm, consisting of only 302 neurons. Detailed maps of mammalian brains could allow the
understanding and curing of numerous neurological and brain diseases. Consequently, brain research
could turn it into one of the most prolific application area of Network Science. In 2010 the National
Institutes of Health in the U.S. has initiated the Connectome project aiming at developing technologies
that could provide accurate neuron-level maps of mammalian brains.
In the Information Communication Technology (ICT) context, the most well known example of
network is the Internet. Its advent in the 70s can be seen as the first building block for the spread and
development of telecommunication networks. Afterwards, in the 80s and 90s further advancements
were made thanks to the revolution in personal communications brought by mobile phone networks.
Nowadays, communication networks pervade every ICT system: the Internet, mobile networks, smart
grids, and smart transportation systems are just some examples. In the next future, we can foresee
further applications involving, for example, network virtualization, distributed assessment, and the
transfer of energy via radio.
Before the emergence of the Internet and other data networks, telecommunication had a clear
meaning: the telephone (and before it the telegraph) was an application of technology that allowed
people to communicate at a distance by voice (and earlier by encoded electronic signals), and telephone
service was provided by the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Nowadays, with the term
telecommunication we refer, in general, to the transmission of signals, messages, sounds and images
or intelligence of any nature by wired, radio, optical, or other electromagnetic systems. Indeed, more
recently, communications at a distance have expanded to include e-mail, instant messaging, Web
browsing, video conferencing, data transport, and several forms of distributed collaboration, allowed
by transmission media that have further expanded from traditional copper wires to include microwave,
terrestrial wireless, hybrid fiber/coaxial cable, satellite, and broadband fiber transport.
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The general exchange of information between communication participiants, either electrically over
physical media, such as cables, or via electromagnetic radiation, involves the use of a technology, and,
usually, we refer to telecommunications, i.e., in its plural form, because it entails many different tech-
nologies. In this context, a telecommunications network can be defined as a collection of transmitters,
receivers, and communcations channels that send or are used to send general messages to one another.
The main goal of the telecommunications is to provide reliable, affordable, fair, widespread devices and
technologies that allow people all around the world to communicate, work together, solve problems,
or just keep in touch. Consequently, several mathematical and engineering methods and models have
been properly designed to address standard issues related to telecommunications aim.
One of the most addressed problems, which we may deal with when considering a transmission
of information content, is errors detection and errors correction. It usually holds that information
contents are divided into several packets in order to allow the different nodes in the network to
share a communication channel in a non-deterministic manner (i.e., packet swithching). In particu-
lar, Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) is an error control technique exploiting feedback information
about faulty reception of some packets to trigger their retransmissions [2, 3]. The most efficient
basic implementation of the ARQ mechanism is the Selective Repeat ARQ (SR ARQ) that specif-
ically retransmitts only those packets who are reported to be in error [12]. Recently, there has
been a renewed interest for ARQ, also including hybrid ARQ techniques, where plain retransmis-
sion schemes are coupled with Forward Error Correction (FEC) [4, 5, 17, 6, 16, 29]. ARQ-based
error control is used in high-quality multimedia applications [7] and included in the evolution of
the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) towards High Speed Packet Access (HSPA)
and the so-called recent Long Term Evolution (LTE) [8].
It is meaningful to investigate on multimedia contents, particularly video, in order to understand
their behavior and analytically characterize their performance since they are expected to be the dom-
inant traffic component over future generation networks. Unfortunately, most of the research on
multimedia transmission just resort to simulation, without strong analytical support for systematic
evaluations. Regarding this, we believe that the reason why multimedia content is difficult to be
characterized in an analytical manner is related to the incremental nature of source coding applied
to such flows. Indeed, video flows are normally obtained through incremental encoders such as those
defined by Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) [9]. As a result, it is worth noting that different
packets have different roles within the video flow and, therefore, the performance of an error correction
scheme, such as ARQ, cannot be simply described as a residual error probability. From a network-
ing standpoint, it matters evaluate whether the missing packets belong to an independently encoded,
rather than an incremental frame [17]. It is further unclear how to apply ARQ-like techniques to such
flows. A counter-argument that is often raised against retransmission-based error control for video is
that it would cause delay to grow, which is not acceptable for real-time content, such as video content.
In such a background, our objective is to propose a mathematical model exploiting discrete-time
Markov chains to represent the SR ARQ retransmission mechanism for multimedia content. This
aspect requires to keep into account interdependences of packets in the source coding [6], and to
further evaluate their impact at the receiver’s side in case a packet is missing, which will also be
differently evaluated depending on the kind of packet. One of the main hurdles for ARQ evaluations
is that classical investigations do not directly apply as the flow consists of different types of packets.
Neverthless, by means of the use of a synthetic description of the inherent structure of the packet group
(i.e., the alternation of independently encoded packets and dependently encoded packets), which we
call macroscopic representation [29], we are able to greatly simplify the system analysis. Furthermore,
another side purpose of this study is to disprove the claim according to which retransmission-based
error control would cause a growing delay for video. Indeed, we show that ARQ can be applied quite
easily if selective retransmissions are carefully chosen.
The telecommunications world is not only limited to ensuring the correct transmission and re-
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ception of any kind of information contents by means of a communication channel. Indeed, another
recent telecommunications aim is to advance and promote significant technology progresses in green
communications and networks including wireline, optical, and wireless communications and networks.
In this setup, green communications and networking means sustainable, energy-efficient, energy-aware,
and environmentally aware communications and networking. Therefore, innovations, new technolo-
gies, new concepts, and new principles toward a sustainable ICT are needed. The major topics
of interest includes (but are not limited to) green wireline, optical, and wireless communications
and networks; network and physical layer design, strategies, algorithms, protocols, and scheduling
that consider environmental factors; energy-efficient and energy-aware heterogeneous networks, self-
organized, and low-power sensor networks; energy efficiency in machine-to-machine communications,
cooperative communications, and smart grid networks; energy harvesting, storage, and recycling for
network cross-layer optimization; environmentally-aware designs of communications and networking
devices and systems; and communications and networking for environmental protection monitoring.
Among these, nowadays electric vehicles (EVs) networks are raising significant interest in the
scientific research community. Indeed, recently alarming pollution levels and increasing world-wide
oil demand are two major circumstances that lead several countries to search for alternate energy
sources and decrease carbon dioxide emissions, especially from car transportation, which makes use
almost exclusively of internal combustion vehicles [33]. In this context, EVs represent a promising
technological choice to decrease pollution and reduce fossil fuel consumption [34]. Neverthless, their
limited autonomy, long recharging times, and scarceness of recharging points pose challenges that
prevent them from being suitable for many car users. Indeed, a phenomenon named range anxiety
may arise: customers are wary of practicality, and, as a matter of fact, EVs market becomes a niche
market [36]. As a consequence, public investments for a better service are discouraged, and this,
in turn, further decreases the attractive aspect of EVs for the average customer. Several practical
solutions are sought to avoid this problem. Above all, it may be thought of enhancing the battery
capacity, reducing the charging time, or increasing the frequency of charging points. In this context,
our aim is to discuss how these aspects can be integrated by a proper Markov model, thereby offering
a neat analytical solution to investigate all these problems.
Another significant aspect of a network is that it might be made up of different entities that refer
to different technologies, referring to a telecommunications context, and which may aim to provide
or require different services with likely different goals. Therefore, keeping the network intelligence
spread throughout the entire network is both a low-cost management solution and the proper way
to involve the increased computational power of communication devices. Consequently, the need
for scalability of modern communication networks has led to the practical establishment of several
distributed management algorithms.
To mathematically characterize this aspect, it might be useful to consider a joint combination of
several different theories that may be not directly related to the standard set of telecommunications
methods and models. Basically, one of the purposes now is related to the further evaluation of classical
telecommunications issues from a more general standpoint. We plan to consider the implementation of
procedures that are far away from the standard procedures used to deal with these problems because
of a different context of application but that work towards the same goal.
As a practical example, it is well known that queueing system theory develops to predict behaviors
of systems subject to randomly arising demands. This was the spirit of the early contributions by
Erlang in 1909 [49], the works by Pollaczek and Khinchine in the 1930s [40], and subsequent studies [50,
51]. Today, queueing theory finds many applications in management of communication networks or air
traffic, planning of manufacturing systems, computer program scheduling, and facility dimensioning.
However, the idea to use a mathematical theory to make predictions on the behavior of multiple
agents is also shared by game theory [72], which is now becoming more and more commonly applied to
telecommunications problems [52]. It will be discussed in the following of this thesis that, differently
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from standard queueing theory, which still adopts a system view, game theory is even more extreme
in considering that individual agents, called players, interact according to their particular interests,
which may be different for every one of them [41].
For this reason, we consider the joint application of both theories to a scenario including multiple
candidate servers, whose objective is to provide some services to their clients that, e.g., can be thought
to be packets arriving at the system for transmission. We refer to this scenario as an uplink case. Each
server represents an option available for the clients and has its own specific success probability of service
completion. In this context, we model this situation as a game, where the servers are the players and
they can decide to be inactive or active; staying active has a fixed local cost for the server, while a
successful task completion is beneficial for the whole system. Clearly, in a system with centralized
supervision, it would be best to only keep active the best server, which means the one with the highest
successful probability. However, this is hindered by two facts: (i) servers act selfishly, as in any game
theory setup; (ii) servers do not even know who the best server is, since they actually do not know
each other’s characteristics. In addition to the uplink scenario, we further consider a downlink case,
where multiple candidate clients require services to some servers. Consequently, we investigate on how
a server can strategically establish to which of the clients is better to offer a service by making some
considerations regarding the system dynamics. Then, the service required, for example, downloading
a specific video, might be shared later by the clients.
To further support the idea that theories spanning different environments can be jointly combined
towards a common goal, we focus on other problems properly related to telecommunications networks
applying a game theoretic point of view. One of these is the so-called jamming problem, a security issue
that can be seen as another application of game theory to wireless networks. Indeed, it describes a
situation where a legitimate transmitting network is contrasted by a malicious attacker whose purpose
is to disrupt communications [54]. This scenario, if properly formulated, might involves just two
agents, i.e., a legitimate network user and the malicious adversary, and, consequently, can be analyzed
in terms of a two-player game. We consider two different setups, such as a general wireless network
and an underwater acoustic sensor network, which differ in the communication channel used by the
proper nodes in the network for communicating [62, 64, 73, 74]. The purpose is to evaluate the effect
of the nodes’ position on the resulting equilibrium conditions and to investigate the dependence of the
equilibria of the game on the actual position of the jammer itself. The game theoretic character comes
into play by representing uncertainty about the position information of the nodes. These evaluations
can be useful in properly determing the countermeasures (if it’s possible) that might be taken against
the malicious jammer in order to limit its effects on the communications.
In terms of network security, further unprecedented challenges are posed by the sudden expanding
of social mobile networking. Also in this context, we might have malicious adversaries that can steal
sensible information and/or disrupt services due to the connection to unprotected wireless hotspots
and the interaction with other nodes in the network [83]. Moreover, nodes are usually unaware of
the purposes of the agents they are interacting with; therefore, legitimate transmitting nodes can be
contrasted by malicious attackers acting, again, with the purpose of disrupting communications. For
this reason, another goal is to use game theory for the identification of malicious nodes. With respect
to previous similar formulations, a wider array of action options for the network’s agents is considered,
notably we include a choice about whether to engage or not in packet exchanging, as well as malicious
activity and its prevention. As a consequence, this leads to a structured analysis of the considered
game, resulting in different equilibrium conditions. More in general, regarding the application of
game theory to jamming problems previously discussed, we considered as the critical parameter the
uncertainty of the agents’ positions in the network, whereas now we focus on the likelihood that the
unknown agent is malicious. Indeed, we consider a scenario in which a legitimate server being unaware
of the nature of its clients has to decide whether to transmit a packet, or monitor the network, or
do nothing. On the other hand, the generic client’s possible set of actions is to correctly forward the
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packet if it’s necessary and if it’s not malicious, or forward it adding errors if it has a malicious nature,
or, finally, just ignore the received packet.
In general, these evaluations based on different critical parameters used to characterize the system
and the objective of the game applied, beyond the design of proper countermeasures against a malicious
node, allow us to see how in some cases the malicious behavior of the nodes are tolerated since a trade-
off between their presence and the effect of damages that they caused are reached.
Strongly related to what has just been discussed, but on a different matter, the problem of rec-
ognizing groups of similar nodes within a mobile social network has been considered. Indeed, as a
general track it can be stated that the nodes of networks, especially social networks, most of the
time can be classified according to either some attributes that they show, or preferences that they
have [96, 116]. These attributes/preferences can be seen, e.g., in terms of friendship relationship with
other nodes as we consider in our investigation. However, due to the fact that it may happen to have
imperfect communication (e.g. because of limited communication range), each node has just a partial
view of the network and it is aware only of its relationships with the immediate neighbors. Depending
on how large the communication range actually is, the problem can be in principle solved by clus-
tering nodes by classifying the friendship relationships. Our analysis shows how a simpler procedure
based on exchange of social information in a collaborative fashion is able to achieve better results
than more expensive clustering algorithms. Even better, these two approaches can be combined by
applying a clustering after the exchange of a given amount of social information, thus improving the
overall results. This approach can be enriched considering the presence in the network of a given
number of malicious nodes, which is the key factor that allows us to link this analysis to the previous
investigations. The intent of these malicious nodes might be, for example, to forward erroneous social
information to a chosen set of nodes in the network in order to compromise the network information
belonging to this set of nodes. With this assumption, it is still possible to evaluate the effects of
transmitting/forwarding malicious information in a network.
In the present thesis, both recent addressed problems and guidelines for future research will be
described and discussed. These guidelines if on one hand aim to continue on the path already traced
by the previous tackled research topics, on the other hand are an effort to start a new research path
where a telecommunications point of view might be used to deal with problems not directly related
to telecommunications networks.
Following the same path of the current research, we propose as one of the future works the inves-
tigation on Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) and Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) by means of game
theory. We will discuss in more detail later at the end of the thesis MCC and MEC [112, 113]. How-
ever, just to give an initial general idea, it is worth saying that in such contexts the mobile device
users that are in the network can decide to oﬄoad the computation of tasks to a remote cloud instead
of the local execution on the device (holding for MCC). They also have the opportunity to oﬄoad the
computation tasks to a server located at the edge of the network named the edge server (holding for
MEC). Keeping in mind that both of them have advantages and disadvantages (e.g, the remote cloud
has more computation capability with respect to the edge server, whereas the edge server is nearest to
the users with respect the remote cloud), our objective is to combine MCC and MEC assuming that
each mobile device user in the network has three different options for a computation task: locally on
the mobile device, computation oﬄoading to the edge server, or computation oﬄoading to the remote
cloud.
The analysis that will be shown is just an initial simple analysis that can be further improved
if we decide to consider in our evaluations the human aspects beyond the device. To do so, more
sophisticated games must be addressed. For this reason, for example, it may be thought to use
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) [114]. In general, EGT is the game theory application to evolving
populations in biology. It defines a framework of contests, strategies, and analytics into which Dar-
winian competition can be modeled. Consequently, it differs from classical game theory because it
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focuses more on the dynamics of strategy change that is influenced by the frequency of the competing
strategies in the population. In this way the dynamics of our system can be better taken into consid-
eration allowing us to model more accurately our system. Moreover, a further combination of game
theory and reinforcement learning in terms of dynamic programming might be conceived in order to
find the best policies using the former and to describe the internal dynamics using the latter.
In order to apply telecommunications techniques in other domains, it is worth reminding that the
concept of network is not only related to an information technology context. As already pointed out,
network studies concern several research fields, from technology to biology. Nowadays, researchers of
different scientific fields focus on relevant open problems, the solution of which is to be sought in the
holistic behavior of networks. Some questions must be considered: how can the interactions between
malfunctioning nodes in a complex generic network result in cancer?, how and why do we see such
a quick spread in some social systems and communication systems, for example involving epidemic
diseases or viruses in computer?, how can some networks work even when most of the nodes are
corrupted?. These problems can involve the comparison between networks of different nature that
have, however, similar structure and organization.
Since the first studies on graph theory integrated with stochastic models, scientists have referred to
complex networks as graphs with non trivial characteristics and with some connection schemes between
the components that are neither purely regular nor completely random [130, 131]. The comparison
between these first studies has led to the surprising discover that many networks, starting from the
World Wide Web to the metabolic system in the cell or the collaboration degree between actors in
Hollywood, are dominated by a small number of nodes, called hubs, that are connected to many other
areas of the same network. In this way, scale-free networks and the small world property have been
proposed. In the last few years, researchers have studied and described the bio-inspired networking
[132], where architectural solutions based on the evolution of living being networks are used to find
solutions suitable for complex networks even related to research fields different from biology.
In the light of this scientific evolution, we suggest a twofold objective: on one hand, to thoroughly
investigate models for these particular networks to understand their structure and evaluate their
performance in terms of communication networks; on the other hand, to consider the application of
techniques typically related to communication networks in order to optimize complex systems, with
particular reference to neural systems. This joint study may be useful to yield scientific contributions
in both fields, in an interdisciplinary fashion. In general, in the literature there are several examples
of analysis of the cells network structure in the living beings in terms of complex network [133]. The
interaction of these cells, in addition to their behaviors, is also investigated. Some other works focused
on the study of the several malfunctioning that can affect the neural network. Indeed, in the last
years there has been an exponential increase in human neuroscientific research. This is due to the
extensive availability of non-invasive techniques for measuring brain activity and structure, such as
neuroimaging and neurophysiological recordings, producing large datasets of spatio-temporal data.
Moreover, it is generally accepted that the brain can likely be modeled as a complex network and, in
the literature, there can be found several description of the relationship between the brain system and
a complex network.
Recently, one of the areas that is raising significant interest is that of brain connectivity; one
of the goals of connectivity analysis is to make the most of the rich datasets that neuroscientists
collect by evaluating the spatio-temporal dynamics in the data [134]. In particular, we will focus on
the investigation of functional and effective connectivity in the brain. The former is the temporal
correlation in the activity of two brain regions, regardless of whether they have direct anatomic links
or not, the latter describes directed causal influences one brain area produces in another. The common
denominator to the different types of brain connectivity is the fact that, in all instances, the system
can be characterized and described as a network and in this way brain properties can be examined
under formal mathematical network theories. As a final consideration, complex network analysis has
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emerged as an important tool to characterize brain connectivity and, since a description that consider
every single components of a system is not suitable for complex systems, a holistic standpoint must
be used in studying these aspects of the brain.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 some classical issues related to the
telecommunications are addressed using standard models properly linked to the telecommunications
context; in Chapter 3 we will show how a theory born in economic environment, i.e., game theory, can
be used to deal with telecommunications problems; future research interests are discussed in Chapter
4; and, finally, some concluding remarks can be found in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Classical telecommunications models
and methods applied to
telecommunications network issues
In this Chapter we deal with some known issues related to video traffic transmissions and management
of EVs networks. Our purpose is to investigate on these topics via Markov model approach in order
to evaluate how some parameters describing the system setup might affect the network performance.
In particular, we show how a hybrid SR ARQ scheme with unequal error protection can be applied to
the transmission of video flows over the wireless channel to address the problems of different packet
encoded techniques without interfering with the proper real-time aspect of multimedia contents. We
further investigate on a environment made up of EVs for assessing and possibly improving their
performance, with particular reference to the evaluation of their autonomy and the resulting range
anxiety worrying the customers.
2.1 A Markov Analysis of Automatic Repeat Request for Video
Traffic Transmission
According to several recent investigations, video traffic is steadily growing.1 The annual Cisco report
forecasts a huge increase due to the massive use of tablets and similar devices [10]. By 2019, nearly a
million minutes of video content will cross the network, accounting for 80% of global traffic.
In this scenario, transmission paradigms to avoid network congestion and convey data correctly
and efficiently become essential. We focus on error control techniques, which are exploited to attain
the reliable data delivery. Usually, FEC is employed, but some contributions argued that ARQ is
better, or useful as well [29].
If the data flow is packet-switched, both FEC and ARQ introduce redundancy in the individual
packets, but for different purposes. FEC uses error correcting codes to recover the original data
without any further interaction with the transmitter. On the other hand, ARQ uses codes for error
detection: if the received packets are corrupted, the receiver asks for their retransmission. This means
that a bidirectional interaction happens between the sender and the receiver, where the latter replies
to each packet, at least from a conceptual point of view, with positive or negative acknowledgments,
denoted as ACKs or NACKs, respectively, depending on the absence or presence of residual errors in
the packet. We focus on a SR ARQ approach [12]. Consequently, whenever the transmitter receives
a NACK, it selectively retransmits the erroneous packet only, i.e., the one that caused the NACK.
1This section is taken from “Markov Analysis of Video Transmission based on Differential Encoded HARQ” published
in IEEE WoWMoM.
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A combined solution for error control is Hybrid ARQ (HARQ), which combines FEC and ARQ.
In this case, redundancy is introduced in the packets with a twofold purpose. First of all, the receiver
checks data integrity and tries to recover corrupted data, according to FEC scheme. In case the number
of errors is higher than the correction capability of the code, but not of its detection capability, the
receiver sends a retransmission request to the transmitter as per the ARQ [13]. In the following
investigation we concentrate on this approach, which has been shown to contain the delay introduced
by a basic ARQ scheme.
It is well known that video contents usually impose strict constraints on transmission time and
may need a non-homogeneous error control, due to the presence of packets with different relevance
in the video flow. Hybrid schemes are particularly suitable for dealing with such requirements. We
consider a video flow made up by packets of different kinds and we assume that the error control
mechanism distinguishes among them applying a hybrid SR ARQ scheme.
The procedure used to encode video packets belonging to the same flow involves their different
nature [14]. We classify them having in mind the MPEG standard, or any similar technique. According
to this, MPEG leverages temporal redundancy between subsequent frames by introducing three types
of frames: I (Intra), P (Predicted), and B (Bidirectionally predicted) [15]. For each of them, a distinct
compression strategy is used. An I-type frame is processed using Intra-frame techniques, which means
by considering the frame as a stand-alone unit and by simply removing the spatial redundancy (similar
to what done for a JPEG picture). P-type and B-type frames are compressed through Inter-frame
techniques, i.e., by considering predictions with respect to temporally preceding and/or subsequent
frames. Both spatial and temporal redundancy are removed. As a consequence, a video sequence is
divided into smaller subsets, each of which is called a Groups of Pictures (GoP), where the three types
of frames alternate based on a specific pattern.
We model a multimedia flow as a sequence of packets that are sent from a source to a destination.
We distinguish between A-packets, that, similar to I-frames of MPEG standard, are autonomous and
are encoded independently from the others, and B -packets, that, like P- and B-frames, are encoded
incrementally based on an A-packet. One independent A-packet and several B -packets incrementally
encoded from it are bundled together in a packet-group. Our analysis, as well as the terminology, are
directly inspired by [16, 17], even though the investigation of those papers is different. Similar ap-
proaches have been used also by [18, 29]. This two-level approach, which considers packet dependence
limited within a packet-group, allows for a tractable analysis, while still accounting for the system
memory introduced by packet interdependencies. However, the ARQ scheme introduces other memory
effects due to retransmissions. Furthermore, since a successful detection of an A-packet is needed to
correctly decode a B -packet, the hybrid SR ARQ scheme ought to keep this difference into account.
In this context, we propose a mathematical model for the analysis of a hybrid SR ARQ scheme
applied to the transmission of video content over a wireless channel. A Markov chain, whose main
parameters are the average error burst length and the steady-state error probability, is used to model
the channel. We describe a finite-state machine tracking the transmission state of packets for which
the transmitter is still waiting for the related ACK/NACK (i.e., the pending packets). On the contrary
from previous contributions, our finite-state machine is analytically tractable even for systems with
relatively large memory, that is with long round-trip time and large size of the packet-group, within
the limits of a Markov analysis. Moreover, we propose a macroscopic Markov chain to model the
whole video transmission system with the aim of quantifying some indicative performance metrics,
namely throughput, average number of transmissions, and packet discarding probability, via Markov
analysis. We pinpoint the effect of the channel parameters on video quality and we extract some
useful considerations about the implementation of the HARQ scheme in real scenarios. Our analysis
is orthogonal to the presence of dynamic adaptations to channel and source conditions at the physical
layer. The model can be extended to also include rate optimization and adaptive modulation and
coding techniques exploiting the knowledge of the system state to further enhance video transmission
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in a cross-layer context [19].
In the literature, several papers treat the analysis of error control techniques for wireless connec-
tions through mathematical models of the whole transmission system. Based on these models, it is
possible to evaluate some performance metrics, such as throughput and delay.
The papers most directly related to our contribution are [29], [16], and [20]. Indeed, in all these
papers HARQ for video transmission with selective retransmission and unequal error protection is
considered, proving that retransmission-based techniques can be jointly used with pure FEC to improve
the transmission. The proposed unequal error protection technique, that consists of retransmitting
only the independently encoded packets and discarding the incremental ones, was first introduced in
[16], and it is the same considered here. However, the present work is different from all these previous
contributions. For example, [16] does not consider any analytical modeling of the Markov chain.
Subsequently, [29] gives a full Markov model but for complexity reasons the round-trip time is limited
to two packets. Finally, [20] extends this analysis to longer packet-groups, but internal limitations of
the model still limit the maximum number of retransmissions and/or packet interdependencies. To
the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the first to relax all these constraints and give a general
evaluation where the only limit is the computational complexity of the resulting Markov chain.
Other papers are significant to our investigations, since they also focus on an ARQ mechanism
applied to video transmission, which poses two challenges: (i) how to introduce retransmission while
at the same time still meeting the delay constraints of a real time application such as video; (ii) how
to differentiate among packets, since multimedia packets have different roles within the video flow.
For example, in [21], the authors try to reduce the delay and buffer size needed by the ARQ
approach by using a Multi-ARQ scheme and a rescheduling technique for transmitting video streams
over wireless channels. A video stream is divided into three sensitivity classes and the unequal error
protection is applyed to them, using ARQ-schemes with higher reliability for higher sensitive portions
of video data. In particular, SR ARQ is adopted for high sensitive video data, while no ARQ scheme
is applied to low sensitive video data. Therefore, a differentiation mechanism is applied to reduce
delay, but this refers to the flow as a whole.
In addition to this, in [22] a prioritized ARQ scheme enhancing the error robustness of streaming
video is defined. The proposed priority based retransmission scheme is adopted with packet importance
information. The estimation of the error propagation effect caused by the loss of a packet determines
the level of packet importance. Lost packets with higher impact values can be retransmitted, while
regular packets of less importance can be discarded to make room for retransmissions. A two-state
Markov model analogous to ours is used to generate the channel packet loss patterns. However, the
importance level is specified individually for each packet, while we consider multiple levels depending
on the structure of the packet-group. A similar priority model for the packets also appear in [23],
where the highest priorities are given to the packets whose loss has stronger effect in the perceived
video quality.
[24] proposes an alternative model where ARQ is better matched with delay constraints typical of
video content by setting a retransmission limit that may force to drop some packet if it is expected
that they will not meet a pre-defined real-time deadline. In this case, the prioritization of packets is
purely based on delay aspects, not on their video characteristics.
Our proposal can also be related to the context of unequal error protection for video. About
that, the authors of [25] proposed a more detailed unequal error protection scheme than ours. They
considered the impact of error propagation on the video quality, that is a very important issue [18].
However, our model, based on a two-level abstraction, does not allow to explore this issue in more
depth. An analogous proposal, involving also a more comprehensive cross-layer optimization, is sug-
gested by [26]. Neverthless, these proposals are limited to FEC, without any discussion on whether
this can be iteratively modified through ARQ. For this reason, we believe that our proposal can be
seen (in addition to theirs) as a complementing extension of their unequal error protection schemes.
19
Other related papers suggest possible expansions in line with our work at the network [27] and
transport layer [93]. They basically identify a possible development of hybrid ARQ in the application
of network coding, and also envisione a streaming control mechanism where ARQ is actually selectively
applied but controlling, and possibly choking, the stream if delay constraints risk not to be met. Our
proposed scheme can be superimposed to improve the performance of these scenarios as well.
The rest of this Section is organized as follows. In Sub-section 2.1.1, we illustrate the HARQ
transmission model and we specify the considered assumptions. Sub-section 2.1.2 presents the macro-
scopic HARQ system description and its evaluation as a result of Markov analysis. Sub-section 2.1.3
discusses some numerical results; finally, Sub-section 2.1.4 draws some conclusions.
2.1.1 Assumption and model of ARQ transmission
The analyzed system consists of a transmitter and a receiver. The transmitter sends a multimedia
flow to the receiver through the wireless channel, which is modeled as a noisy and correlated channel
with known statistics. The flow is subdivided into packets, each of them representing an encoded
information unit. As it is generally the case in ARQ analysis, we assume that the Heavy Traffic
condition holds, i.e., the transmitter’s queue is always backlogged and, thus, there are always packets
to transmit.
The system adopts a hybrid SR ARQ technique with unequal error protection. Therefore, the
receiver checks packets integrity upon reception. Whenever errors are detected, it tries to reconstruct
the original data by exploiting the redundancy of channel coding in a FEC-like fashion. The transmit-
ter is then informed about correct or incorrect packet reception through selective acknowledgments
sent on a feedback channel. The feedback channel is assumed not to be instantaneous and error-free,
which is reasonable due to the short length of ACK/NACK messages. In the literature, there are
examples of investigation about the consequences of errors affecting feedback messages [30]. The main
conclusion is that the impact of errors roughly consists in a re-scaling of the error probability on the
forward channel.
We consider two different types of packets, denoted as A and B. A-packets are independently
encoded, meaning that they are stand-alone data units that can be decoded without requiring that
any other packet is decoded first. Conversely, a B -packet is incrementally encoded from a single A-
packet; thus, to be decoded, its correct reception is not sufficient, as the generating A-packet must
be correctly received as well. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that A- and B -packets have
the same length2 and that, for each A-packet, the number of B -packets incrementally encoded from
it is `, ` ∈ N, ` ≥ 1. An (`+1)-element set consisting of an A-packet and its corresponding B -packets
is referred to as a packet-group. B -packets are transmitted after the corresponding A-packet. As a
consequence, A-packets and B -packets alternate within the data flow according to a precise pattern,
which consists of an A-packet followed by ` B -packets. Apart from that, there is no dependence
between B -packets. These assumptions are not restrictive, as the analysis could still be performed
considering more interdependences among packets, only with more involuted math. Moreover, note
that the packet-group can be considered as the analogous of a GoP in MPEG.
We assume that time is slotted and a slot is equal to the time needed to transmit a packet of
either type. When a packet is transmitted, the corresponding acknowledgment arrives after a number
m of slots equal to the round-trip time, which coincides with the ARQ window. This implies that, at
any time instant, the number of pending packets does not exceed m. Without loss of generality, we
consider m = M(`+ 1) + 1, with M ∈ N,M ≥ 1. If the round-trip time is not an integer multiple of
the time slot, M may still be chosen such that m is the smallest integer higher than the round-trip
time.
2In reality, the lengths of these packets are not explicitly considered in the model. As long as the channel quality
stays approximately constant throughout each packet transmission, considering different packet lengths just complicates
the model without adding any significant insight. See [29] for a detailed discussion on this point.
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Figure 2.1: Markov representation of the channel (channel chain).
The unequal error protection requires that the A-packets for which the transmitter receives a
NACK are retransmitted; erroneous B -packets are instead discarded. There are essentially two moti-
vations for differentiating between A- and B -packets. First, A-packets are more important; indeed, to
correctly decode B -packets it is necessary to successfully decode their corresponding A-packet. Sec-
ond, the retransmission of all types of packets may lead to queue instability and long delays. Provided
that retransmissions can be triggered for A-packets only, just a fraction of 1`+1 packets may undergo
retransmissions and a system in which no additional delay increase occurs can be designed.
To avoid delay increases, we assume that retransmissions of A-packets are prioritized, replacing
transmissions of B -packets in some following packet-group [16]. Moreover, A-packets can be retrans-
mitted at most r times. We assume that the maximum number of transmissions r of a given A-packet
satisfies r ≤ ` + 1. A packet-group always starts with a new A-packet, dubbed a “fresh” A-packet.
If a fresh A-packet α1 transmitted at slot k is followed by ` B -packets and is in error, then the
packet-group transmitted at time slot k +M(`+ 1) through k + (M + 1)(`+ 1)− 1 will contain two
A-packets. A fresh A-packet, α2, in slot k+M(`+ 1), i.e., in head position, and the second A-packet,
α1 at its first retransmission, in slot k + M(` + 1) + 1, in place of the first B -packet incrementally
encoded from α2. If α1 results in error again, its second retransmission replaces the second B -packet
in the packet-group transmitted at slot k + 2M(` + 1) through k + (2M + 1)(` + 1) − 1, and so on.
It follows that an A-packet at its nth retransmission is transmitted in place of the nth B -packet of a
packet-group, exactly m slots after the beginning of its last transmission. The number of transmissions
already performed by an A-packet can be recognized as its position within a packet-group. In fact, a
fresh A-packet occupies the head position. If retransmitted, it shifts one position to the right, moving
to the second position. If retransmitted again, it shifts to the third, and so on. This means that when
a retransmitted A-packet reaches the end position of a packet-group it can no longer be retransmitted
and is discarded if in error. B -packets fill the empty slots not used for retransmissions. In particular,
for each fresh A-packet, at least `− r + 1 B -packets are transmitted.
To determine the outcome of packet transmissions, we model the channel state evolution through
a discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC). This DTMC, referred to as channel chain, has two states:
state 0, representing the error-free channel, and state 1, representing an erroneous channel. The
channel DTMC is depicted in Fig. 2.1. This is a model similar to the Gilbert Elliot model, however,
in our model a transmission performed when the channel is in state 0 or 1 is always successful or
always erroneous, respectively [31]. The channel state is constant within each time slot, and makes
transitions from a slot to the next according to the one-step transition probability matrix P, which
completely characterizes the channel chain. P = {pij}, i, j ∈ {0, 1}, where pij is the probability of
going from state i to state j in a single step,
P =
(
p00 p01
p10 p11
)
. (2.1)
Also note that transitions to K slots ahead are governed by the K-step transition probability matrix
PK .
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Matrix P can be used to infer information about the average number of consecutive erroneous
slots, which we refer to as the burstiness B, and the packet error probability at steady-state, which
we denote as ε. The burstiness quantifies the channel correlation and its value is B = 1p10 . The
steady-state packet error probability is ε = p01p10+p01 .
Even though the model seems simple, it allows to investigate the impacts of both the average error
rate ε and the channel correlation, related to the burstiness B.
2.1.2 Macroscopic HARQ system description and performance metrics
Since the considered HARQ scheme uses selective retransmissions based on packet type and the channel
has a non-zero round-trip time, our analysis requires to track previously transmitted packets. Indeed,
in order to determine which packet should be transmitted at a generic slot k, it is necessary to know
which type of packets have been transmitted at slot k − m (i.e., the slot in which the packet was
transmitted, whose acknowledgment is received at the beginning of slot k) through slot k − 1. The
reception of an ACK or NACK at the beginning of slot k then triggers the transmission of a new packet
(A or B) or the retransmission of an already transmitted A-packet. Correspondingly, the model of the
whole transmission system needs to memorize the types of pending packets, i.e. those for which the
transmitter has not received the feedback message yet, and the channel state during their transmission
[12].
As a first step, we define a finite-state machine that models the possible pending packets config-
urations, i.e. the possible sequences of A-packets and B -packets that at a given time slot k could
be pending. Transitions occur at each time slot, leading to a new pending packet configuration that
depends on ACK or NACK reception, with the ACK or NACK corresponding to the oldest pending
packet at time slot k (i.e., that sent in slot k −m + 1). We refer to the machine states as machine
stages and we indicate the number of machine stages as L. Each machine stage stands for a possi-
ble pending packets configuration and is denoted by a vector σ = [σ0 σ1 . . . σm−1] of length m, with
σj ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}, 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1. Considering that at time slot k the finite-state machine is in stage
σ(k), we have that each σj(k), for 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, identifies the type of packet transmitted at slot
k−m+1+ j and the number of transmissions that this packet has already undergone. More precisely,
σj(k) = 0 if the packet transmitted in slot k −m+ 1 + j is a B -packet; σj(k) = n, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} if
the packet transmitted in slot k−m+ 1 + j is an A-packet at its nth transmission. Note that the last
element, σm−1(k), refers to the packet transmitted at slot k, while the first element, σ0(k), refers to
the packet transmitted at slot k−m+1, for which the transmitter receives the corresponding feedback
at the end of slot k.
The number of machine stages, which influences the overall system complexity, can be obtained by
considering that for any choice of the parameters `, r, M , and thus m = M(`+ 1) + 1, the finite-state
machine would pass through `+ 1 different machine stages only, provided that the channel was error-
free. To see it, consider a pending packets configuration that contains fresh A-packets only and where
the packet in head position is of type A. We indicate such configuration as C. Since no retransmitted
A-packet is present, the number of B -packets associated to each A-packet is `. Therefore, the vector
representation of C contains M consecutive sequences [1 0 . . . 0] with ` zeros, the last one followed by
value 1. Now, suppose that the channel is error-free. This implies that no NACK is received and that
the finite-state machine indefinitely transits over the same cycle of `+1 stages. The first one coincides
with C. The following ones can be obtained orderly by shifting one position to the left the values in
the vector representation of the preceding stage, removing the first element and adding a 0 in last
position. Since the number of shifts to the left that can be applied to the vector representation of C
before returning to C itself is `+ 1, this is also the number of machine stages in the considered cycle,
which we refer to as ideal cycle, since the channel is assumed to be error-free.
From the ideal cycle, we can derive the total number of stages of the finite-state machine for all
pending packet configurations. The idea is to sum the number of stages of the idle cycle and the
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Figure 2.2: Graphical display of the finite-state machine of pending packets configurations; ` = 3,
r = 2, M = 1, m = M(`+ 1) + 1 = 5, L = 10.
number of stages that the machine may pass through when the channel resulted to be erroneous in
at least one pending packet transmission (and thus, the assumption of error-free channel is removed).
The stages in this last set have an associated vector representation where the 1s are the same in
number and position as those on one of the stages of the idle cycle, while some 0 element is replaced
by a value x ∈ {2, . . . , r}, due to retransmissions of A-packets.
Consider for example the simplest case r = `+ 1 e M = 1. The number of machine stages with a
vector representation where 1s are placed as in C are 2`, including C. The number of machine stages
with a vector representation where 1s are placed as in the stages following C in the ideal cycle is 2`+1
for each stage, including the stage of the ideal cycle. Thus, the total number of machine stages in this
simple case is given by L = 2` + `(2`+1).
The same rationale, i.e. the definition of the idle cycle and the determination of stages affine
to the stages of the idle cycle, can be applied to compute the total number of stages of a generic
finite-state machine with arbitrary parameters. The following expression holds L = [(r − 1)2r + (`−
r + 2)2r−1](2r−1)M−1 = (r + `)2M(r−1).
Fig. 2.2 shows an example of finite-state machine considering ` = 3, r = 2, M = 1, m = M(` +
1) + 1 = 5, L = 10. In Fig. 2.2, green arrows identify the transitions that occur when the transmitter
receives an ACK for an A-packet; red arrows describe the transitions that occur when the transmitter
receives a NACK for an A-packet that has not yet reached the maximum number r of transmissions.
Black arrows represent transitions that occur when an ACK/NACK is received for a B -packet or when
an ACK/NACK is received for an A-packet that has already been transmitted the maximum number
of times, i.e., 2 times in the considered example. These last ones are forced transitions.
Given the channel DTMC and the finite-state machine of pending packets configurations, we
develop a macroscopic DTMC that models that entire transmission system and which we refer to as
HARQ chain, analogously to [16][20]. The HARQ chain allows for the computation of the system
steady-state probabilities which, in turn, are employed to compute three networking performance
metrics, namely throughput, average number of transmissions to correctly deliver an A-packet, and
A-packet dropping probability.
At each time slot k, the HARQ chain’s state is described by a vector S(k) = [σ(k) b0(k) . . . bm−2(k)
c(k)] subdivided into three different parts, each of which carries a specific information. σ(k) is the
finite-state machine stage, as discussed previously. b(k) = [b0(k) . . . bm−2(k)] describes the channel
states from slot k−m+1 through k−1. In particular, bj(k) = 0 if the channel at slot k−m+1+j was
error-free, and thus the packet transmitted at that slot was correctly received; bj(k) = 1 if the channel
23
at slot k − m + 1 + j was erroneous, and thus the packet transmitted at that slot was erroneously
received. c ∈ {0, 1} indicates the channel state at slot k. The number of HARQ chain’s states, N ,
can be obtained as N = L · 2m−1 · 2, where L is the number of machine stages of the finite-state
machine. The value of N also reflects in the computational complexity of our model. As we will show
later, we require the computation of steady-state probabilities, obtained by solving a linear system
associated with a N × N matrix. This matrix is sparse and, as a consequence, we can compute the
solution efficiently by using procedures whose (both space and time) complexity is O(N). Moreover,
N depends exponentially on m; however, it is possible to approximate this exponential dependence
with a linear one, thereby decreasing the computational complexity, following the approach of [32].
At time slot k, σ(k + 1) is univocally determined by σ(k) and the value of b0(k), which indicates
whether the oldest pending packet at time slot k has been correctly received or, instead, needs to
be retransmitted. Indeed, when σ(k) represents a set of pending packets with an A-packet in its
head position and b0(k) = 1, the A-packet retransmission is scheduled at time slot k + 1, provided
that this A-packet has not reached the maximum number r of allowed transmissions. The elements
bj(k + 1), 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 3, depend on the values of elements bj(k), 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 2, and on the value of
c(k). Finally, the value of c(k + 1) depends on the value of c(k), according to the channel transition
probability matrix P.
The transition matrix T of the HARQ chain can be defined by observing that, given state S(k) =
[σ b0 . . . bm−2 c] (where we omit the dependance on k in the right-hand side of the equality for notation
simplicity), the only admitted transitions towards a future state S(k + 1) include
• S(k + 1) = [σc b1 . . . bm−2 c 0] with probability pc0
• S(k + 1) = [σc b1 . . . bm−2 c 1] with probability pc1
• S(k + 1) = [σe b1 . . . bm−2 c 0] with probability pc0
• S(k + 1) = [σe b1 . . . bm−2 c 1] with probability pc1
where σc and σe represent the pending packets configurations at time slot k + 1 when the received
feedback at the end of slot k is an ACK or NACK, respectively. Equivalently, they represent the
pending packets configurations at time slot k + 1 when b0(k) = 0 and b0(k) = 1, respectively. Table
2.1 shows σc and σe for each possible σ, considering ` = 4, r = 3, M = 1, m = M(` + 1) + 1 = 6,
L = 28.
The HARQ chain is irreducible (there is a connection between each state) and each state is recurring
(the probability that the system comes back to a state is 1 for each state). As a consequence, we can
evaluate the steady-state probabilities pi = [pi0 pi1 . . . piN−1]T , i.e. the probabilities that the system
is in a certain state at time slot k, for large k. We solve the system Tpi = pi, under the constraint
that elements in pi sum to 1. We use pi to determine the performance metrics, as explained in the
following.
With respect to throughput, i.e., the amount of data correctly delivered in unit time, positive con-
tributions are given by correct transmissions of A-packets and B -packets for which the corresponding
A-packet has been correctly delivered. To quantify such contributions, we need to inspect the HARQ
chain’s states. If σ0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} and b0 = 0, then the HARQ chain’s state corresponds to a successful
reception of an A-packet. Therefore, the throughput includes the sum of the steady-state probabilities
associated to the HARQ chain’s states in which σ0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} and b0 = 0. If σ0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} and
b0 = 1, then the HARQ chain’s state corresponds to a failed reception of an A-packet. In this case, if
σ0 = r, then the contribution to the throughput is zero; if σ0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1}, then further consid-
erations need to be made, as it will be explained in the next paragraph. If σ0 = 0 and b0 = 1, then
the HARQ chain’s state corresponds to a failed reception of a B -packet and the throughput remains
unchanged. If σ0 = 0 and b0 = 0, then the HARQ chain’s state corresponds to a correct reception
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Table 2.1: Table of the σ-transitions for ` = 4, r = 3, M = 1, m = M(`+ 1) + 1 = 6, L = 28.
σ Configuration σc σe
0 100001 1 5
1 000010 2 2
2 000100 3 3
3 001000 4 4
4 010000 0 0
5 000012 6 6
6 000120 7 7
7 001200 8 8
8 012000 9 9
9 120001 10 11
10 200010 2 12
11 200012 6 15
12 000103 13 13
13 001030 14 14
14 010300 18 18
15 000123 16 16
16 001230 17 17
17 012300 19 19
18 103001 22 23
19 123001 20 25
20 230010 21 26
21 300100 3 3
22 030010 21 21
23 030012 24 24
24 300120 7 7
25 230012 24 27
26 300103 13 13
27 300123 16 16
of a B -packet, which contributes to throughput on condition that the corresponding A-packet has
successfully reached the destination.
In the following, we consider a system with parameters ` = 4, r = 3, M = 1, m = M(`+1)+1 = 6
and we illustrate some examples of computations for throughput contributions. Consider σ = 000010.
The first packet of this configuration is of type B. The HARQ’s chain states with such σ and b0 = 1
do not contribute to throughput.
If σ = 000010 and b0 = 0, then we need to consider the transmission outcome of the A packet
from which the B packet has been incrementally encoded. By observing σ, we can deduce that an
ACK has been sent for that A-packet. If this was not the case, the pending packets configuration
would have been σ = 000012. Therefore, the steady-state probabilities of the HARQ chain’s states
with σ = 000010 and b0 = 0 are added to the throughput.
Consider now σ = 000012. The A-packet from which the B -packet in head position has been
incrementally encoded is at its second transmission. If b0 = 0 and c = 0 (i.e., the transmission of the
A-packet is successful), then these states give a positive contribution to throughput. If c = 1, further
reasonings are needed; the A-packet is transmitted for the third (and last, since we are assuming
r = 3) time after 6 time slots starting from the current time slot, k. Therefore, if c(k + 6) = 1, there
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is no throughput contribution. Otherwise, if c(k + 6) = 0, there is a positive contribution that can
be obtained, for every state with σ = 000012, b0 = 0, and c = 1, by multiplying the steady-state
probability of such states by P6(1, 0) (i.e., the entry at row 1 and column 0 in P6).
Finally, consider σ = 000120. Similar observations hold. However, in this case the transmission
outcome of the A-packet is described by b4. Therefore, if b0 = 0 and b4 = 0, the contribution is
positive, independently of c. Whereas, if b0 = 0 and b4 = 1, the contribution is positive if and only
if the transmission of the A-packet after 5 time-slots from the current one is successful. In this case,
the contribution is computed by summing the stationary probabilities associated to the states with
b0 = 0, b4 = 1, and c = 1 multiplied by P
5(1, 0) and those associated to the states with b0 = 0, b4 = 1,
and c = 0 multiplied by P5(0, 0).
Another relevant metric is the average number of transmissions, which is however interesting
only for A-packets, because B -packets are always transmitted just once. We define the conditional
probabilities pi(n|A), n = 1, . . . , r, as the probabilities that the system is observed when an A-packet
is at its nth transmission. Such probabilities are evaluated as the ratio between the sum of the steady-
state probabilities of the HARQ chain’s states with σ such that σ0 = n and the sum of the steady-state
probabilities of the HARQ chain’s states with σ such that σ0 ∈ {1, . . . , r}. For the following numerical
choices of the parameters ` = 4, r = 3, M = 1, m = M(` + 1) + 1 = 6, for example, the conditional
probabilities can be expressed as, see [20]:
pi(1|A) = p1 + p2 + p3
p1 + 2p2 + 3p3
pi(2|A) = p2 + p3
p1 + 2p2 + 3p3
pi(3|A) = p3
p1 + 2p2 + 3p3
(2.2)
where p1, p2, and p3 are the probabilities that an A-packet is transmitted exactly one, two, three
times, respectively. By solving the above system of equations 2.2, the average number of transmissions
of A-packets can be derived as p1 + 2p2 + 3p3. Analogous computations can be done for a system with
different parameters.
Finally, when an A-packet reaches its rth transmission and is still in error, it is dropped. The
probability of dropping an A-packet, denoted as Pdrop,A, is computed as the sum of the steady-state
probabilities of the HARQ chain states with a pending packets configuration corresponding to an
A-packet at its last transmission and with the channel state equal to 1 during this transmission.
Thus,
Pdrop,A =
N−1∑
i=0
χ(σi,0 = r & bi,0 = 1)pii (2.3)
where χ(·) is an indicator function, taking value is 1 if the inner condition is true and 0 otherwise;
σi,0 and bi,0 are the head elements of σ and b, respectively, in the ith HARQ chain’s state.
2.1.3 Numerical results
We consider a system with exemplifying parameters. Our aim is to evaluate a setup sufficiently
complex to give a detailed description of the HARQ operations and performance, but, at the same
time, tractable enough to be solved easily, without involving high computational power. This setup
can be modified to different cases of interest. In particular, it can be tuned to mimic real traffic traces;
as illustrated in [29], using real traffic traces for the evaluations only involves a careful choice of the
parameters’ values. In light of this, we analyze a system where the number of B -packets incrementally
encoded from an A-packet is ` = 4, the maximum number of transmissions for A-packets is r = 3, the
packet group length is `+ 1 = 5 packets, the round-trip time is equal to m = M(`+ 1) + 1 = 6 time
slots, and M = 1. It follows that the number of pending packets configurations is L = 28 and that
the number of HARQ chain states is N = 28 · 25 · 2 = 1792.
As a first set of results, we show how metrics vary depending on the steady-state error probability
ε for different values of the burstiness B; then, similarly, we show how metrics vary depending on B
for many values of ε.
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Figure 2.3: Throughput vs. ε for various values of B.
We consider ε varying from 0.01 to 0.4. As for the burstiness B, i.e., the average number of
consecutive erroneous time slots, we consider the values 5, 10, 30, and also we consider the special
case where B = 11−ε , which is referred to as the i.i.d. case, since in this case the channel is just
a binary memoryless symmetric channel with identical error probability ε regardless of the state of
the system. The aim is to highlight the differences between performance in case of error bursts with
length comparable with the length of a packet group (B = 5, 10), in case of error bursts significantly
longer than packet groups (B = 30), and in the i.i.d. case, i.e., the case of independent and identically
distributed errors.
In Fig. 2.3, each curve represents the throughput for variable ε and fixed B. We can notice that
the throughput decreases as ε increases. Indeed, the increase in packet error probability causes the
reduction of packets correctly delivered to the receiver and, correspondingly, a throughput decrease.
It is worth observing, temporarily neglecting the i.i.d. case, that for fixed ε, the throughput increases
as B increases. In fact, the channel correlation causes the temporal axis to be roughly subdivided
into blocks, each of which can be considered correct or incorrect. Erroneous blocks, i.e., the ones
where the channel is bad, do not bring any contribution to the throughput; correct blocks, i.e., the
ones where the channel is good, determine the successful deliver of a sequence of packets, giving a
relevant contribution. In the i.i.d. case, it results that the throughput is higher than that obtained
with a correlated channel for small values of ε. However, if ε increases, the performance over correlated
channel becomes better than over i.i.d. channels. In Fig. 2.4 we underline these last considerations
by reporting the ratio between the actual throughput and the value 1 − ε, which is the throughput
in the i.i.d. case without distinction between A- and B -packets and without limits on transmissions.
We conclude that the channel correlation does not necessarily imply a degradation of the system
performance. Conversely, the throughput is higher than the i.i.d. case if the channel error probability
at steady-state is not too small.
In Fig. 2.5 we show the average number of transmissions of an A-packet for varying ε and fixed B.
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Figure 2.4: Throughput compared to the i.i.d. case vs. ε for various values of B.
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Figure 2.5: Average no. of A-packet transmissions vs. ε for various values of B.
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Figure 2.6: Probability of dropping an A-packet vs. ε for various values of B.
According to the fact that a higher error probability implies a higher number of failures in A-packet
transmissions, we observe that the average number of transmissions increases as ε increases, following
a coarsely linear trend. Moreover, for fixed ε, the average number of transmissions is higher for higher
burstiness. Indeed, if the channel is correlated and an A-packet is erroneously received, the greater
the correlation, the higher the probability that the following transmissions are erroneous.
In Fig. 2.6 we illustrate the probability of dropping an A-packet. It can be observed that this
probability increases as ε increases, for each value of B. Indeed, the increase in ε implies an increase
in the average number of transmissions and in the probability that an A-packet is erroneously received
at its last transmission. Furthermore, for values of B nearly equal to the packet-group length (i.i.d.
errors, or B = 5, or B = 10) the dropping probability increases slowly as ε increases for small values
of ε, whereas it increases faster for higher values of ε. For values of B higher than the packet-group
length (B = 30), the dropping probability increases roughly linearly as ε increases. Finally, we can
observe that the dropping probability is very small in any case. This fact agrees with the previous
results. Indeed, the average number of transmissions is less than 1.8 (see Fig. 2.5) and the maximum
number of transmissions is 3. Thus, the third transmission of an A-packet and its failure are unlikely
events.
We now discuss the numerical results obtained by varying B in the range [ 11−ε , 30] for a fixed ε
value chosen within set {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. In Fig. 2.7 we report the ratio of the actual throughput and
that obtained in the i.i.d. case without distinction between A- and B -packets and without limits on
transmissions. The variability interval of the throughput increases as ε increases. In fact, the curve
for ε = 0.1 remains nearly constant. More precisely, the throughput initially decreases, it assumes
its minimum values for B values comparable with the packet-group length, and then it increases very
slowly. The curves for higher values of ε show that in these cases the throughput assumes its smallest
values for B roughly corresponding to the i.i.d. case and that it then increases as B increases. This
increase is faster for B values lower than, say, 20, and is lighter for higher values. In any case, the
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Figure 2.7: Throughput compared to the i.i.d. case vs. B for various values of ε.
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Figure 2.8: Average no. of A-packet transmissions vs. B for various values of ε.
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Figure 2.9: Probability of dropping an A-packet vs. B for various values of ε.
throughput seems to tend to an asymptotic value.
Finally, in Fig. 2.8 and Fig. 2.9 we report the average number of transmissions and the dropping
probability of an A-packet. These figures confirm the previous results. Moreover, it can be observed
that the range of values assumed by either performance metric is larger for higher ε. From Fig. 2.8 we
can also deduce that the average number of transmissions becomes almost constant for high values of
B (say, higher than 10, twice the length of a packet group). The dropping probability of an A-packet
in Fig. 2.9 is roughly constant for values of B around the i.i.d. case; it quickly increases until B
reaches value 10 and it increases more slowly for higher values of B.
2.1.4 Conclusions
In this Section, we presented a Markov framework for the performance evaluation of a hybrid SR
ARQ scheme with unequal error protection applied to the transmission of multimedia contents over
the wireless channel. We considered a video flow divided into independent and incrementally encoded
packets. Our basic assumption is that the HARQ scheme privileges the transmission of independent
packets, due to their more relevant role. As a consequence, independent packets are the only ones to
be selectively retransmitted, if in error.
Since we aim to avoid delay increases, we assumed that retransmissions replace transmissions of
incrementally encoded packets and that the admissible retransmissions are limited. We modeled the
entire transmission system using a macroscopic Markov chain, including the Markov chain representa-
tion of the channel and a finite-state machine identifying the possible pending packets configurations.
As performance metrics, we considered the throughput, average number of transmissions, and
dropping probability of independent packets. We reported and commented the results for a system with
fixed parameters. We found that channel correlation may be beneficial to increase throughput and,
therefore, the transmission speed. On the other hand, we verified that correlation has a worsening effect
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on the average number of transmissions and the dropping probability, since these quantities increase
as the channel burstiness increases. In video transmissions, retransmissions lead to undesirable delays
and dropped independent packets cause an irreversible loss of information, which, in turn, compromises
the quality of the video. A tradeoff between transmission speed and reproduction quality has thus
emerged. Moreover, the adopted approach can be extended to better describe the performance of
more specific video transmission protocols operating on possibly correlated channels.
2.2 Markov models for electric vehicles: the role of battery param-
eters and charging point frequency
Two of the major reasons that lead many nations to search for alternate energy sources and decrease
carbon dioxide emissions, especially from car transportation which makes use almost exclusively of
internal combustion vehicles (ICVs), are the alarming pollution levels and increasing world-wide oil
demand.3 This problem is especially heavy in the United States, causing 30% of world greenhouse
gases emissions, and also in Europe, where the 20-20-20 directive set a goal for the reduction of fossil
fuel usage of 20% and replacement with renewable energies (increased by 20%) by year 2020 [33].
In this background, EVs may be seen as a technological solution not only to decrease pollution,
but also to reduce usage costs for the end user. EVs can diminish carbon dioxide emissions by 50%
and have four to six times lower per-km cost than traditional ICVs [34]. Moreover, EVs can also be
integrated with Internet of Things (IoT). To avoid, for example, the frequent electric vehicle theft
and traffic accident problems, EV monitoring system could be designed based on the IoT technology
[35]. Yet, some hurdles to a widespread diffusion of EVs are represented by limited autonomy, long
recharging times, and, finally, scarceness of recharging points.
These aspects involve a limited applicability of EVs, so that a vicious circle arises. The diffidence
of the customers towards their practicality especially due to their limited autonomy, a phenomenon
known as range anxiety [36], leads to a niche market. As a consequence, public investments for a better
service are discouraged, and this, in turn, further decreases the palatability of EVs for the average
customer. As a matter of fact, preliminary sociological studies have shown that EV users often limit
the usage and do not fully exploit the vehicle autonomy, fearing they will not find a recharging point
before the battery runs out of charge. Furthermore, long recharging times are distasteful to the users,
since they prevent an intense usage and independence in other daily activities.
Considering a modeling standpoint, several intervention points where these aspects can be tackled
might be defined. It can be thought of improving the battery efficiency, either increasing its capacity,
or making it faster to recharge, or both. At the same time, more charging points can be deployed,
increasing, in this way, their availability. With nowadays technology, the cost-benefit relationship of
these actions can be rather variable, being also connected with the subjective perception of the end
users. Investigating them with an adequate level of details would involve several related economic and
social aspects that are out of the scope of our investigation. However, we aim at giving a preliminary
contribution for what concerns the technical evaluation of these elements. To do so, we discuss the
capability of stochastic models and, in particular, of Markov chains to integrate all of them in a
comprehensive description.
In general, Markov models have been used for quantitative evaluation of urban transportation
practices. Particularly, there are studies proposing a Markov model to characterize EV behaviors in
urban mobility scenarios [37]. Inspired by these descriptions, we propose an enlarged Markov chain
where we consider that also the battery management can be integrated. In particular, we discuss the
accuracy of the model, and show that even a loose time granularity may still correctly reflect average
3This section is taken from “Markov Models for Electric Vehicles: the Role of Battery Parameters and Charging Point
Frequency” published in IEEE CAMAD.
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Figure 2.10: The resulting system Markov Chain with 3N + 3 states.
performance of the EV, especially for the metrics of interest related to range anxiety. Moreover, we
show how the model can be properly tuned to investigate the impact of three key aspects mentioned
above, i.e.: (i) autonomy of the battery; (ii) speed of battery recharging; (iii) frequency of recharging
points.
Our proposed Markov model can be further extended to several more advanced evaluations, still
conserving a fully analytical formulation that gives a powerful description, but without requiring an
excessive computational cost. In particular, more advanced behavioral patterns of the EV users can
be considered, as well as more traffic dynamics and intensities over the day. Also, complex battery
effects can be introduced instead of the simple model where the battery charge increases when the EV
is parked in a charging point and decreases as the EV moves, by considering leakage or stabilization
effects. Finally, the model can be further integrated within stochastic optimization frameworks [38],
in order to devise intelligent algorithms for maximum energy efficiency and/or autonomy.
The rest of the Section is organized as follows. Sub-section 2.2.1 describes the system model; in
Sub-section 2.2.2 the numerical results are shown; and, finally, in Sub-section 2.2.3 we draw some
concluding remarks.
2.2.1 System model
To represent the daily activity of an EV, we consider the following simplified model. We assume that
the EV drives through a urban scenario during a day, cyclically alternating being parked and on the
move. The EV is considered to always leave from and return to the owner’s home, where a charging
point is available, in the morning and at the end of the day, respectively. Thus, at the beginning of
each day cycle, its battery is fully charged. The duration of the entire daily activity is random, but
its expected value is a working day period, so as to model the condition where the vehicle returns
home at night after a determined average time. Also, some (but not all) of the parking area within
the city have a charging point where the EV’s battery can be replenished. To relate this analysis to
the study of range anxiety, our objective is to study the probability of running out of all the charge
in the battery before the day ends, called pd. This probability depends, among other aspects, on the
length of the chosen path for that day, the number of driving routines performed, the battery models,
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and the fraction of parking spots that are charging points. Moreover, we want to study especially
the impact on pd of increasing the charging speed or the battery capacity. We model this scenario
with a discrete Markov Chain, making a transition every ∆t seconds, in which we consider that the
EV can operate under three conditions: Drive, that is, the EV moves consuming battery; Charge,
whenever the EV stops in a parking spot that is equipped with a charging point, so that the battery is
recharged; and, finally, Park, if the EV stops in a parking position without any charging. In addition
to this, we describe the battery as an energy queue, having multiple possible charge levels, which are a
quantization of the battery charge. We set N as the number of levels, which means we consider levels
from 1 to N , with 1 representing the highest charge, i.e., 100% of the battery. The transitions between
the three conditions happen according to an independent underlying Markov process, for which several
characterizations exist in the literature [37]. Note that this part of the model can be enlarged with
additional conditions describing different ways of operating the EV, but such an extension would add
little to the description made above. Thus, we can define transitions from i to j, with i, j ∈ D,C,P,
where D, C, P stand for Drive, Charge, and Park, respectively. These three conditions further define
macro-blocks of the Markov chain, in which we combine the condition (D, C, or P) with the charge
level k.
It is worth noting that the charge level can only increase (or otherwise stay constant) if the
condition is C; conversely, it can only decrease (or again stay constant) in condition D. When the
system condition is P, we assume that neither discharge nor charge of the battery take place. It
would be possible to also include other effects, such as charge balancing or leakage, but their effect
is marginal with respect to charge and discharge caused by actual stationing at a charging point and
driving, respectively, so we leave their inclusion for future work.
Under these assumptions, the Markov Chain would consist of 3N states, but we consider three
additional states: the Depleted state identifies the situation in which an EV is in condition D with an
empty battery and is therefore forced to stop, a condition that causes serious dissatisfaction to the
user; the Overcharged state, representing a scenario in which the EV is in condition C with the battery
fully charged, and therefore may have a higher probability of leaving the charging spot; and finally,
the Home state, which corresponds to the situation in which the EV eventually arrives home at the
end of the day if its operation is not terminated sooner by encountering the Depleted state. In other
words, the Home state describes the service termination for the day in the ideal usage conditions.
From the modeling stand point, it is just one of the possible exit states from a D condition, which
corresponds to the EV heading back home instead of temporarily parking. Thus, the Markov chain
has 3N + 3 states, with Depleted and Home being absorbing states. Fig. 2.10 shows the resulting
diagram of the Markov chain and its transitions.
The Depleted state is considered to characterize the range anxiety, since the owner of the EV
would like to complete its daily route without being absorbed into it. For this reason, since the chain
is ultimately absorbed by either the Depleted or the Home state, we define as pd the probability that
the former occurs, whereas 1−pd describes the probability of ending in the Home state, as is desirable.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the transitions among the system conditions to be inde-
pendent of the EV charge level. In other words, we assume that the driver is actually oblivious to
the state of the battery, which does not influence his/her behavior. It would be easy to improve the
description of the model by considering a higher likelihood of moving towards a charging point when
the charge level is low. Such a characterization would surely be possible within a Markov approach
akin to our model, but it would require some assumptions on the driver’s behavior (e.g., his/her risk
aversion and/or the desire to avoid the Depleted state as much as possible), which in turn would need
some supporting experimental data. Since all these characterizations are related to the range anxiety
of the users, we prefer to keep this concentrated in the simple evaluation of pd with independence
between the system condition and the battery charge level.
As a result, we can describe the entire system through few simple parameters. In particular, we
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define pstart as probability that when the system is in conditions C or P, the engine is turned on and
a corresponding state with the same charge level, but under condition D, is entered. As said above,
this value is the same regardless of the actual charge level of the battery. Also, we assume that this is
the exit probability from state Overcharged, even though it would be easy to change this, for example,
by assuming that a fully charged EV leaves the charging spot immediately with probability 1.
Quite similarly, we define the probability that the EV leaves condition D as a constant term pstop;
in this case, the system condition becomes P or C, which in turn depends on how broad is the fraction
f of electrified parking. We assume that charging stations are uniformly distributed across the areas
where the EV can park, thus condition D is left towards C with probability fpstop, and towards P
with probability (1 − f)pstop. However, another exit options exists from condition D, which is the
probability to enter the absorbing Home state, which happens with probability phome. Note that
this parameter can be set depending on the desired average duration of a daily cycle not interrupted
by absorption to the Depleted state; in particular, in the following we chose it so that the EV stays
out for an average of 12 hours. Finally, the two remaining parameters are the probabilities that the
EV battery charge decreases or moves to a higher level, things that may happen when the system
condition is D or C, and which are denoted by symbols pc and pcharge, respectively.
Such a Markov chain can be solved very easily through standard stochastic process analysis to
find, among other metrics of interest, the value of pd. The number of states N does not heavily
impact on the complexity of the solution, as will be further discussed next. Technically speaking,
this happens because the transition matrix related to the Markov model is sparse; indeed, the process
can be seen as a Quasi-Birth-and-Death process similar to those in [39]. In the following, we discuss
the application of our model and the extraction of pd as a range anxiety analysis. We preliminary
investigate the quantization granularity required to have an accurate model, and afterwards we show
that our proposed model is able to keep into account the impact of battery capacity, recharge speed,
and frequency of the charging spots.
2.2.2 Numerical results
First of all, we consider the impact of quantization parameters in the model previously proposed. The
model accuracy heavily depends on the choice of ∆t and N , which do not refer to real characteristics
of the EV system, but are just chosen so as to make the model tractable. Also, in order to have
a better understandable model, we introduce further parameters that characterize the system more
descriptively, as opposed to the transition probabilities of the Markov chain.
The chosen parameters are the EV autonomy in km from a full battery, denoted as A; the average
recharge time, denoted as Tcharge, to reach the state Overcharged from an empty battery assuming
no change of condition occurs; the average length of the paths that the EV drives and their average
number within a day, denoted as L and n, respectively; the duration of the daily hours, denoted as
H; the average EV speed v.
In particular, we can introduce H∗ = H(1 − LnHv ) as the time fraction in which the EV is not
driving. Thus, we can write the following relationships, which directly follow from their definitions.
pstart =
n∆t
H∗
(2.4)
pstop =
v∆t
L
n− 1
n
(2.5)
phome =
v∆t
L
1
n
(2.6)
pc =
v∆t
A/N
(2.7)
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Figure 2.11: Probability of successful service completion within the day (i.e., the battery is not fully
depleted), varying discretization parameters ∆t and N .
pcharge =
∆t
Tcharge/N
(2.8)
In the following, if not specified otherwise, we assume these values, that can be seen as a reasonable
choice: A = 100km, Tcharge = 2h, L = 25km, n = 8, H = 12h, v = 50km/h, f = 0.5. These are
sample values useful to give a proof of concept for the model; more realistic results can be used
if available. For what concerns the evaluations of the quantization accuracy, similar results have
actually been obtained in a wide range of parameters. Thus, we can plot in Fig. 2.11 the probability
of successful service completion, in other words, the probability that the EV at the end of the day is
not found in the Depleted state, i.e., 1− pd. This is shown by considering different choices of ∆t and
N . Regardless of the actual value of the metric, from the figure it is evident that, when the number
of levels N is sufficiently high, granularity in time only has a marginal effect. This is likely to happen
because the considered time interval of a daily cycle is sufficiently large to make a time quantization
interval of several seconds acceptable. Conversely, from the figure it appears that a sufficiently high
value of N is required. As a result, in the following we use N = 100 and ∆t = 15 seconds.
Now, we explore some building aspects of the model in more depth. The impact of the battery
capacity on the range anxiety is related to the width of the Markov chain: the higher the number L of
battery levels, or conversely, the slower the transitions towards the Depleted state, the less likely that
the EV usage unsuccessfully ends in that state. An increase of the charge speed implies considering a
stronger transition probability towards states with higher energy levels in condition C. Finally, another
relevant element is the frequency of charging points, which also directly captured by our model. We
also stress that these aspects all have a direct translation into three system parameters, namely, the
autonomy A, the time to charge Tcharge, and the parameter f .
To show a sample result, in Fig. 2.12 we report the probability of successful service completion
pd as a function of the battery autonomy A, but also considering different values of f and Tcharge.
One can notice that A is the key factor to avoid range anxiety, since a reasonably high probability of
service completion (in the figure, we highlighted a threshold of 1− pd = 70%) can be achieved only if
A is large enough. However, the frequency of charging points impacts on this result as well, since if f
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is very low, the required autonomy might be too high: for example, f = 0.1 causes 1− pd to be below
70% unless A is very large.
Finally, we also focus on the impact of Tcharge. From the considered model, this impact is less
relevant, but still significant. According to the figure, a faster charging cycle can decrease the required
autonomy by 10% or more; however, this happens only when f is high enough. This is because a
faster charge can keep battery depletion sufficiently far even in the cases where the EV stops at the
charging point only for a short while.
In addition, we must consider that the Markov chain presented here has only absorption to state
Depleted as a (large) penalty, i.e., total failure. However, we can extend this point by introducing a
reward process over the Markov chain, according to which the EV could cumulate a payoff depending
on the condition it is in. In this case, we can consider an additional state, in which we force the
vehicle’s charging; this state involves no reward for the EV. More in general, several other investigations
can exploit the proposed model, either expanding it, or including experimental evaluations to derive
meaningful system parameters.
2.2.3 Conclusions
We proposed a Markov chain for assessing and possibly improving the performance of EVs, with
particular reference to the evaluation of their autonomy and the resulting range anxiety related to
the customers. Our chain builds up on a behavioral model of the EV, including possible actions such
as “drive” and “park,” as well as the battery status modeled as an energy queue. We showed how
the model can easily integrate several elements of interest in the performance evaluation, namely the
battery capacity, the density of the charging points, and the speed of charge for the battery.
As possible extension of this work, we could consider a relationship between the behavior of the
users in the EVs and the charge level of the battery through a Markov decision process (MDP). We
can further consider different conditions of motion; in particular, we can consider multiple states
related to various motion kinds, each of which could have different levels of battery charge, and also
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possibly a different reward in an MDP. Moreover, in our analysis we did not treat situations in which
a deterioration of the battery or some malfunctions could imply a decrease in the EV autonomy over
time. In future works, we might take care of these aspects considering a longer timescale. Furthermore,
some additional battery effects (such as leakage) may be considered by defining other parameters
describing the probability to move to lower level of charge even under Park conditions. Finally,
an optimization framework for this reward collection can be formulated [38], so as to transparently
implement intelligent algorithms for battery management.
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Chapter 3
Game theory applied to
telecommunications networks issues
In this Chapter we describe the application of game theory models to address some telecommunications
issues with particular reference to management of a queueing system, jamming problems, and group
recognition in a communications network. Moreover, in the following of the thesis we also discuss a
game theoretic approach applied to a mobile computing setup. The purpose of the presentation of
these investigations is to show how the joint combination of different theories born in different contexts
can be useful enriching the evaluation of systems looking at them from a perspective that differs from
the one commonly used.
3.1 Preliminaries on game theory
What economists call game theory, psychologists call the theory of social situations, which gives an
accurate description of what game theory is about. Although game theory is relevant to games such as
poker or bridge, most researchers in game theory focuses on how groups of people interact. There are
two main branches of game theory: cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Non-cooperative
game theory deals mainly with how intelligent individuals interact with one another in an effort to
achieve their own purposes.
In this setting the objective is to make predictions on the behavior of multiple agents that constitute
the system under exam. For this reason, game theory is also used more and more commonly to
address problems related to contexts that differ from the economic and psychological ones, such as
telecommunications problems [52].
In general, game theory considers that individual agents, called players, perform actions according
to their personal interests that may differ from the interests of someone else in the same system [41].
Each player acts towards the maximization of its own utility, for the assessment of which we must
consider the actions played by all players. Moreover, each player has to create some beliefs about the
actions performed by its opponents in the game, because it does not know them. The utility, called
payoff, represents an arbitrary quantification of the goodness coming from a joint selection of actions.
In general, a static game of complete information is conveyed by a triple G = (N , S, P), where N is
the set of players, S is the set of all strategies allowed to players, and P represents the payoffs that
depend on the actions chosen by the players. Considering this kind of game, a strategy can be defined
as playing an action, but its definition become more complex if we consider more advanced setups.
In game theory the computation of equilibrium conditions is an important issue. We can define an
equilibrium as a joint strategy profile where all players payoffs are locally maximized. In particular,
we are interested in the computation of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) [72] defined as a strategy profile
according to which each player does not have a stimulus to change on their side their path of action.
39
In this context, players can perform pure o mixed strategies, where the former defines tha action a
player will take for any situation it could deal with, the latter considers a probability distribution over
the set of pure strategies.
For our evaluations, we consider a Bayesian game that is a game of incomplete information in
which each player can be of a type. The type of each player is different from its opponents type
and has a different payoff function. This captures the fact that players may have different behaviors.
Furthermore, we assume that distribution over types is common knowledge between players. Thus,
each player knows its own type, but it does not know its opponents type. In this scenario, a strategy
can be defined as a complete plan of actions in which every chance of the game, types included, are
considered. The important aspect in a Bayesian context is that players form correct beliefs about their
opponents action and type; indeed, equilibrium conditions hold whenever players beliefs are correct
and robust. Considering all these assumptions, we can say that a NE describes a situation in which
each player is playing a best response to its belief about the strategy chosen by the opponents and
their type.
In the following, we will refer also to Zero-sum Game that is a mathematical representation of a
situation in which each participant’s gain or loss of utility is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of
the utility of the other participants, which means that if the total gains of the participants are added
up and, then, the total losses are subtracted, they will sum to zero. On the other hand, non-zero-sum
describes a situation in which the interacting parties’ aggregate gains and losses can be less than
or more than zero. A zero-sum game is also named as strictly competitive game while non-zero-sum
games can be either competitive or non-competitive. Most of the time, zero-sum games are solved by
means of the minimax theorem which is closely related to linear programming duality, or with Nash
equilibrium.
In the sequel of the present Chapter, we will exploit these concepts to capture the inherent un-
certainty of distributed systems, which is very relevant to communication systems. We will show
how this theoretical background enables a descriptively powerful evaluation of the system and paves
the road to a useful characterization for many distributed network problems. In [46], nodes forward
packets randomly and in an uncoordinated behavior. It may be interesting, for example, to evaluate
how much efficiency is lost with respect to the case of coordinated management. In [47], multiple
access techniques are integrated; this is a strong research topic also in view of upcoming 5G cellular
networks. In this case, the access selection may be done with or without coordination among the
controllers allowing a comparison between the different performance evaluations obtained. Finally,
in [48] the authors consider the problem of optimizing the transmission strategy of two devices with
energy harvesting capability that share a wireless channel, in order to maximize the long-term average
importance of the transmitted data. It is assumed that a central controller is kept informed on the
energy level and packet importance of both nodes. Actually, it may be useful to compare the case of
a distributed behavior (either collaborative or competitive) of the nodes and compare the resulting
performance with respect to the central controller case. Furthermore, in the same spirit also the
coexistence of multiple uncoordinated energy sources is a relatively unexplored field that can be inter-
esting to investigate in light of the strong interest received by energy harvesting as a way to achieve
self-sustainable transmission and green networking.
40
3.2 Bayesian game analysis of a system with multiple candidate
agents
The need for scalability of modern communication networks has led to the practical establishment
of several distributed management algorithms.1 Indeed, keeping the network intelligence spread in
the entire network is both a low-cost management solution and also the proper way to involve the
increased computational power of communication devices.
To mathematically characterize this aspect, we consider a joint application of queueing theory [40]
and game theory [41]. In more detail, we consider a queueing system in two different cases: uplink
and downlink. In the uplink case, we consider multiple candidate servers, whose clients, for example,
can be thought of being packets arriving to the system for transmission. Each server represents an
option available at the device, which is managed by its own controller, and has its own specific success
probability for transmission. We model this situation as a game, where the servers are the players
and they can decide to be inactive or active; staying active has a fixed local cost for the server, while
a successful transmission or, more in general, service completion is beneficial for the whole system. It
is worth noting that in a system with a centralized supervision, it would be best to only keep active
the server with highest success probability. However, according to our analysis servers act selfishly, as
a normal setup in any game theory applications, and servers do not even know who the best server
is, since they do not know each other’s characteristics. While the former is a classic ingredient of
game theory capturing the lack of cooperation, the latter is due to the lack of communication between
the agents, which is represented by modeling the problem as a Bayesian game [72]. In this setup, we
compute the social welfare of our system as the sum of the individual expected gains. As a measure of
inefficiency we compute the Price of Anarchy (PoA), one of the well known game theoretic parametes
that indicates the loss due to the lack of cooperation and measures how the efficiency of a system
degrades due to selfish behavior of its agents.
As well as for the uplink case just introduced, we evaluate at the same way also a downlink case,
where we consider a system with candidate clients requiring services to a server that has the purpose
of choosing the best client to which offer them in terms of maximizing the whole network gain and
performance. We will explain in more details later on the two scenarios and the corresponding analysis.
Up to our knowledge, this work is the first to combine these two mathematical approaches in this
way. Various works in the literature study different characterizations of a queueing model using game
theory; most of them consider the point of view of the customers. Indeed, some research works include
whether to avoid or follow the crowd [42], and the proper period of time in which to arrive to a queue
in order to minimize waiting and tardiness costs [43]. Other papers study the network as a whole and
its strategic structure as a complex system made of customers and servers [44, 45].
We remark that our analysis has strong consequences in modeling a transmission system with
multiple alternatives controlled by distributed agents, a rationale that can be applied throughout the
entire protocol stack. For example, at the network layer it can be exploited for a distributed routing
selection in multi-hop environments [46]. At the datalink layer, multiple access techniques can be
coordinated similarly [47]. Finally, at the physical layer, this can be applied for devices powered by
multiple energy sources [48].
We refer to a game in which each player is characterized by a type, which is unknown to the others
and we consider different levels of cooperation. Our goal is to compare the effects of cooperation
and communication between the agents involved in the system. For this reason, we consider different
scenarios and we compute the PoA quantifying the system inefficiency due to the selfish behavior of
its members. In our case the PoA is evaluated as the ratio between the gain obtained in the best
possible scenario, in which everything is known and there is cooperation, and the gain related to the
1This section is taken from “Bayesian Game Analysis of a Queueing System with Multiple Candidate Servers” pub-
lished in IEEE CAMAD.
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worst scenario, in which just a single agent works and the others are off. Moreover, we compute the
gain that each agent has due to the fact that there are other agents in the system with whom it can
cooperate. We call this measure Maximum Diversity Gain.
The rest of this Section is organized as follows. Sub-section 3.2.1 describes the system model
and the game theory application; we compute the NEs in Section 3.2.2. Section 3.2.3 presents some
numerical results and, finally, some concluding remarks can be found in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 System model
We focus on downlink/uplink systems. In particular, we consider our system in two different contexts:
one in which two clients require services to a server that has to decide to which of them offer them
(i.e., downlink case) and the other one in which there are two servers offering services and we need to
determine which of the two servers is better to offer them to a client (i.e., uplink case).
3.2.1.1 Downlink case
In the downlink case we consider a system with two clients and a single server. The clients, client 1
and client 2, require a service offered by the server that has to establish to which of them is better to
offer the service making some considerations regarding the system dynamics. Each client can either
be active or inactive. Just to give an explanatory example, if the service required by the clients is the
transmission of a content, it is reasonable to assume that the server sends data to the active client if
just one client is active; it may be possible that then the active client could send the content to the
inactive one. Instead, if both clients are active, the server sends the data to the best client and, as a
consequence, this client may share the content with the other client for example via Bluetooth. We
assume that to each client is associated a variable µi ∈ [0, 1], with i ∈ [1, 2], that describes the interest
of client i in having a certain service offered by the server. Moreover, we define c as the cost of being
active for a client. The parameter c varies in the range (0, 1). The value of c is equal for both clients.
We assume that the probability of success, that is the probability that the service is accomplished, is
1 and, when both clients are active, the best one is choosen according to its value of µi; in particular,
we assume that the server will choose the client with the higher interest level.
We can model this system in a game theoretic context, in which client 1 and client 2 are the two
players, player 1 and player 2, respectively. From here on, we will use in an interchangeable way
both terms client and player. The set of actions that players can do is constituted by being active
and being inactive. In particular, to every pair of actions of the clients corresponds an arbitrary
quantification of the goodness coming from performing those actions. In this way, each player can
choose the best action considering the payoff associated to each possible move. It is worth noting that,
in this case, each player acts towards the maximization of its own utility. We assume that successfully
task completion involves a profit of 1, the profit is 0 otherwise, for both client (even the one not being
active). As already discussed, if both client are active, the server chooses the client with the higher
level of interest; however, the additional active client does not bring any additional benefit to the
system. Proceeding with the analysis, since there are two possible players and two possible actions,
we need to consider 4 different cases. If both clients are inactive, we reasonably assume that any task
is required and, thus, any task is offered by the server. As a consequence, players payoffs are supposed
to be 0. In the case in which client i is active and client j is inactive, the payoff of the former is µi− c
and the one of the latter is µj . Finally, if both clients are active, the payoff of player 1 is µ1 − c and
that of player 2 is µ2 − c.
In Table 3.1 each entry shows the corresponding payoff for the two players associated to the pair
of actions chosen, on rows for player 1 and columns for player 2.
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Player 2
active inactive
Player 1
active µ1 − c, µ2 − c µ1 − c, µ2
inactive µ1, µ2 − c 0, 0
Table 3.1: Payoff of the players
Player 2
active inactive
Player 1
active max(µ1, µ2)− c, µ1 − c, µ1
max(µ1, µ2)− c
inactive µ2, µ2 − c 0, 0
Table 3.2: Payoff of the players
3.2.1.2 Uplink case
In the uplink case we consider a system with two servers, server 1 and server 2, and a single client.
The client may require some services and it is necessary then to decide which of the two servers to
choose to offer those services. We assume that each server can either be active or inactive and has a
certain probability of successfully completing a service, µ1 or µ2, respectively, when it is active. Also
in this scenario, we consider the parameter c as the cost of being active, with c ∈ (0, 1), and its value
is equal for both servers. Moreover, we consider that when neither server 1 nor server 2 is active or
none of the two servers is able to complete the task even if active, the service is not offered and, in this
case, the cost paid by servers is d. Without loss of generality, we set d = 0; for d > 0, it is sufficient
to consider a rescaling of the utilities.
We can model this problem as a game in which the two servers are the players, player 1 and player
2, and their possible actions are being active or being inactive. In our evaluations successfully and
incorrect task completion involve a profit of 1 and 0, respectively, for both servers (even the one not
offering the service). If both servers are active, then the service is offered by the server with the higher
successful probability assuming that the additional active server does not bring any benefit to the
system. For each pair of actions it is possible to compute the payoff for each player and, then, players
can choose their best move. Four different cases are to be considered. If both servers are inactive,
neither attemps to offer the service and their payoffs are 0. If server i is active and server j is inactive,
the payoff of the former is µi(1 − c) + (1 − µi)(−c) = µi − c and that of the latter is µi. Instead, if
both servers are active, the value of their payoff is max(µ1, µ2) · (1 − c) + (1 −max(µ1, µ2)) · (−c) =
max(µ1, µ2)− c for both of them.
In Table 3.2 each entry indicates the payoff associated to the pair of actions for the players.
3.2.2 Nash Equilibrium Computation
To analyze our systems, we consider a Bayesian setup. In particular, we assume that each player i,
i ∈ {1, 2}, has a type that is the level of interest in the downlink case and the probability of correct
task completion in the uplink case, represented as µi in both cases. The types of the players follow a
joint distribution that is common knowledge between players. In more details, each player knows its
own type, but it has to create some beliefs about its opponent type. To evaluate players payoff, we
need to weigh the payoff expressions previously discussed with respect the types distributions, that is
we need to compute the expected payoff. Furthermore, since our aim is to compare systems with and
without cooperation and communication between agents, we consider different scenarios.
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3.2.2.1 Scenario 1-Distributed service without signaling downlink case
Since we are considering a Bayesian context, a pure strategy si for player i represents the choice of
being active or inactive for every possible type µi.
Client i will be surely inactive if µi = 0 and surely active if µi = 1. If we consider an intermediate
case, client i will be active if its expected payoff when it is active is greater than the expected payoff
when it is inactive. Focusing on a single client i, if a given value of µi involves that the server decide
to offer the service to client i, then any other µ˜i > µi will allow the choice of client i. This is implied
by the monotonicity of the expected payoff weighed on the distribution of the type as a function of µi.
Indeed, client i is chosen by the server as the best client if µi > c, thus, if this holds then also µ˜i > c
holds. Therefore, we can state that the optimal strategy follows a threshold policy.
Proposition. The best response of player i will be to be active and require the service if and only
if
µi ≥ c
1− ρ−i (3.1)
where ρ−i is the probability that player j 6= i is active. If we consider the distribution over types
uniform in [0, 1], then (3.1) becomes µi = c/µˆj . Indeed, if player j chooses threshold µˆj and it is
active if and only if µj > µˆj , then the probability that player j is active is equal to the probability
that its type is greater than or equal to µˆj . For this reason 1− ρ−i = µˆj . Moreover, if player i belief
is that µˆj < c, then its best response is to never require the service to the server and, therefore, to set
its threshold µˆi = 1. Conversely, player i ’s best response is to choose µˆi = c/µˆj .
Figure 3.1: Areas for the players expected payoff computation downlink case.
Eq. 3.2 defines the best response threshold strategy µˆi of player i assuming that player j chosen
threshold is µˆj .
BRi(µˆj) =
{
c
µˆj
, if µˆj ≥ c
1, if µˆj < c
. (3.2)
Plotting the best response curves of the two players varying µ1 and µ2, it is possible to determine for
which values of the pair (µ1, µ2) they intersect. We found that the curves coincide for c ≤ µi ≤ 1 with
i ∈ {1, 2}. As a consequence, the pairs (µ1, µ2) that satisfy µ1µ2 = c with c ≤ µi ≤ 1 and i ∈ {1, 2}
are NEs.
Fig. 3.1 shows the areas considered for the computation of the players expected payoff. Indeed,
since we consider a given distribution over types, it is necessary to weigh on this distribution con-
sidering different contributions and then summing their values. The following equations are the 4
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contributions for the expected payoff of player 1.
A = 0 (3.3)
B = µˆ2
[
1− µˆ21
2
− c(1− µˆ1)
]
(3.4)
C = µˆ21
[
1− µˆ2
2
]
(3.5)
D = (1− µˆ2)
[
1− µˆ21
2
− c(1− µˆ1)
]
(3.6)
(3.7)
As a consequence, the expected payoff of player 1 is given by A+B + C +D. Instead, for player
2 we obtained
A = 0 (3.8)
B = µˆ22
[
1− µˆ1
2
]
(3.9)
C = µˆ1
[
1− µˆ22
2
− c(1− µˆ2)
]
(3.10)
D = (1− µˆ2)
[
1− µˆ22
2
− c(1− µˆ2)
]
. (3.11)
(3.12)
3.2.2.2 Scenario 2-Lazy client downlink case
This case refers to the scenario in which one client can be active or inactive and the other one is always
inactive. It is as we have just a single client requiring services in the system and, for this reason, this
represents the worst case due to the fact that there is neither cooperation nor communication between
the clients. Since we consider two clients, there a two different sub-cases: case 2a that describes the
situation in which client 2 is always inactive, case 2b that corresponds to the situation in which client
2 is actually the only one that can be active.
In the following analysis, we focus on case 2a. Indeed, the same results are obtained for case 2b
after reversing clients roles. Given that player 2 is always inactive, the best strategy for player 1 is to
be active if µ1 − c > 0. This case is a particular case of the previous Scenario 1 considering the pair
(µˆ1, µˆ2) = (c, 1) (similarly (µˆ1, µˆ2) = (1, c) for case 2b) as NE.
Finally with these assumptions, player 1 expected payoff is∫ 1
0
dµ2
∫ µˆ1
0
0 dµ1 +
∫ 1
0
dµ2
∫ 1
µˆ1
(µ1 − c) dµ1 = 1− c
2
2
− c(1− c) (3.13)
considering that µˆ1 = c. Whereas, for player 2 we obtained∫ 1
0
dµ2
∫ µˆ1
0
0 dµ1 +
∫ 1
0
dµ2
∫ 1
µˆ1
µ2 dµ1 =
1− c
2
. (3.14)
3.2.2.3 Scenario 3-Coordinated service downlink case
The coordinate service scenario refers to the case in which the game is completly known to the players;
in particular, each player knows its opponent type. In this case both cooperation and communication
are allowed between clients. Moreover, we assume that when both clients are active, the one with the
highest interest µi requires the service to the server.
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We assume now that player 1 knows the threshold value µˆ2 of player 2.
Theorem If µˆ2 > c, then BR1(µˆ2 > c) < µˆ2 since the optimal strategy is a threshold policy. We
prove this theorem by contradiction. Indeed, assuming that BR1(µˆ2 > c) > µˆ2, then this involves that
if c < µ1 < µˆ2, player 1 does not require any service because inactive. However, as a counter example,
we can prove that if c < µ1 < µˆ2, for player 1 is better to be active in order to have a higher payoff.
Indeed, defining q as Prob{µ2 > µˆ2}, if the previous condition on the value of µ1 holds, then the
payoff of player 1 if it decides to be inactive depends on whether player 2 requires or not the service
and it is qµ1, instead if player 1 decides to require the service its payoff is qµ1 + (1− q)(µ1 − c). As a
consequence, for player 1 it is better to be active if qµ1 + (1− q)(µ1− c) > qµ1, that is if µ1 > c. This
implies that BR1(µˆ2) < µˆ2. This last result is in contrast with respect to what we have previously
found.
At this point, we want to prove the following Lemma.
Lemma Assuming that player 1 knows the value of µˆ2. If µ1 ≥ µˆ2 ≥ c, then for player 1 it is
better to decide to be active and require the service. As a consequence, BR1(µˆ2) = c.
We define r = χ(µ1,1)(µ2) and q = χ(µˆ2,1)(µ2)−χ(µ1,1)(µ2), where the use of the indicator function
χ means, for example, that q =
{
1, if µˆ2 ≤ µ2 ≤ µ1
0, otherwise
. Assuming this, if player 1 decides to be active
and require the service, then its payoff is rµ1 + q(µ1 − c) + (1− r − q)(µ1 − c), on the other hand, if
it decides not to require it, its payoff is rµ1 + qµ1 + (1− r − q)0. Then, for player 1 it is better to be
active if
rµ1 + q(µ1 − c) + (1− r − q)(µ1 − c) > rµ1 + qµ1 (3.15)
holds. This means that (µ1 − c)(1− r) > 0. Now, considering the expectation on µ2
(µ1 − c)Eµ2 [1− r] > 0 (3.16)
(µ1 − c)
∫ 1
0
1(1− r)dµ2 > 0 (3.17)
(µ1 − c)
∫ µ1
0
dµ2 > 0 (3.18)
that is
µ1(µ1 − c) > 0. (3.19)
This is always true because of the initial assumption of our Lemma. This means that player 1 reaches
a higher payoff being active and requiring the service. In conclusion, since in general it must hold
that BRi(µˆj) ≥ c, BRi(µˆj > c) < µˆj , and BRi(µˆj < c) > µˆj > c, in this setup, the NE, that is also a
Pareto optimality, is given by the pair (µˆ1, µˆ2) = (c, c).
It is worth noting actually that it is not necessary to have a complete a priori coordination between
the agents operating in the system. Indeed, consider a scenario in which the system works as in Scenario
1 as previously discussed with the difference that when both clients are active, they can exchange some
information about their type values in order to decide which of them is better to remain active and,
on the other hand, which of them is better to switch off. With this assumption, the evaluation of the
NE changes with respect to that scenario. Now, just some considerations follow to better explain this
new setup. Focusing on player 1, it is reasonable to assume that if µ1 < c, if player 2 is inactive and
player 1 decides to be active and request the service, its expected payoff is negative. Then, in this
case, it is better to be inactive for player 1 gaining 0 as expected payoff. Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that player 1 can think to be active if µ1 > c. When this holds, three different cases can
occur according to the value of µ2
• case a 0 < µ2 < c: this occurs with probability Prob{µ2 < µ1} = µ1 and the payoff for player 1
is µ1 − c if it is active and request the service, 0 otherwise;
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• case b c < µ2 < µ1: this occurs with probability Prob{µ2 < µ1} = µ1 and the payoff for player
1 is µ1 − c if it is active and request the service, 0 otherwise;
• case c µ2 > µ1: this occurs with probability Prob{µ2 > µ1} = 1− µ1 and the payoff for player
1 is µ1 in any case.
Indeed, in case a and case b it holds that µ1 > c and µ2 < µ1, then when clients tell each other the
type values, player 1 knows that its type is higher, thus it has to decide whether being active and
requiring the service or not according to the comparison of µ1 and c. Instead, in case c player 1 knows
a posteriori that its type is lower than its opponent type. Therefore, even if player 1 a priori decided
to be active, player 2 will be active too and require the service since µ2 > µ1 holds. As a consequence,
player 1 expected payoff will be µ1. To evaluate the NE it is sufficient to compare the expected payoff
when active with respect to the expected payoff when inactive; in more details, µ1(µ1 − c) > 0.
Same considerations hold reversing player 1 with player 2. Finally, we find that the NE is given by
the pair (µˆ1, µˆ2) = (c, c). This results is the same as the one obtained for the scenario with coordinated
service as discussed at the beginning of this Sub-section. In conclusion, the best expected payoffs for
the players is reached even just allowing a partial communication between clients, in particular when
they are both active, without assuming complete a priori knowledge of the system.
3.2.2.4 Scenario 1-Distributed service without signaling uplink case
What previously said for the downlink still holds in the uplink case; in particular, server i will be
active if the expected payoff when it is active is greater than the expected payoff when it is inactive.
Moreover, also in this case it is still valid that the optimal strategy is a threshold policy for the same
reason as previously discussed. The differences with the downlink case lies on the fact that for this
scenario the evaluation of the NEs is significantly different. Focusing on player 1, we want that its
payoff when it is active is greater than its payoff when it is inactive, therefore, defining q as the
probability that player j is active
q [max(µ1, µ2)− c] + (1− q)(µ1 − c) > qµ2 + (1− q)0. (3.20)
Doing some calculations, this means that
q [min(µ1, µ2)] < µ1 − c. (3.21)
Player 1 knows the value of µ1, but it does not know µ2. On the other hand, distribution over types
is common knowledge, therefore, we average on this distribution and solve
Eµ2 [q [min(µ1, µ2)]] < Eµ2 [µ1 − c] . (3.22)
Since µ1 − c is a constant with respect to Eµ2 , Eµ2 [µ1 − c] = µ1 − c; the hardest part here is the
computation of the other expectation. In particular, considering µ1 and µ2 uniformly distributed in
(0, 1), we know that
Eµ2 [q [min(µ1, µ2)]] =
∫ 1
0
q ·min(µ1, µ2)dµ2. (3.23)
At this point, we have to consider two different cases to solve the integral:
• case in which µ1 < µˆ2∫ µ1
0
0 ·min(µ1, µ2)dµ2 +
∫ µˆ2
µ1
0 ·min(µ1, µ2)dµ2 +
∫ 1
µˆ2
1 · µ1 · dµ2 = µ1(1− µˆ2) (3.24)
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• case in which µ1 > µˆ2
∫ µˆ2
0
0 ·min(µ1, µ2)dµ2 +
∫ µ1
µˆ2
1 · µ2 · dµ2 +
∫ 1
µ1
1 · µ1 · dµ2 = µ1 − µˆ2/2− µ21/2. (3.25)
As a consequence,
µ1 − c >
{
µ1 − µ1µˆ2, if µ1 < µˆ2
µ1 − µˆ2/2− µ21/2, if µ1 > µˆ2
(3.26)
µ1 >
{
c/µˆ2, if µ1 < µˆ2√
2c− µˆ22, if µ1 > µˆ2
(3.27)
If µ1 > µˆ2, we know that µ
2
1 + µˆ
2
2 > 2µˆ
2
2, as a consequence, µ
2
1 + µˆ
2
2 > 2c is true if µˆ2 >
√
c. In general,
µi >
{
c/µˆj , if µi < µˆj√
2c− µˆ2j , if µi > µˆj
(3.28)
with i, j ∈ {1, 2}. If we plot the corresponding curves considering the two players, we obtain that the
intersection is in (µ1, µ2) = (
√
c,
√
c). This represents the only NE of this scenario.
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Figure 3.2: Areas for the players expected payoff computation uplink case.
Fig. 3.2 shows the areas considered for the computation of the players expected payoff. Indeed,
since we consider a given distribution over types, it is necessary to weigh on this distribution con-
sidering different contributions and then summing their values. The following equations are the 5
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contributions to sum for the expected payoff of player 1.
A = 0 (3.29)
B = µˆ2
[
1− µˆ21
2
− c(1− µˆ1)
]
(3.30)
C = µˆ1
[
1− µˆ22
2
]
(3.31)
X =
(1− µˆ31)(µˆ2 − 1)
3(µˆ1 − 1) + cµˆ1(1− µˆ2) (3.32)
− (1 + µˆ1)
2
(c+ µˆ1)(1− µˆ2)
Y =
(1− µˆ32)(µˆ1 − 1)
3(µˆ2 − 1) + cµˆ2(1− µˆ1) (3.33)
− (1 + µˆ2)
2
(c+ µˆ2)(1− µˆ1)
The expected payoff of player 1 is given by A+B +C +X + Y . For player 2 we obtained similar
results, it is sufficient to swap B with C and X with Y .
3.2.2.5 Scenario 2-Lazy server uplink case
This second scenario refers to the situation in which one server is always inactive and the other one
can either be active or inactive. In this case, it is as there is just a single server in the system that
works. For this reason, this represents the worst possible scenario. We will show that the obtained
results confirm this fact.
Since there are two servers in the system, as before we define case 2a situation in which the only
server that can be active in the system is server 1, case 2b the case in which server 1 is always inactive.
We will focus on case 2a; similar results hold for case 2b after reversing servers roles.
Server 2 is always inactive, this means that µˆ2 = 1. As a consequence, the best response threshold
strategy for player 1 is to be active if and only if µ1 − c > 0, that is µˆ1 = c. In this scenario the pair
(µ1, µ2) = (c, 1) does not represent a NE. Indeed, given µˆ2 = 1, it is not true that the best response
threshold strategy for player 1 is µˆ2 = c. Under these considerations, we evaluate the expected payoff
considering the pair (µ1, µ2) = (c, 1) and its computation involves an unidimensional computation. In
particular, the expected payoff of player 1 is∫ µˆ1
0
0 dµ1 +
∫ 1
µˆ1
(µ1 − c) dµ1 = 1− c
2
2
− c(1− c) (3.34)
considering that µˆ1 = c. Whereas, the expected payoff of player 2 is∫ µˆ1
0
0 dµ1 +
∫ 1
µˆ1
µ1 dµ1 =
1− c2
2
. (3.35)
3.2.2.6 Scenario 3-Coordinated service uplink case
Also in this case, it holds that the game is completly known to the players and both cooperation and
communication are allowed to the servers. However, for the sake of clarity and explanation, since
the payoffs of downlink and unplink could differ also when there is complete knowledge, we give the
detailed analysis for the uplink case even if it could seem being very similar to the downlink situation.
In general, focusing on player 1, knowing that µ1 > µ2, player 1 will be active deciding to offer
the service if and only if µ1 > c. Instead, if µ2 > µ1, then it will be inactive. Similar considerations
hold for player 2.
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We assume now that player 1 knows the threshold value µˆ2 of player 2.
Theorem If µˆ2 > c, then BR1(µˆ2 > c) < µˆ2 since the optimal strategy is a threshold policy. We
prove this theorem by contradiction. Indeed, assuming that BR1(µˆ2 > c) > µˆ2, then this involves
that if c < µ1 < µˆ2, player 1 does not offer any service. However, as a counter example, we can prove
that if c < µ1 < µˆ2, then for player 1 is better to offer the service gaining a higher payoff. Indeed,
defining q = Prob{µ2 > µˆ2}, if the previous condition on the value of µ1 holds, then the payoff of
player 1 if it decides to be inactive depends on whether player 2 offer or not the service and it is qµ2,
instead if player 1 decides to offer the service its payoff is qµ2 + (1− q)(µ1− c). As a consequence, for
player 1 it is better to be active if qµ2 + (1 − q)(µ1 − c) > qµ2, that is if µ1 > c. This implies that
BR1(µˆ2) < µˆ2 and it is in contrast with respect to what we have previously found.
We prove now the following Lemma.
Lemma Assuming that player 1 knows the value of µˆ2. If µ1 ≥ µˆ2 ≥ c, then for player 1 it is
better to decide to be active and offer the service. As a consequence, BR1(µˆ2) = c.
We define r = χ(µ1,1)(µ2) and q = χ(µˆ2,1)(µ2)−χ(µ1,1)(µ2), where the use of the indicator function
χ means, for example, that q =
{
1, if µˆ2 ≤ µ2 ≤ µ1
0, otherwise
. Assuming this, if player 1 decides to be active
and offer the service, then its payoff is rµ2 + q(µ1 − c) + (1− r − q)(µ1 − c), instead if it decides not
to offer it, its payoff is rµ2 + qµ2 + (1− r − q)0. Then, for player 1 is better to be active if
rµ2 + q(µ1 − c) + (1− r − q)(µ1 − c) > rµ2 + qµ2 (3.36)
holds. This means that (1− r)(µ1 − c) > qµ2. Now, considering the expectation on µ2
(µ1 − c)Eµ2 [1− r] > Eµ2 [qµ2] (3.37)
(µ1 − c)
∫ 1
0
1(1− r)dµ2 >
∫ 1
0
qµ2dµ2 (3.38)
(µ1 − c)
∫ µ1
0
dµ2 >
∫ µ1
µˆ2
µ2dµ2 (3.39)
that is
(µ1 − c)
∫ µ1
0
dµ2 >
∫ µ1
µˆ2
µ2dµ2. (3.40)
As a consequence,
µ21 − 2cµ1 + µˆ22 > 0 (3.41)
that is always true because of the negative discriminant. This means that player 1 reaches a higher
payoff being active and offering the service. In conclusion, since in general it must hold that BRi(µˆj) ≥
c, BRi(µˆj > c) < µˆj , and BRi(µˆj < c) > µˆj > c, therefore, in this setup, the NE, that is also a Pareto
optimality, is given by the pair (µˆ1, µˆ2) = (c, c).
It is worth noting actually that still holds that it is not necessary to have a complete a priori
coordination. Consider a scenario in which the system works as in scenario with distributed service
without signaling with the difference that when both servers are active they can exchange some
information about their type values to be able to decide which of them is better to offer services.
Focusing on player 1, it is reasonable to assume that if µ1 < c, if player 2 is inactive and player 1
decides to be active and offer the service, its expected payoff is negative. Then, in this case, it is
better to be inactive for player 1 and having a zero expected payoff. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that player 1 decides to be active if µ1 > c. When this holds, three different cases can occur
according to the value of µ2
• case a 0 < µ2 < c: this occurs with probability Prob{µ2 < µ1} = µ1 and the payoff for player 1
is µ1 − c if it is active and offers the service, 0 otherwise;
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Figure 3.3: Total expected payoff for the distributed case without signaling (downlink case).
• case b c < µ2 < µ1: this occurs with probability Prob{µ2 < µ1} = µ1 and the payoff for player
1 is µ1 − c if it is active and offers the service, 0 otherwise;
• case c µ2 > µ1: this occurs with probability Prob{µ2 > µ1} = 1− µ1 and the payoff for player
1 is µ2 in any case.
Indeed, in case a and case b it holds that µ1 > c and µ2 < µ1, then when servers tell each other the
type values, player 1 knows that its type is higher, thus it has to decide whether being active and
offering the service or not according to the comparison of µ1 and c. Instead, in case c player 1 knows
a posteriori that its type is lower than its opponent type. Therefore, even if player 1 a priori decided
to be active, player 2 will be active too and offers the service since µ2 > µ1 holds. As a consequence,
player 1 expected payoff will be µ2. To evaluate the NE it is sufficient to compare the expected payoff
when active with respect to the expected payoff when inactive; in particular, µ1(µ1 − c) > 0.
We can drawn the same concluding remarks as the downlink case, and, in particular: (i) same
considerations hold reversing player 1 with player 2; (ii) the NE is given by the pair (µˆ1, µˆ2) = (c, c)
(that is, same result obtained for the scenario with coordinated service). As a consequence we can
state also for the uplink case that the best expected payoffs for the players cen be reached even just
allowing a partial communication between servers without assuming complete a priori knowledge.
3.2.3 Performance evaluations
3.2.3.1 Downlink case
We consider the distribution over types uniform in the interval (0, 1). For scenario 3.2.2.1, we take
the following NEs: (c, 1), (c2/3, c1/3), (c1/2, c1/2), (c1/3, c2/3), and (1, c). Moreover, we define the social
welfare as the sum of the expected payoff obtained for the two players.
Fig. 3.3 shows the social welfare obtained for scenario 3.2.2.1, considering the 5 NEs previously
mentioned. As we can observe from these results, the highest value of the social welfare is given by
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Figure 3.4: Player 1 expected payoff varying the cost of being active (downlink case).
the pairs (c, 1) and (1, c). The values of cost of being active c vary from 0.02 to 0.5 because for higher
values of c we obtained degraded performances for all cases.
Fig. 3.4 shows the expected payoff of player 1 in three of the scenarios considered in the downlink
case. Indeed, we have found that the best NEs for scenario 3.2.2.1, are the NEs of scenario 3.2.2.2,
case 2a and case 2b, then, for this reason, we consider results for scenario 3.2.2.2 case 2a and case 2b,
and scenario 3.2.2.3. As we can notice from this figure, the expected payoff for player 1 considering
scenario 3.2.2.3 and scenario 3.2.2.2 case 2b are the same. It is worth noting that scenario 3.2.2.3
represents the best possible scenario. Therefore, from Fig. 3.4 we can state that the performances
obtained when we assume client 1 always inactive are the same as the performances in the best possible
case. Instead, looking at scenario 3.2.2.2 case 2a when client 2 is always inactive, we can observe that
the expected payoff of player 1 is lower, in particular significantly lower as c increases, with respect to
the results of the other 2 scenarios considered. For symmetry reasons, the expected payoffs of player
2 are the same as those shown in Fig. 3.4.
Since for this setup focusing on player 1 payoff, we find that a selfish behavior of player 1 implies
the same payoff as the complete and perfect knowledge scenario, it can be stated that the computation
of the PoA is meaningless.
3.2.3.2 Uplink case
Fig. 3.5 shows the expected payoff of player 1 in the NEs obtained for the scenarios considered in
the uplink case. The cost c varies in the range [0.02 0.5] also for this results. In this figure, we can
notice that the payoff for scenario 3.2.2.6 is an upper bound due to the assumption of complete a
priori knowledge. On the other hand, the payoff for scenario 3.2.2.5 case 2a represents a lower bound.
Looking at scenario 3.2.2.5 case 2b, we can state that for small values of c it is not always advantageous
being always inactive: the player could have higher payoff cooperating with its opponent. Instead,
for higher values of c, scenario 3.2.2.5 case 2b gives a higher expected payoff with respect to scenario
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Figure 3.5: Player 1 expected payoff varying the cost of being active (uplink case).
3.2.2.4.
In Fig. 3.6 we show the PoA computed as the ratio between the social welfare obtained in scenario
3.2.2.6 (best case) and the social welfare in scenario 3.2.2.4. As we can notice, as c increases also the
PoA increases. This means that increasing the cost c, the social welfare becomes more affected by
non-cooperation in term of payoff.
In the same figure we show also what we have called the Maximum Diversity Gain, that is what a
player gain due to the fact that there is another player in the system with which it can cooperate. We
compute this quantity as the ratio between the social welfare in scenario 3.2.2.6 and the social welfare
in scenario 3.2.2.5. As c increases, also the maximum diversity gain increases.
3.2.4 Conclusions
In this Section of the present thesis, we considered systems with multiple candidate strategic agents
requiring or offering services (downlink or uplink case, respectively) that can decide to keep them
active, and therefore available to require/offer the service, or inactive. We analyzed our systems under
different cooperation and communication assumptions between the participiants and we applied game
theory to evaluate the agents’ behavior. Our main goal was to quantify the impact of the lack of
cooperation and of communication among the agents in terms of system performance.
In general, the main result is that the a priori perfect knowledge of the system is not necessary.
As a matter of fact, we found that additional partial information brings significant improvements in
the system. In particular, considering a scenario in which it is allowed to the agents to share specific
information about their types involves the same NE computation as the perfect knowledge case.
Considering a more dept reading of the numerical results, for the uplink case we found that staying
inactive is not always advantageous, but it depends on the value of the cost of being active that the
agent has to pay. On the other hand, for the downlink case it holds that the results related to the
scenario in which the client is acting selfishly in terms of payoff are the same as the results obtained
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Figure 3.6: Price of anarchy and maximum diversity gain varying the cost of being active (uplink
case).
considering a setup with complete and perfect knowledge. As a consequence, acting selfishly is not
always a negative choice, but it depends on the environment considered for the evaluations.
As a possible extension of the present analysis, it might be considered a different value for the cost
of the agents or a cost function that depends on some characteristic parameters of the system.
3.3 A zero-sum jamming game with incomplete position information
in wireless scenarios
Jamming problems are a classic application of game theory to wireless networks. 2 The scenario where
a legitimate transmitting network is contrasted by a malicious attacker acting on the purpose of dis-
rupting communication can be faced in several contexts. For example, wireless ad hoc networking for
military and civil purposes can be considered, where the jammer tries to disable the communication
capabilities of the network [54]. The investigation can be extended to the physical layer, where the
jammer is also able to corrupt the messages exchanged by the legitimate transmitters [55]. Also, cog-
nitive spectrum access [56] can be investigated as another scenario of application, where the jammers
can exploit vulnerabilities of reconfigurable cognitive radios.
From a modeling point of view, a jamming problem has a quite direct appeal in that, if properly
formulated, it involves just two agents and, therefore, can be naturally framed as a two-player game
between a legitimate network owner/user, from now on called the transmitter (T), and the adversary
that wants to cause disturbance or disruption in the communication, referred to as the jammer (J). In
this Section, we consider a simple setup where T can use multiple wireless channels for communicating
and can select among them based on their quality, described, for example, through some capacity
2This section is taken from “A Zero-Sum Jamming Game with Incomplete Position Information in Wireless scenarios”
published in IEEE European Wireless.
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expressions that ultimately depend on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). Thus, in the
case of fixed ambient noise, the data capacity of a channel only depends on the signal attenuation
on it, and of course on the actions of J. On the other hand, we assume that J is only capable of
brute-force attacks at the physical layer, aiming at raising the interference level on a given channel
[57]. The interference that J can cause on a channel depends on the attenuation that its transmission
gets on it.
For our evaluation, we adopt a standard formulation of the problem as a zero-sum game [55, 57],
where T is the maximizer and J is the minimizer. The value of the game will simply be the sum capacity
that T is able to achieve on the channels used for transmission. The final goal is to investigate the
role of mutual positioning between T and J, since the attenuation can be related to the path loss
experienced on the channel, which in the end is related to the distance. For the sake of simplicity, we
consider a simple distance-based path loss model, but it is immediate to generalize the results to any
situation where the channel quality is position-dependent.
We consider a Bayesian approach as done for jamming in [58] (and also in [59, 60] for other
networking problems), where T has different types based on the positions of its nodes. This reflects
the imperfect knowledge that J may have on the network structure. We aim to investigate the role
of the position of J, and how this can impact on the resulting equilibrium. For this reason, J is not
considered to be a player with type, this means that its position is known to all the players. Actually,
with this assumption we evaluate whether the presence (or the knowledge thereof) of a jammer in a
given position is a relevant element for the network and it changes its gameplay.
It turns out that, depending on the propagation scenario, there may be several situations where
the effect of J is limited. One of these cases is when J is so far from the network that it cannot cause
any damage; in this sense, our investigation includes physical layer security considerations [61], but it
is not limited to them. In reality, the cause of J’s irrelevance is more game theoretic than physical.
According to the structure of the game, if the resulting zero-sum formulation has a single NE in pure
strategies for J, i.e., there is a single behavior that a rational jammer can adopt, its presence can be
ignored. This is not because it does not cause any harm, but rather there is no effective countermeasure
that can be taken against it.
One can also argue that such a jammer would not even be detected in the first place [57]. As a
matter of fact, if J’s equilibrium move is to play along a certain pure strategy, T cannot tell whether J
is really present in the network or there simply is a high interference level. Because of this ignorance,
T has no margin of loss, and no margin for improvement either. On the other hand, there are positions
of J where the resulting NE dictates that J plays a mixed strategy, meaning that T should counteract
more than one possible jamming action. We label these positions as critical, and we identify them by
looking at where the maximin of the game is different from the minimax and therefore, roughly put,
there is something at stake for the communication network. As a general conclusion, we find that the
choice of the proper countermeasures against jamming attacks should take into account the position
of the jammers and possibly scan the interested area with different purposes, depending on whether
a potential position of a jammer is critical or not.
The rest of this Section is organized as follows. In Sub-section 3.3.1 we describe the propagation
scenario, with simplified fundamentals of wireless communications. In Sub-section 3.3.2 we give the
game theoretic model for the problem, and in Sub-section 3.3.3 we compute the NEs. We present
some numerical results in Sub-section 3.3.4. Finally, the concluding remarks can be found at the end
of the next Section.
3.3.1 Wireless scenario
Radio waves propagate in different ways depending on the frequency used, and more in general on
the physical scenario of communication [62]. However, the most important characteristic of interest
in our analysis is that the perceived signal strength of a radio signal depends on the mutual positions
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of transmitter and receiver. In many simplified models, the larger the distance, the weaker the signal.
This is also the rationale that we adopt in the following analysis, which allows for a simple description
by means of few parameters.
It is worthwhile noting, however, that radio propagation is much more complex than what will
be discussed; it involves a thorough description of the frequency channel and the geometry of the
area surrounding the transmitter and the receiver to account for factors such as: the presence or the
absence of a direct path (line-of-sight) between the terminals; the effect of reflections, refractions,
scattering, and related phenomena, from other objects present in the area; the characterization of the
noise on said channel; the existence of other transmitters located close-by that can cause interference;
and many other relevant issues. Also, these characteristics of the wireless channel are inherently time-
varying [63]. Rapid fluctuations of the signal strength are possible, especially in mobile environments.
Thus, the proper characterization of the wireless channel is that of a stochastic process and what we
give in the following is to be meant as its statistical description derived from different realizations
(which can be just samples at different time instants if the process is ergodic).
All these issues are outside the scope of the present work, where, for simplicity reasons, we consider
a stationary channel with a straightforward distance-dependent attenuation through a power law,
whose exponent is the only parameter that summarizes the scenario. More refined models are certainly
possible but do not qualitatively change the conclusions that we draw later.
Thus, a signal transmitted with power PT is received with a power attenuation a(dT ) depending
only on the distance dT between the transmitter and the receiver, and therefore called the path loss at
a distance dT . We assume that a(dT ) follows a power law with positive exponent α, usually α ∈ [2, 4],
i.e.,
a(dT ) = K0
(
dt
d0
)α
(3.42)
where d0 is a reference distance (in particular, we can consider d0 = 1m), so as to drop it from the
equation) and K0 is the attenuation at d0. The received power will be PT /a(dT ).
We can assume a background noise with power spectral density N0 to be present on the channel,
whose bandwidth is equal to B. It is common to take the noise term as an additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN). The noise power will thus be N0B. The meaning of this term can also be extended
to include interference effects from other transmitters. Moreover, note that the background noise
does not necessarily have to be white (and thus N0 be a constant), nor Gaussian [64]; however,
basic communication theory descriptions often regard the noise in terms of equivalent thermal noise
characterizations, e.g., through noise temperature. Or alternatively, the term N0B can be replaced
with a more complicated expression where we compute the integral of the power spectral density over
the channel band [62].
In short, we use N0B to include both noise and also any unintentional interference. We can
therefore compute the SINR at the receiver when the transmitter is at a distance dT , denoted as
Γ(dT ), in the absence of jamming, as
Γ(dT ) =
PT
a(dT )N0B
. (3.43)
Instead, if a jammer is present on the same channel, located at a distance dJ from the receiver and
using a jamming power PJ , we must consider it when computing the SINR; therefore we denote it as
Γ(dT , dJ), and put it equal to
Γ(dT , dJ) =
PT
a(dT )[N0B + PJ/a(dJ)]
. (3.44)
We can use 3.42 to model the attenuation of both the transmitter and the jammer. However, to
take into account that the propagation models of the two may be different, we consider two different
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parameters in the equation, i.e., we denote with α (as before) the path loss exponent of the transmitter,
and, conversely, we use β for the jammer (for simplicity, we use the same K0, though). From 3.44, we
obtain
Γ(dT , dJ) =
PT
dαT [K0N0B + PJ/d
β
J ]
. (3.45)
If noise, bandwidth, and transmission powers (both the useful and the jamming terms) are constants,
the impact of the distance can be summarized as
Γ(dT , dJ) =
1
dαT (K1 +K2d
−β
J )
, (3.46)
with K1 and K2 being suitable constants. An infinitely far jammer has no effect on the SINR, as
Γ(dT ) = Γ(dT ,∞).
A suitable performance metric that may describe what a transmitter would like to maximize (and
a jammer to minimize) is the channel capacity C. For example, we can use the formula of the Shannon
capacity for an AWGN channel, which results in defining C as
C = Blog2[1 + Γ(dT , dJ)], (3.47)
which depends on the SINR (and, thus, also on the presence of a jammer).
If the transmitter operates over F multiple channels spanned by index i = 1, 2, ..., F , and each
of them has bandwidth Bi, we take ξi to represent an indicator function that equals 1 whether the
jammer is disturbing with power PJ the transmission on the ith channel, and 0 otherwise. The sum
capacity available in the system in the presence of a jammer is therefore
Ctot =
F∑
i=1
{χiBilog2[1 + Γ(dT , dJ)] + (1− χi)Bilog2[1 + Γ(dT )]}. (3.48)
Remarkably, the Shannon capacity is a good choice in terms of utility in the micro-economic
sense [65], since it is a concave function of the SINR. In the following Sub-section, we will use it to
characterize the payoff received by T in a zero-sum game.
3.3.2 Game theoretic model
We consider a wireless network with 2 transmitters, denoted as T1 and T2, sending data to a receiver
(sink node), whose distances from the receiver are d1 and d2, respectively. The available spectrum is
divided into 2 channels (c1 and c2) of equal bandwidth B. For the sake of simplicity, all propagation
aspects of the channels will be represented through the path loss exponent of 3.42. In particular,
we assume that c1 and c1 are characterized by parameters α1 and α2, respectively, when the useful
transmitters operate on them. The entire network is represented by the single player T in the game,
which thus comprehends T1, T2, and the receiver, as they are assumed to act towards the same goal,
i.e., maximizing the total network capacity. To coordinate multiple access of T1 and T2, the network
adopts a frequency division multiple access (FDMA) scheme, i.e., either of the channels c1 and c2 is
assigned to T1 and the other to T2, without overlap. Nodes T1 and T2 use the same transmission power
PT .
However, the network activity is menaced by a malicious jammer J whose aim is to minimize
the overall capacity of the network. The jammer is placed at distance dJ from the receiver, and can
operate over only either c1 or c2, with a fixed power PJ , as per 3.44. Also, the path loss exponent
perceived by J on channels c1 and c2 is equal to β1 and β2, respectively.
Our goal is to model the interaction between T and J as a zero-sum game with incomplete infor-
mation. Thus, we consider a finite set D that has cardinality D and contains pairs of distances, i.e.,
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D = ((d(1)1 , d(1)2 ), ..., (d(D)1 , d(D)2 )), where d(k)i is the ith transmitter’s distance in the kth pair. Each of
the elements of D is considered to be a type of player T, denoted as Θk = (d(k)1 , d(k)2 ). T can be of
type Θk with probability pk, where the terms pk are values between 0 and 1 for which
∑
k pk = 1.
For example, if a finite set of distances Z = {zj}j=1,....,L is available for both transmitters, and the
transmitters can even have the same distance, then D = Z × Z and D = L2. For the analysis, we
consider that dJ can only have one value (a possible extension of the present investigation is to allow
also uncertainty for dJ). The distance dJ is known by both players. Conversely, type Θk is only known
to player T, but the probability distribution p = (p1, p2..., pD) is common knowledge in the game.
This characterization with types follows that of Bayesian games.
Once the type Θk of T is given by a virtual player called Nature, T can perform either of these
two actions: (A1) assign c1 to T1 (and, consequently, c2 to T2); (A2) the exact opposite, i.e., assign
c2 to T1. Since the channels are fully described by the propagation parameter αi, if A1 is chosen,
then the index i of αi is the same of Ti; for A2, they do not match. Hence, T has N = 2
D pure
strategies, since a strategy is defined as a D-tuple of actions, one per each type that T can be, and
each action has two alternatives to choose from. We write the ith pure strategy of T as Xi, then the
kth element of the associated D-tuple, referred to as Xi(k), defines whether T plays action A1 or A2
when its type is Θk. J can instead perform either of the two actions: (Y1) attack channel c1 with
attenuation parameter β1, or (Y2) attack c2 with attenuation parameter β2. Therefore, J has just two
pure strategies, coinciding with its actions Y1 and Y2.
We denote the sets of all possible pure strategies of the players as X = {Xi}i=1,...,N and Y =
{Y1, Y2}. We define a mixed strategy ξ for T as an N -tuple (ξ1, ..., ξN ) that belongs to the space of
probability distributions over X , ∆X , i.e., ξi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, .., N and
∑
i=1,..,N ξi = 1. So, ξi denotes
the probability that T plays Xi. Similarly, a mixed strategy η for J belongs to ∆Y and is the pair of
probabilities η1 and η2 = 1− η1 that J plays Y1 and Y2, respectively.
Given the prior probabilities p = (p1, ...., pD) for the type of T, we can put this Bayesian game
in normal form using a N × 2 matrix M = {mij}, where entry mij with i = 1, ..., N and j = 1, 2,
represents the expected payoff for T when players T and J play their ith and jth pure strategy,
respectively, computed as
mij =
D∑
k=1
pkCtot(Xi(k), Yj) (3.49)
where Ctot(Xi(k), Yj) is the sum capacity of the network according to Eq. 3.48 when T is of type Θk,
and thus performs action Xi(k) with probability pk, while J chooses action Yj .
Also note that since the game is zero-sum, we do not need to represent J’s payoff, which will be
−mij . Finally, the expected payoff of a joint mixed strategy (ξ, η) can be computed by averaging the
entries of M with weights equal to the probabilities of ξ and η.
3.3.3 Bayesian Nash Equilibria computation
The Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNEs) of the zero-sum game, given the prior distribution p for the
type of T and the resulting payoff matrix M, can be found via von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem
[66]. Since the game is a classic zero-sum game, it can be found to have at least one NE in mixed
strategies, and actually all NEs yield the same payoffs. The mixed strategies played at NE will be
maximinimizer strategies for both players, i.e., they assure to the players the highest payoff they can
get in the worst-case scenario of the strategy played by the opponent.
We denote one of these equivalent NEs as (ξ∗, η∗), where ξ∗ is the mixed strategy played by T and
η∗ is that played by J. There will be a unique quantity v, called the value of the game, such that each
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NE yields a payoff equal to v to T (and correspondingly a payoff equal to -v to J), for which
v = max
∆X
min
1≤j≤2
N∑
i=1
ξ∗imij = min
∆Y
max
1≤i≤N
(mi1η
∗
1 +mi2η
∗
2). (3.50)
To solve numerically, we search for ω1 and ω2, with
ω1 = min
1≤j≤2
N∑
i=1
ξ∗imij (3.51)
ω2 = max
1≤i≤N
(mi1η
∗
1 +mi2η
∗
2), (3.52)
so that ω1 is maximized and ω2 is minimized. The Minimax Theorem guarantees that the pair (ξ
∗, η∗)
is a NE and the value is given by ω1 = ω2. To solve the maximization of 3.51 and the minimization
of 3.52, we reduce them to two linear programs with proper slack variables for ω1 and ω2. Thus, the
problems become
max ω1
s.t. ω1 ≤
N∑
i=1
ξimi1, ω1 ≤
N∑
i=1
ξimi2
ξi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., N,
N∑
i=1
ξi = 1
(3.53)
and, analogously,
min ω2
s.t. ω2 ≥ η1m11 + η2m12
.
.
.
ω2 ≥ η1mN1 + η2mN2
η1 ≥ 0, η2 ≥ 0, η1 + η2 = 1.
(3.54)
Both problems can be solved by means of optimization techniques; we used Dantzig’s simplex algorithm
[67]. We evaluate and compare the solution for different choices of the set D, the prior p, the distance
of the jammer dJ , and the propagation coefficients αi and βi.
We also compute the maximin and the minimax in pure strategies, which can be done by consid-
ering the same problems as above but imposing ξ and η to have all the elements equal to 0 but one,
which is equal to 1. In this case, ω1 gives the maximin and ω2 the minimax. As a matter of fact,
these values can be immediately found by scanning the matrix M and taking minima and maxima
over rows and columns.
3.3.4 Numerical results
We evaluate a scenario where the propagation parameters α1, α2, β1, and β2 take different values
in the range 2÷3. We take N0B, which represents the noise power plus the external unintentional
interference, as equal to −120 dBm. We set the transmission power terms of the transmitter and the
jammer to be the same, i.e., PT = PJ = 0 dBm.
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Figure 3.7: NE strategy of T as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 15] m
(α1=α2=β1=2, β2=2.5, prior distribution for T’s type: [1/3 1/3 1/3]).
We set 3 types for T in D = {(5, 5), (5, 10), (10, 10)} m. As a consequence, each of the 8 pure
strategies of T is a triple of binary values (for brevity, we just write 1 or 2 instead of A1 or A2). For
example, strategy [1 2 1] denotes that T assigns c1 (i.e., the channel with attenuation parameter α1)
to transmitter T1 when it is of type 1 or 3, while it assigns c2 (i.e., the one with attenuation parameter
α2) to T1 if it is of type 2; in other words, this strategy means that channel c1 is assigned to T1 when
the transmitters are at the same distance, and to T2 if T1 is closer to the sink. Finally, we place the
jammer at a distance dJ ranging from 0.01 to 15 m.
In this scenario, we evaluate the NE of the game, and its dependence on dJ . First, we considered
the case of a uniform distribution for the types of T, i.e. pk =
1
3 , k = 1, 2, 3, with attenuation
parameters α1 = α2 = 2 for T, and β1 = 2, β2 = 2.5 for J. Figs. 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 refer to this setting.
Figs. 3.7 and 3.8 show T’s mixed strategy and J’s mixed strategy, respectively, depending on dJ .
In particular, Figs. 3.8 reveals that there are values of dJ for which the strategy of J at equilibrium is
pure. For these cases, the corresponding strategy of T is a mixed strategy with probability 1/4 split
over a support represented by all pure strategies [· 2 ·], i.e., those for which action number 2 is played
by T when its type is Θ2. In other words, T surely plays A2 when the nodes T1 and T2 are placed at
different distances, otherwise it randomly chooses between its alternatives; indeed, when the strategy
of J is pure, and the nodes are placed at identical distances, T is indifferent on which channel to assign
to the nodes.
This result is also visible from figures such as Fig. 3.9, in which we plot the NE payoff for T
(quantified as the capacity per unit of bandwidth: this is also what displayed in all similar plots
afterwards), together with the maximin and minimax payoff in pure strategies. In the very region
where J’s equilibrium move is a pure strategy, the three curves coincide. In these cases, the transmitter
strategy can be regarded as insensitive to the presence of a jammer. From Fig. 3.9, the game has
some degree of uncertainty in its outcome only when dJ is less than 4.484 m, which means that the
jammer has an unpredictable behavior more or less only when closer to the receiver than the closest
position available to the transmitters.
Fig. 3.10 shows the comparison between NE’s payoff, maximin’s payoff and minimax ’s payoff for
a configuration slightly different from the previous one. We considered the same a priori probability
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Figure 3.8: NE strategy of J as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 15] m
(α1=α2=β1=2, β2=2.5, prior distribution for T’s type: [1/3 1/3 1/3]).
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Figure 3.9: NE payoff in mixed strategies as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 15] m (α1=α2=β1=2, β2=2.5,
prior distribution for T’s type: [1/3 1/3 1/3]).
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Figure 3.10: NE payoff in mixed strategies as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 15] m (α1=β1=β2=2, α2=2.5,
prior distribution for T’s type: [1/3 1/3 1/3]).
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Figure 3.11: NE payoff in mixed strategy as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 15] m (α1=β2=2, α2=β1=2.5,
prior distribution for T’s type: [1/3 1/3 1/3]).
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Figure 3.12: NE payoff in mixed strategy as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 15] m (α1=α2=β1=2, β2=2.5,
prior distribution for T’s type: [1/6 2/3 1/6]).
but we set α1 = β1 = β2 = 2 and α2 = 2.5. In this case, the NE always imply a pure strategy for the
jammer, regardless of the distance of J from the destination, since the maximin and minimax, and also
the NE payoff, coincide for every dJ , and thus T’s strategy is always insensitive to J’s presence. This
result is also correct since, in the presence of an unbalanced situation for the transmitter but not for
the jammer (a channel has lower αi and therefore has better quality, while the two βi are identical),
intuitively the jammer should always cause disturbance on the better channel.
Fig. 3.11 shows the comparison between NE’s payoff, maximin’s payoff and minimax ’s payoff for
α1 = β2 = 2 and α2 = β1 = 2.5. In this case, the NE strategy of the jammer does not degenerate into
a pure strategy for a whole region of intermediate distances, 5.298 m < dJ < 8.730 m, which is more
or less comprised between the available positions for the two transmitters.
Figs. 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 show the results obtained considering the same values for the parameters
used in Figs. 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11, respectively, for a non-uniform distribution of T types, where p2 = 2/3,
and p1 = p3 = 1/6. This leads to an expansion of the critical regions in which the jammer plays a
mixed strategy. In particular, in Fig. 3.12 the border of the critical region is pushed to 5.830 m, i.e.,
beyond the smallest value in D, i.e., 5 m, and a similar and even more relevant enlargement of the
region happens in Fig. 3.14, where J plays a mixed strategy in the entire interval 0 < dj < 10.012
m. Also, in Fig. 3.13, differently from the similarly shaped Fig. 3.10, the equilibrium strategy of the
jammer is not a pure strategy for a very wide range of positions, namely, for dJ < 11.740 m, even
though the differences are minor.
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Figure 3.13: NE payoff in mixed strategy as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 15] m (α1=β1=β2=2, α2=2.5,
prior distribution for T’s type: [1/6 2/3 1/6]).
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Figure 3.14: NE payoff in mixed strategy as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 15] m (α1=β2=2, α2=β1=2.5, a
priori probability [1/6 2/3 1/6]).
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3.4 Jamming in underwater sensor network as a Bayesian zero-sum
game with position uncertainty
We further apply the analysis just discussed to an underwater scenario.3 Underwater acoustic sensor
networks (UASNs) can be employed in a wide array of applications, from monitoring and prevention
of seismic events, such as tsunamis and/or earthquakes, to equipment control and surveillance for
autonomous systems operating undersea [68]. As any other kind of communication systems, they may
be subject to malicious attacks. One of these is jamming. Since most of the practical solutions for
counteracting jammers are designed with terrestrial radio networks in mind, they may be unsuitable
for UASNs, which can therefore be extremely vulnerable to such attacks [69]. Also in considering
this scenario, we tackle the investigation according to a game theoretic point of view. We consider a
scenario, similar to [58], where the jammer creates noise-like interference with the aim of producing
denial-of-service attacks. Indeed, underwater sensors do not usually possess sophisticated signal pro-
cessing capabilities and, consequently, it is reasonable to assume that jamming attacks just consist of
raising the noise level. In this setup as well as in the previus Section, the sensor nodes are able to
use several communication channels and the resulting utility of the network is determined by its total
transmission capacity. The jammer is only able to produce noise-like interference on a channel at a
time and the interference that it causes depends on the attenuation perceived on it.
In the following, the sensors play together as the maximizer of the sum capacity that the network
can reach on the channels involved in the transmission, and the jammer is the corresponding minimizer,
and, in general, the analysis proceeds at most at the same way as discussed for the Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) case.
In more details, the rest of this Section is organized as follows. In Sub-section 3.4.1 we describe
the propagation scenario, with simplified fundamentals of underwater wireless communications. We
present some numerical results in Sub-section 3.4.2. Finally, we draw the general conclusions consid-
ering also the WSNs analysis in Sub-section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Underwater scenario
Research on UASNs is somehow more limited compared to terrestrial sensor networks based on radio
communications. These two kinds of networks share similarities for what concerns their many potential
applications and their distributed nature; the main difference relates to the specific physical layer
utilized, which relies on acoustic and radio waves, respectively, since it is generally accepted that radio
signals do not propagate well underwater [73].
While the wireless medium is fairly understood in the literature, the acoustic channel for under-
water communications is more difficult to characterize and utilize. Also, the standard uses of acoustic
communications mostly involve echolocation (with applications such as the sonar and the fathometer),
which, from a networking standpoint, have little interest as it only involves a single transmitter-receiver
pair. The study of acoustic communications in a network context is more constrained, also because,
still differently from terrestrial networks, equipment may be much more expensive.
Still, it may be expected that in specific environments and fields of application, submarine network-
ing can find suitable exploitation. Moreover, due to the inherent difficulty of coordinating multiple
nodes underwater, game theory investigations can be useful to devise distributed solutions. The major
features and challenges that need to be faced in underwater environments include, but are not limited
to, the following issues [74]. First of all, underwater channels have a small bandwidth compared to
their terrestrial counterparts, resulting in lower bit rates. Also, the speed of acoustic waves in water is
five orders of magnitudes lower than that of electro-magnetic waves in air (about 1.5 · 103 m/s versus
3This section is taken from “Jamming in Underwater Sensor Networks as a Bayesian Zero-Sum Game with Position
Uncertainty” published in IEEE GLOBECOM.
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3 · 108 m/s, respectively); this results in a huge propagation delay in underwater channels. Thus, it
is hinted in [65] that FDMA may be more attractive than its time division analog. However, under-
water channels have much lower carrier frequencies than radio (kilohertz versus gigahertz), thus they
cannot be considered as narrowband and frequency-selectivity must be accounted for even in a simple
analysis. Actually, the use of cognitive and opportunistic access techniques can be a solution to adapt
communication to the varying conditions at different times, distances, and channels.
All of these elements will be taken into account in our analysis. Other aspects that are not explicitly
considered, but are worth mentioning, regard the higher unreliability of underwater networks, even in
controlled scenarios: radio networks can be unreliable too, but to a lower extent and/or only if adverse
conditions are assumed. Underwater links may lose connectivity due to propagation phenomena under
the sea surface, or because of node mobility due to oceanic currents. Finally, underwater sensor nodes
have severe energy constraints, since battery replacement or energy harvesting, e.g., through solar
panels, may be extremely difficult or unavailable.
For these reasons, jamming attacks may be extremely harmful in underwater environments, and
mechanisms to detect and prevent them are important. The huge propagation delay might forbid the
sensor nodes from communicating with external controllers; as a consequence, an underwater network
has to exploit its own resources to detect and mitigate the jamming attack [69].
The acoustic power attenuation of underwater channels is strongly dependent on the communi-
cation distance and on the signal frequency. An absorption loss is present, due to the conversion of
acoustic pressure into heat, which increases with the signal frequency f as well as with the communi-
cation distance d. As a consequence, shorter communication links offer higher data rates. Attenuation
A(d, f) can be expressed in dB using Urick’s model as [76]
10 log10A(d, f) = A0 + k log10 d+ d10 log10 a(f) (3.55)
where k is a spreading factor term, a(f) is an absorpion coefficient, and A0 is a normalization constant
(the value for A(d, f) at 1 m and very low frequencies). Formula 3.55 shares structural similarities with
path loss expressions commonly used for the wireless case [77]. There are some relevant differences,
though. First of all, since water is a much more dispersive medium for acoustic waves than what
air is for electro-magnetic beams, there is a further dependence of distance: beyond the geometrical
spreading, i.e., the first summand, d also appears in the second one, the absorption term. Also,
the spreading factor k, describing the geometry of propagation, has lower values than what usually
considered in radio environments [77]. Spherical spreading, that would lead to k = 20, is taken to be
a best-case value in radio propagation, where the presence of obstacles lead to much higher values.
Instead, for underwater acoustic propagation, shallow water scenarios may even have a more favorable
spreading than spherical, since physical waveguide effects may produce a cylindrical spreading [78],
and therefore 10 ≤ k ≤ 20.
Absorption is expressed using Thorp’s formula, giving a(f) as a function of frequency f as [79]
10 log10 a(f) = aW f
2 + α1
f2
f21 + f
2
+ α2
f2
f22 + f
2
+ ... (3.56)
where aW is a pressure-dependent coefficient describing absorption in pure water, while the αjs,
with j = 1, 2, ... weigh further terms due to saline absorptions, and the terms fj are the relaxation
frequencies for these terms. For sea water, two such terms are usually included, j = 1 is for boric acid,
especially relevant at low frequencies, and j = 2 for magnesium sulphate.
The oceanic noise can be modeled as the sum of several components, including turbulence, shipping,
surface motion, and thermal noises [80]. Thus, we consider a power spectral density (PSD) of the noise
N(f) = Nt(f) + Ns(f) + Nw(f) + Nth(f), where Nt(f), Ns(f), Nw(f), and Nth(f) are noise terms
corresponding to turbulence, shipping, surface motion, and thermal noise, respectively.
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These components can be expressed in dB re µPa per Hz as a function of the frequency f in kHz
as [75]
10 log10Nt(f) = 17− 30 log10 f (3.57)
10 log10Ns(f) = 40 + 20(s− 0.5) + 26 log10 f − 60 log10(f + 0.3) (3.58)
10 log10NW (f) = 50 + 7.5ω
1
2 + 20 log10 f − 40 log10(f + 0.4) (3.59)
10 log10Nth(f) = −15 + 20 log10 f. (3.60)
The parameters in 3.57-3.60 are the shipping activity s, ranging from 0 for lowest activity to 1 for
most intense shipping and ω, i.e., the wind speed value in m/s, since surface motion noise is caused
by wind-driven waves. In our numerical setup, we considered practical spreading with k = 15, A0 = 0
dB, intermediate shipping activity s = 0.5 and no wind (ω = 0), and a frequency range between 10
and 40 kHz. At these frequencies, absorption due to pure water and boric acid are negligible, while we
consider the absorption associated to magnesium sulphate, with parameters f2 = 66 kHz and α2 = 48
dB/km [81].
If a communication channel operates on a frequency band Bi with bandwidth Bi = |Bi|, using a
flat power profile, then the average SNR for a tone at frequency f can be expressed as [75]
SNR(d, f) =
PS
A(d, f)N(f)Bi
(3.61)
where PS is the power of the transmitting sensor node, A(d, f) is the attenuation PSD and N(f) is the
noise PSD. As it can be noticed, the expression of the SNR is the same as the previous Section, however
the formulations of attenuation and backgroung noise are quite different because of the different
communication channel considered. In particular, A(d, f) increases with f while N(f) decreases with
f (at least in the relevant interval for acoustic communications). As a result, [A(d, f)N(f)]−1 has a
maximum for some frequency. Fig. 3.15 shows the frequency-dependent part of the SNR for a tone
transmitted underwater with d = {1, 5} km with the aforementioned choice of parameters.
For the transmission over Bi, Shannon’s capacity Ci is
Ci =
∫
Bi
log2[1 + SNR(d, f)df ]. (3.62)
However, if a malicious node also causes noise-like interference on a specific channel, this as to be
taken into account in the capacity’s computation; consequently, we replace the SNR with the average
SNJR which is
SNJR(d, f) =
PS
A(d, f)[N(f)Bi + PJA(dJ , f)−1]
(3.63)
where PJ is the power of the malicious node and dJ is its distance from the receiver. The channel
capacity in the presence of a jammer becomes
C
′
i =
∫
Bi
log2[1 + SNJR(d, f)df ]. (3.64)
In the next Sub-section we will directly discuss the numerical results obtained considering different
values of the parameters describing the setup under investigation. This is due to the fact that the
game theoretic model and the BNEs computation are exactly the same as those described for the WSN
case. Indeed, in this scenario the relevant aspect is that we change the nature of the communications
channel, however the overall mathematical formulation is still the same.
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Figure 3.15: Frequency-dependent part of the SNR [A(d, f)N(f)]−1 for a tone transmitted underwater
with d = 1, 5 km (s = 0.5, w = 0 m/s).
3.4.2 Numerical results
We consider a scenario with two sensors (T1 and T2), a receiver (included in T at the same way as
previously discussed for the WSN scenario), and a jammer J. Given the matrix M, whose entry mij
represents the expected payoff for T when player T is playing its ith pure strategy and player J is
playing its jth pure strategy, to compute BNEs we use first von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem and,
then, we solve
max ω1
s.t. ω1 ≤
N∑
i=1
ξimi1, ω1 ≤
N∑
i=1
ξimi2
ξi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., N,
N∑
i=1
ξi = 1
(3.65)
and
min ω2
s.t. ω2 ≥ η1m11 + η2m12
.
.
.
ω2 ≥ η1mN1 + η2mN2
η1 ≥ 0, η2 ≥ 0, η1 + η2 = 1.
(3.66)
by means of Dantzig’s simplex algorithm, where ξi is the mixed strategy played by T and ηi is that
played by J.
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Figure 3.16: T mixed strategy as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 6] km (prior distribution for T’s type:
[1/3 1/3 1/3]).
We assume that the transmission powers are constant PT = PJ = 95 dB re µPa. We solve the
game for dJ ranging from 0.01 to 6 km. We assume that T1 and T2 share a common spectrum at
[10, 40] kHz, divided into 2 channels (c1 and c2) of 15 kHz (B1 = [10, 25] kHz and B2 = [25, 40] kHz
are the frequencies range considered for c1 and c2, respectively). Noise and attenuation over these
channels can be determined as previously discussed obtaining
N1 =
∫
B1
N(f)df = 37.44dBreµPa, (3.67)
N2 =
∫
B2
N(f)df = 32.87dBreµPa. (3.68)
It can be noticed by looking at Fig. 3.15 that, although channel c1 has a slightly higher noise, it is
the better channel for a sensor that is far away.
The possible positions for the sensors are at 1 and 5 km. We could consider all pairs (4 alternatives)
to be included inD, but since two of them, i.e., (1, 5)km and (5, 1)km, give the same results, we consider
just D = {(1, 1), (1, 5), (5, 5)} km. Consequently, T has 3 types and each of the 23 = 8 pure strategies
of T is a triple. For the sake of clarity, as seen for the wireless network case, [1 1 2] means that T
assigns c1 to T1 if it is of type 1 or 2, while it assigns c2 to T1 if it is of type 3.
Given this setting, we plot the BNE of the game as a function of dJ . Figs. 3.16 and 3.17 report
the BNE strategies of the players. We consider the case of a uniform prior distribution for T’s type,
i.e., p = [1/3 1/3 1/3]. Fig. 3.16 shows that there exists a critical distance dc for J such that all
BNE strategies of T are equiprobable combinations over a support given by all pure strategies in the
form [·, 2, ·]. That means that T always plays A2 (i.e., assigning c1 to T1) if its type is (1, 5), which,
in turn, means that it assigns the closer node to the worse channel (anticipating J will not jam it),
and, furthermore, it blindly selects its move if it is of types (1, 1) or (5, 5), due to the fact that it is
indifferent on its alternatives if the distances of the nodes are equal. Fig. 3.17 shows the same results
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Figure 3.17: J mixed strategy as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 6] km (prior distribution for T’s type:
[1/3 1/3 1/3]).
from J’s standpoint, i.e., there exists a distance dc for J at which its BNE strategies are pure, namely,
J disrupts communication on c1 with probability 1.
In Fig. 3.18 the payoff at BNE for T quantified as the sum capacity of the network in bit/s is
shown. The BNE expected payoff for T is bound by the maximin’s payoff and the minimax ’s payoff
in pure strategies. These quantities are computed as the maximum of the minima and the minimum
of the maxima over rows and columns of M. The three curves converge at dc and, then, coincide for
dJ ≥ dc. In this region the behavior of the sensor network is almost independently of the jammer’s
action, and vice versa. The Bayesian game is uncertain of its outcome at the equilibrium only when
dJ ≤ 1.68 km, that means that the jammer is relatively close to the receiver, closer or just slightly
farther than the closer of the two sensors.
Furthermore, we consider a different configuration of the network, in particular with a non-uniform
prior distribution for T’s type, such as p = [3/4 1/8 1/8] (Fig. 3.19). It is worth noting that
considering this configuration, the transmitting sensor nodes are more likely to be close to the sink
node and located at the same distance (this is also known to the jammer). Fig. 3.19 shows the BNE
payoff for T and, also, the maximin’s payoff and the minimax ’s payoff in pure strategies. We obtain
performance similar to the previous case, i.e., the three curves converge if dJ is greater than dc, but,
now, dc is smaller than before, it equals 1.01 km. The maximin and minimax bounds are tighter,
consequently, the situation resembles a pure strategy case regardless of dJ .
Finally, we consider another non-uniform prior distribution for T’s type, p = [1/8 1/8 3/4]. The
BNE payoff for T, the maximin and minimax bounds coincide for every dJ ranging from 0.01 to 6
km (Fig. 3.20). As a consequence, if transmitting sensor nodes are likely to be far from the sink
node, then the strategy of T is always independent of dJ . Intuitively, the jammer will always disrupt
communication on the better channel (c1). However, this does not mean that the jammer has no
impact. Indeed, it can be noticed that the achieved capacity is much lower than what achieved in
the previous cases (Figs. 3.18 and 3.19). Neverthless, the network performance is more predictable.
Moreover, in this setup the sensor network actually knows that there is a jammer, but, in reality it
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Figure 3.18: NE payoff in mixed strategies as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 6] km (prior distribution for T’s
type: [1/3 1/3 1/3]).
Figure 3.19: NE payoff in mixed strategies as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 6] km (prior distribution for T’s
type: [3/4 1/8 1/8]).
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Figure 3.20: NE payoff in mixed strategies as a function of dJ ∈ [0.01, 6] km (prior distribution for T’s
type: [1/8 1/8 3/4]).
would be actually difficult to detect it, since its actions would be identical to a higher noise (e.g., due
to a more intense shipping or wind noise) on channel c1.
3.4.3 Concluding remarks for the jamming problem evaluation in WSNs and
UASNs
In these last two Sections, we investigated a game theoretic setup of the jamming problem with variable
distances of the players involved. In particular, we formulated a Bayesian game where we framed the
positions of the useful transmitters as the type of the maximizer player, whereas the jammer, i.e., the
minimizer player, can only occupy a fixed position, which is characterized by a distance dJ from the
intended receiver. In particular, we considered two possible different scenarios: wireless network and
underwater acoustic sensor network. The difference between these two environments is due to the
fact that the communication channels differ. For example, it is well known that underwater channels
have a small bandwidth compared to terrestrial channels, meaning lower bit rates. Then, the speed
of acoustic waves in water is several orders of magnitudes lower than that of the electromagnetic
ones in air, consequently, this results in a huge propagation delay. Therefore, some medium access
adjustments may be necessary. However, in general, it was possible to draw the same final observations
in both cases. We investigated the dependence of the NEs and the resulting payoff on dJ . We obtained
as the main result that, depending on the propagation parameters, there are intervals for dJ where
the NE solution implies that the jammer adopts a pure strategy, that means that a given channel
is jammed with probability 1. As a matter of fact, the network manager should especially control
those situations where this does not happen. Those cases are the ones in which the jammer occupies
a position according to which at the equilibrium its strategy mixes multiple jamming actions. Such
scenarios have been classified as critical positions for the jammer. It can further be stated that any
security enforcement should especially check those areas for jammers.
However, it would make sense to consider a deeper interaction between the network and the jammer,
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where the game formulated here is used as a basis. For example, it can be thought of relaxing the
assumption of knowing the jammer’s position with certainty, and let this to be the type of the jammer.
Our preliminary investigations indicate that the game becomes even more interesting. Especially, a
more complicate interaction takes place and in the end the region where a jammer exhibits critical
influence may change and even shrink further. Future analysis will be required to extend the analysis
and identify challenges in an expanded setup with more advanced game theory instruments.
3.5 Analysis of strategic security through game theory for mobile
social networks
Social mobile networking is rapidly expanding, as most of the users connected to social networks
also enjoy wireless connectivity and the seamless integration brought by next generation networking
[82].4 However, this poses unprecedented challenges in terms of network security. Connecting to
unprotected wireless hot-spots and/or interacting with other mobile nodes in a machine-to-machine
communication may imply the risk of having sensible information stolen and/or services disrupted by
malicious adversaries [83]. Furthermore, in the previous Section we addressed the problem of jamming
in wireless and underwater acoustic sensor network, where a malicious node with the aim of disrupting
network communications is present.
Mobile nodes are usually unaware of the intentions of the terminals they are interacting with.
From a theoretical perspective, the network layer of a social mobile network operates assuming full
cooperation and commonality of intents. However, not all the involved nodes may be benign: some
can be adversaries pretending to collaborate, while instead pursuing some different purposes than the
network wellbeing. In general, there exist multiple kinds of malicious clients with different purposes
and abilities. These clients could act as hacker, cracker, cybercriminals, cyber terrorist, and malicious
insiders [84]. As a consequence, we deal with several security problems in which the identity of a client
is unknown to a legitimate node searching for collaboration. Thereafter, we refer to this scenario as a
server-client interaction, even though this is done only to follow the common choices in the literature
and by no means limited to this kind of interaction. Hence, in what follows server denotes a legitimate
node of the network that interacts with a client of unknown intentions [89].
If the server trusts the clients to be benign and does not implement a surveillance procedure,
attackers would be able to disrupt network operation by simply pretending to be legitimate clients.
On the other hand, if the server considers each client as a potential malicious agent, it will implement
some costly surveillance procedure that decreases the quality of service provided, not only for the
server itself, but also for all the legitimate benign clients. Therefore, the most compelling network
security problem is to correctly define a proper operation where both types of clients are considered
and efficient defense strategies are designed with the purpose of preventing malicious activities and
providing good quality of services to benign nodes [85].
Game theory has been widely used to tackle security problems in communication networks [94].
This approach enables low-cost distributed management of the network, as well as defining some
theoretical performance bounds. However, most security issues are generally modeled as the interaction
between a defender and a node that is certain to be a malicious attacker. In reality, the correct
identification of a malicious client is challenging, especially if the attacker adopts a strategic behavior
that tries to keep its true intent hidden from the network [88]. For this reason, it is not always possible
to infer the identity of a malicious agent known to the other nodes of the network, but rather, only
an estimate about the character of the client can be made; thus, the specific instrument to use in this
scenario is that of Bayesian games [87].
4This section is taken from “Analysis of strategic security through game theory for mobile social networks” published
in IEEE CAMAD.
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Our purpose is to analyze a server/client game where the client can be either benign or malicious
with a known prior probability. The nodes have an available set of possible actions that they can
perform in the network. We remark that the existing literature usually considers just two actions
available to each player, which enables a simple approach to the problem but on the other hand makes
it easy to identify the client type (depending on whether he plays its collaborative action or not). We
aim at expanding this scenario by including additional moves that enable a malicious client to get
undetected, which in our opinion is a more realistic option.
A sample scenario could be a packet forwarding situation that is often used in the context of
security. In this case, sensor nodes would have the option to transmit a packet, and supporting clients
acting as relays can choose among forwarding it without damaging it, ignoring it, or adding some
intentional errors to its transmission. This wider set of available options makes the analysis more
realistic. Still, we are able to analyze the game in closed-form, and show some examples of analysis
with given numerical values. Specifically, we consider a Bayesian game framework to capture the
uncertainty about the client’s nature, and identify the BNEs of this game, and discuss how they are
affected by the numerical parameters. We also suggest some implications on the security strategies of
the network.
In [89] and [87] authors provide a survey and classifications of existing game theoretic approaches
to network security issues. They state that game theoretic approaches show that they are powerful
tools for solving network security problems and that new game theoretic approaches should be a pool
of research directions on network security. In [88] a new Bayesian hybrid detection approach has been
suggested for a network defender. In this approach a lightweight monitoring system is used to estimate
the defender opponent’s actions, and a heavyweight monitoring system acts as a last resort of defense.
The results obtained show that the dynamic game produces energy-efficient monitoring strategies for
the defender, while improving the overall hybrid detection power.
We can find similar analysis in [91] and [92]. In particular, a new exact method called DOBSS
for finding the optimal strategy for the leader in a Bayesian Stackelberg game is presented in [91]. In
these kind of games, one agent, called the leader, must commit to a possibly mixed strategy that can
be observed by other agents, called the followers, before they choose their own strategies. The leader
is uncertain about the types of adversary it may face, therefore such games are extremely valuable
in modeling domains involving security, including patrolling, setting up checkpoints, network routing,
transportation systems and others. As a consequence, solution techniques such as DOBSS for effi-
ciently solving such games are crucial. In [92], using a game-theoretic approach, authors propose a
selective and dynamic mechanism for counter-fingerprinting. They first model and analyze the interac-
tion between a fingerprinter and a target as a signaling game. Then, they derive the Nash equilibrium
strategy profiles based on the information gain analysis and they design a mechanism to prevent or
to significantly slow down fingerprinting attacks. Their game-theoretic approach appropriately distin-
guishes a fingerprinter from a benign client and mystifies packets to confuse the fingerprinter, while
minimizing the effects on legitimate clients. This mechanism can reduce the probability of success of
the fingerprinter significantly, without deteriorating the overall performance of other clients.
[86] presents an application of the Bayesian game theory to model node behaviors in trajectory
privacy preservation activities in mobile Wireless Sensor Networks (mWSNs). The characteristics of
autonomous nodes, including selfish, malicious and cooperative, have been formulated in the TPP
game, and the trustworthiness of the unknown type node has been evaluated. Then, authors derive
the equilibrium strategies of the game in both theoretical and simulation results.
In [90] authors study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of non zero-sum
matrix games played by an attacker and a defender. It is assumed that at each stage of the game
iterations, the players make imperfect observations of each other’s previous actions. The underlying
decision process can be seen as a fictitious play (FP) game, but in their analysis the communication
channels that carry action information from one player to the other, or the sensor systems, are error
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prone. Two possible scenarios are addressed: if the error probabilities associated with the sensor
systems are known to the players, then the analysis provides guidelines for each player to reach a NE
related to the NE of the underlying static game; if the error probabilities are not known to the players,
then they evaluate the effect of observation errors on the convergence to the NE and the final outcome
of the game. Moreover, both the classical FP and the stochastic FP have been discussed, where for
the latter the payoff function of each player includes an entropy term randomizing its own strategy,
which can be interpreted as a way of concealing its true strategy.
Security is a trouble of major importance to governments and companies throughout the world.
Since resources are usually limited, complete coverage of potential points of attack is not possible.
Deterministic allocation of available law enforcement agents adds predictable vulnerabilities that can
be exploited by malicious adversaries. Strategic randomization is a game theoretic alternative that in
[93] is implemented in Intelligent Randomization In Scheduling (IRIS) system, a software scheduling
assistant for the Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) that provides law enforcement aboard U.S. commercial
flights. The authors model the problem as a Stackelberg game, with FAMS as leaders that commit
to a flight coverage schedule and terrorists as followers whose purpose is to attack a flight. The
FAMS domain presents three challenges. First of all, with tens of thousands of commercial flights
per day, the size of the Stackelberg game to solve is very large. Therefore, they use ERASERC,
the fastest known algorithm for solving this class of Stackelberg games. Secondly, creating the game
itself becomes a challenge due to number of payoffs needed for these large games. To address this
issue, an attribute-based preference elicitation system to determine reward values is created. Thirdly,
the complex scheduling constraints in transportation networks make it computationally very hard to
model the game by explicitly modeling all combinations of valid schedules. Then, authors model the
leader’s strategy space by incorporating a representation of the underlying scheduling constraints. The
scheduling assistant has been delivered to the FAMS and is currently undergoing testing and review
for possible incorporation into their scheduling practices.
Finally, since in many security problems, service providers are basically unaware of the type of
their clients that can potentially be an attacker (who will launch an attack at any time during their
connections to service providers) or a legitimate agent, in [94] is provided a general framework for
modeling security problems subject to different types of clients connected to service providers. Authors
develop an incomplete information two-player game to capture the interaction between the service
provider, the server, and an unknown client. In particular, they consider two types of clients, i.e.
attacker and benign clients, and they analyze the game using perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(PBNE) with different conditions. As a result, they design an algorithm using the computed PBNE
strategy profiles to find the best defense strategy that the server should use.
The rest of this Section is organized as follows. In Sub-section 3.5.1, we describe the system model
and the game theory application; we compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium analysis in Sub-section
3.5.2. Section 3.5.3 presents some numerical results and Section 3.5.4 draws the conclusions.
3.5.1 System model
We consider a Bayesian game, in which players can be of different types to capture different behaviors
that the players may have.
For the sake of presentation, we consider the interaction between two nodes. This can be further
extended to a larger number of nodes by repeating the pairwise interaction. In a mobile social network,
each node can be either malicious or benign, depending on how they interact with the rest of the
network. Malicious nodes damage communications in the network so as to disrupt its operation;
we only focus on this kind of malicious attacks, that are aimed at denying service [85]. Moreover,
we consider the typical interaction of multihop networks, where nodes exchange packets and require
mutual collaboration in the form of relaying data to the end destination. In this setting, a server can
decide to transmit a packet to another node, monitor the network in order to detect malicious nodes
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P2
Forward Ignore Damage
P1
Nothing 0,-1 0, 0 -1,-∞
Packet 1, 1 -1, 0 -2, -∞
Surveillance -3, -2 -3, 0 2, -∞
Table 3.3: Normal-form (matrix) of the game considering Player 2 no malicious
without transmitting any packet, or do nothing and remain inactive. Furthermore, considering that
some nodes may have malicious purposes, when a node is asked to forward a packet, it can really do
so, or ignore the packet, or even forward a corrupted version of it, to cause harm.
We assume that one of the nodes, denoted as node 1, is a benign node (if both nodes are malicious,
it is pointless to consider the defense from an adversary). The other node, denoted as node 2, may be
either a legitimate node or a malicious attacker. We define p as the prior probability of being malicious
for node 2. Note that the type of node 2 is private information, which means that node 2 is aware of
being either malicious or not, while node 1 does not know (but it can estimate it via the probability
p). Node 1 acts as a server that can transmit packets to a client or protect the network against
malicious agents through surveillance. Node 2 acts as a client and it can forward a received packet
without any damage, ignore a received packet, or forward a received packet corrupting it depending
on its behavior. We can model this scenario using a two-player static Bayesian game in which the
server and the client are the players, player 1 and player 2, respectively. The set of actions that
can be taken is {Nothing, Packet, Surveillance} for player 1 and {Forward, Ignore,Damage} for
player 2. These actions reflect the three types of possible interactions. Every pair of actions yields an
arbitrary quantification of the goodness coming from its resulting outcome. Because of the Bayesian
context, it is assumed that each player has a type Θi, with values in {0, 1}, that describes its being
malicious. If a generic player i is malicious, its type is Θi = 1, otherwise it is Θi = 0. We assume that
only player 2 has a type. As a consequence, Θ1 = 0 and Θi ∈ {0, 1}; finally, we formally state that
p = Prob[Θ2 = 1].
Before analyzing the Bayesian game, we separately describe the cases in which player 2 is benign or
malicious, as two different static games without any Bayesian element. We set arbitrary numbers for
the utility of each outcome, that satisfy an ordinal criterion (most preferred situations have a higher
utility). The actual numbers are chosen just for the sake of easy computations; the same analysis is
still valid for other choices of values.
First, consider the scenario in which player 2 is not malicious. Table 3.3 shows the normal-form
matrix describing this game. Player 2 will reach a payoff equal to −∞ if it chooses to damage
the transmission. Therefore, it will never choose that action that can be considered as a strictly
dominated strategy. Indeed, a strategy is dominated if, regardless of what any other players do, the
strategy brings to the player a strictly smaller payoff than some other strategy. For this reason, we
can neglect this strategy in our analysis because it is dominated by both Forward and Ignore. Once
we neglect the Damage action of player 2, a similar observation iteratively holds for the Surveillance
strategy of player 1. In particular, this strategy is now strictly dominated by Nothing that allows to
the player to earn a higher payoff regardless of what opponent may do. This is quite intuitive because,
since player 2 is not malicious, it does not have any incentive to damage network, therefore, it is
not necessary for player 1 to monitor and control the network against malicious agents. After these
considerations, the 3x3 matrix can be simplified in a 2x2 matrix keeping the rows denoted by Nothing
and Packet, and the columns Forward and Ignore from the original normal-form matrix. At this
point, we can easily observe that two NEs in pure strategies can be found. In more details, these NEs
are: (Nothing, Ignore) and (Packet, Forward). In addition, we investigate on the existence of NEs
in mixed strategies. Defining α as the probability that player 1 chooses Nothing and β the probability
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P2
Forward Ignore Damage
P1
Nothing 0,-1 0, 0 -1,1
Packet 1, -1 -1, 0 -2, 3
Surveillance -3, -2 -3, 0 2, -3
Table 3.4: Normal-form (matrix) of the game considering Player 2 malicious
that player 2 plays Forward, this game has a single mixed NE (12 ,
1
2). This means that player 1 will
plays Nothing with probability 12 and Packet with probability
1
2 . In more details, we find that player
1 will play Nothing if β < 12 , it will play Packet if β >
1
2 , finally, it will be indifferent between playing
Nothing or Packet if β = 12 . Similar observations hold for player 2; it will choose Forward if α <
1
2 ,
it will choose Ignore if α > 12 , and it will be indifferent if α =
1
2 . 3.69 and 3.70 describe the best
response strategy of player 1 and player 2, respectively.
BR1 =
{
Nothing, if β ≤ 12 ,
Packet, if β ≥ 12
(3.69)
BR2 =
{
Forward, if α ≥ 12 ,
Ignore, if α ≤ 12
(3.70)
Table 3.4 shows the normal-form matrix describing the simple game in which player 2 acts as a
malicious player. With respect to Table 3.3, few meaningful changes have been made. In particular,
acting to Damage the network is now possible. Also, the mutual benefit of cooperation that was
previously described by the outcome for (Packet, Forward) has been altered for the malicious player.
Focusing on player 2’s payoffs, Forward is strictly dominated by Ignore. Then, for player 1 it holds
that Packet is strictly dominated by Nothing. This is intuitive because, since player 2 is malicious,
it does has incentive to damage nodes communication in order to gain a higher payoff; therefore, it is
better for player 1 to monitor and control the network against malicious agents or to do nothing instead
of transmitting a packet which will be corrupted. After these considerations, also in this case the 3x3
matrix can be simplified in a 2x2 matrix keeping the rows denoted by Nothing and Surveillance, and
the columns Ignore and Damage from the original normal-form matrix. At this point, we can observe
that there are no BNE in pure strategies. Concerning the existence of BNEs in mixed strategies and
defining α as the probability that player 1 chooses Nothing and β the probability that player 2 plays
Ignore, this game has a single mixed BNE denoted as (34 ,
1
2), i.e., player 1 will plays Nothing with
probability 34 and Surveillance with probability
1
4 and player 2 will choose Ignore or Damage with
equal probability. The best response of players 1 and 2 is shown by the following equations.
BR1 =
{
Nothing, if β ≤ 12 ,
Surveillance, if β ≥ 12 .
(3.71)
BR2 =
{
Ignore, if α ≥ 34 ,
Damage, if α ≤ 14
(3.72)
3.5.2 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium analysis
Now we consider an incomplete information game in which player 1 is not aware of the type of its
opponent, i.e., benign or malicious. Either of the two games previously described is actually played
with probability 1− p or p respectively, with the parameter p (but not the actual type) being known
in advance by player 1. That is, p is the prior probability of player 2 being of malicious type.
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P2
IF II DF DI
P1
N 0, p-1 0, 0 -p, 2p-1 -p,p
P 1-2p, 1-p -1, 0 1-3p, 2p+1 -p-1, 3p
S -3, -2+2p -3, 0 5p-3, -p-2 5p-3, -3p
Table 3.5: Normal-form (matrix) of the Bayesian game
P2
DF DI
P1
N -p, 2p-1 -p, p
P 1-3p, 2p+1 -p-1, 3p
Table 3.6: Simplified normal-form (matrix) of the Bayesian game
Table 3.5 shows the payoff of each player according to the different strategies that it can take.
For the sake of exposition, we shorten the action names by writing N , P , S, F , I, D, instead of
“Nothing,” “Packet,” “Surveillance,” “Forward,” “Ignore,” and “Damage,” respectively. As previously
stated for the two simple games, when player 2 is not malicious it actually plays only Forward or
Ignore, instead when it is malicious it can play Ignore or Damage. Furthermore, under a Bayesian
framework we represent strategies by defining an action for each player’s type. Thus, while player
1’s possible strategies are the same as the previous two games (i.e., they coincide with actions N ,
P , S), the strategies of player 2 are instead pairs of actions, since we need to specify what player 2
does depending on its type. This means that player 2 has four possible strategies in the Bayesian
game, namely its strategy set is {IF, II,DF,DI}. We denote each strategy as a pair of actions to be
played when the client is either malicious or benign, respectively. For example, strategy IF means
that player 2 will play Ignore if malicious, Forward otherwise. Note that, for the sake of brevity,
we already discarded player 2’s strictly dominated strategies, depending on its type. To compute the
payoffs earned by the players, we take expectations over beliefs for types. For example, for actions
(N, IF ): player 1 earns 0 if player 2 is not malicious, that is, with probability p, and 0 if player 2 is
malicious, therefore the payoff is still 0; player 2 earns -1 if it is not malicious, that is, with probability
p, and 0 otherwise, therefore its payoff is 0 · p− 1 · (1− p) = p− 1. To compute the BNEs, we consider
different cases depending on whether p < 12 or p >
1
2 .
3.5.2.1 Likely benign client
This represents the case in which p < 12 . From Table 3.5, we notice that S is a strategy strictly
dominated by N for player 1. As a consequence, we can neglect S as a possible action of player 1.
Moreover, we can also state that II and IF are strictly dominated strategies for player 2; the former
is strictly dominated by DI, the latter is strictly dominated by DF . Table 3.6 summarized the game
considering these observations.
There exist two BNEs in pure strategies: (N,DI) and (P,DF ). Defining α as the probability
that player 1 plays N and β as the probability that player 2 chooses DF , we also find a mixed BNE:
(12 ,
1
2(1−p)). In more detail, the best strategy for player 1 is to choose N if β <
1
2(1−p) , P if β >
1
2(1−p) ,
and to be indifferent if β = 12(1−p) . At the same time, the best strategy for player 2 is to play DF if
α < 12 , DI if α >
1
2 , and to be indifferent if α =
1
2 . The best response strategies of the two players
are:
BR1(Θ2) =
{
N, if β ≤ 12(1−p) ,
P, if β ≥ 12(1−p) .
(3.73)
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P2
IF DI
P1
N 0, 0 -p, p
S -3, 0 5p-3, -3p
Table 3.7: Simplified normal-form (matrix) of the Bayesian game
BR2(Θ1) =
{
DF, if α ≥ 12 ,
DI, if α ≤ 12
(3.74)
3.5.2.2 Likely malicious client
In this case p > 12 . In Table 3.5, P is now a strategy dominated by N for player 1. As a consequence,
we can neglect P as a possible action of player 1. We can also state that, focusing on player 2 payoff,
IF is dominated by II. Moreover, it can be observed that there exists a linear combination of the
payoffs that player 2 can reach playing DI and II that gives a higher payoff with respect to playing
DF . In other terms, there exists µ such as µ · u2(DI) + (1 − µ) · u2(II) > u2(DF ), where ui is the
payoff of player i. 3.75 shows that, since p > 12 ,
2p−1
p <
p+2
3p , there exists an interval for µ in which
the condition on the payoffs is satisfied:
2p− 1
p
< µ <
p+ 2
3p
. (3.75)
Thus, we can neglect DF as a dominated strategy for player 2. Table 3.7 summarized the game
considering these observations. In this case, the game has no BNEs in pure strategies. However,
defining α as the probability that player 1 plays N and β as the probability that player 2 chooses II,
there exists a mixed BNE: (34 ,
2p−1
2p ). In more details, the best strategy for player 1 is to choose N if
β > 2p−12p , S if β <
2p−1
2p , and to be indifferent if β =
2p−1
2p . At the same time, the best strategy for
player 2 is to play II if α < 34 , DI if α >
3
4 , and to be indifferent if α =
3
4 . The best responses are:
BR1(Θ2) =
{
N, if β ≤ 2p−12p ,
S, if β ≥ 2p−12p .
(3.76)
BR2(Θ1) =
{
II, if α ≥ 34 ,
DI, if α ≤ 34
(3.77)
3.5.2.3 Uniform prior probability
The final case is when the server considers both types of the client to be equally likely (p = 12), which
may also mean that the server cannot make any assumption about the client’s character. If we consider
this situation of maximum uncertainty about player 2, we obtain the payoffs shown in Table 3.8. As
it can be noted from the table, in this case there are no dominated strategies. Therefore, the analysis
for the computation of the equilibria is much harder with respect to previous cases. However, a mixed
equilibrium is bound to exist, and also continuity of the expected utility in the Bayesian case can be
exploited (so that we can find the Nash equilibrium via the left and right limits that fall within the
two previous cases).
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P2
IF II DF DI
P1
N 0, −1
2
0, 0 −1
2
, 0 −1
2
, 1
2
P 0, 1
2
-1, 0 -1
2
, 2 -3
2
,3
2
S -3, -1 -3, 0 -1
2
, -5
2
-1
2
, -3
2
Table 3.8: Normal-form (matrix) of the Bayesian game for p =
1
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Figure 3.21: Comparison of player 1 payoff obtained via the theoretical analysis and simulations
considering mixed NE.
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Figure 3.22: Comparison of player 1 payoff obtained via the theoretical analysis, simulations consid-
ering mixed NE, and considering pure NEs for p < 12 .
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Prob. that the client is malicious p
Pa
yo
ff 
of
 th
e 
cli
en
t (p
lay
er 
2)
 
 
Simulations using mixed NE
Theoretical value
Simulated payoff + σ
Simulated payoff − σ
Figure 3.23: Comparison of player 2 payoff obtained via the theoretical analysis and simulations
considering mixed NE.
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Figure 3.24: Comparison of player 2 payoff obtained via the theoretical analysis, simulations consid-
ering mixed NE, and considering pure NEs for p < 12 .
3.5.3 Numerical results
In this Sub-section, we discuss some numerical results, obtained by both analysis and simulation. We
consider that each player plays a mixed equilibrium strategy. We limit our results to the repetition of
a static Bayesian game, meaning that at each stage we do not consider the update of the belief that
player 1 has on the type of its opponent. However, we can model this scenario through the repetition
of a dynamic Bayesian game in which the game evolution is taken into account and the defender can
dynamically update its beliefs based on new observations of actions chosen by its opponent and the
game history in order to adjust its monitoring strategy accordingly. We will consider this aspect as a
future work.
Figs. 3.21 and 3.23 show the payoff reached by player 1 and player 2, respectively, versus the
value of p, i.e., the prior probability that player 2 is malicious. In these figures, we compare the
payoff obtained through the theoretical analysis discussed in previous sections represented by the
blue-dotted line with respect to the payoff obtained via simulations described by the blue-star line. As
it can be observed by the figures, the simulations results follow very well the theoretical development.
In particular, looking at Fig. 3.21 we can see that, for p < 12 , the lower the value of p, the higher
the value of player 1 payoff. This is reasonable because the lower p, the less likely that player 2 is
malicious, then it is not necessary to apply surveillance against a possible attacker in the network.
As a consequence, player 1 can reach a higher payoff by transmitting packets. On the other hand, for
p > 12 the value of player 1’s payoff is constantly equal to -0.5 (also confirmed by simulations). This is
because players play the mixed BNE, then for player 1 is more likely to play N and, as a consequence,
it is more likely that player 2 will play DI. Focusing on Fig. 3.23, we can notice that, for p < 12 ,
the lower p, the lower player 2’s payoff. Indeed, the higher p, the lower the value of (2(1 − p))−1;
therefore, player 2 will reach a higher payoff damaging the network. For p > 12 , the higher is p, the
lower is the probability that player 2 will play strategy DI. Since player 1 is more likely to play N at
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the equilibrium, player 2’s payoff will be 0.
In Figs. 3.21 and 3.23 we also show the simulated payoff value plus or minus its standard deviation
(obtained by simulation) with the red/black triangle lines. Looking at Fig. 3.21 we can observe that
for too low and high values of p there is a greater dispersion of the individual observations around the
average value. This aspect is less pronounced in Fig. 3.23.
Finally, Figs. 3.22 and 3.24 show the development of the players payoff considering theoretical
analysis results with the red-square line, simulations results described by the blue-dotted line, and
the results obtained considering that players play the two pure BNEs shown by magenta-star line and
black-triangle line. In these figures, we consider p varying in the interval [0.10.5]; indeed, only in this
interval there exists the pure BNEs. As we can notice, one of the two pure BNEs, that is (P,DF ),
outperforms the other cases. In particular, this is more evident for player 2’s payoff shown in Fig.
3.24.
3.5.4 Conclusions
In this Section, we showed how game theory can be employed as an instrument to characterize inter-
actions in social online networking. Especially, mobility of terminals poses several challenges in terms
of identifying malicious players that aim at damaging the network operation.
To this end, we considered a Bayesian game between a server and a client where the server is
operating with incomplete information and only has a prior belief on the client actual type. The
analysis confirms practical aspects of network surveillance. In particular, it is found that malicious
clients are hard to defeat without a proper detection and confirmation that they are indeed malicious.
On the other hand, given the high cost of surveillance operation, the best strategy for the server
would not be to force the identification of malicious clients, but rather to force a malicious client to
strategically play some less harmful strategies. This would lead to an implicit surveillance without
the need of actually putting them into operation. Our numerical findings confirm this trend, that is,
under certain circumstances, it is more advantageous for the client (even a malicious one) not to harm
the network in fear of retaliation. Especially, this may happen if a strategic client does not apply just
a myopic optimization of its own payoff, but rather tries to avoid being identified. The best way to do
so would actually be to occasionally cooperate with the network, which would lead to a transparent
surveillance in which the client itself has the right incentive to behave correctly.
Beyond straightforward extensions, such as putting more players or changing the values of the
game, there are several extensions that are left for future work, but still are worth discussing here.
For the specific choice of the numerical parameters made, we were able to find and discuss a detailed
solution of the various cases depending on the prior p representing the likelihood of a malicious client.
So, a first immediate extension is to investigate cases where the dominance of some actions does not
apply at all and a three-fold mixed NE is found, i.e., the support of the mixed strategies include
each action. This would complicate the analysis but will likely end up in a similar outcome of what
discussed.
A more important application of game theory instruments concerns instead the derivation of an
update rule for beliefs that is able to improve the social welfare. Notably, for the server it is not
advantageous to have uncertainty on the client’s type. This is visible from Figs. 3.21 and 3.23 where
the server’s payoff is shown to have the most desirable values for p around 0, i.e., whenever player 2 is
guaranteed to be benign. On the other hand, even knowing with certainty that the client is malicious
is preferable, as the payoff is actually the same than what received in the cases with a likely malicious
player 2, which is not confirmed yet. This means that, from the server’s standpoint, it would be overall
preferable to know with certainty the status of the client than having no information about it.
Finally, the strategic choice of the adversary (a malicious client) here is always seen as a myopic
maximization of the local value of its own utility. It would be certainly interesting to include more
sophisticated strategies for the client, so that it can cheat the belief update rule of the server; for
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example, it can occasionally forward some packets despite being malicious in order to gain trust from
the server.
3.6 Social communication to improve group recognition in a network
Online social networks are still enjoying an unprecedented success and represent a very effective
instrument for mass communication and content dissemination over the Internet.5 From the scientific
research standpoint, a strong theoretical component may be envisioned behind the pattern recognition
and profiling engines that many online social networks adopt to offer better services to their users [95].
Profiling users can also be useful to discover communities of individuals sharing some attributes and
therefore exploiting the inherent redundancy within the network, for example, to provide them with
similar services or caching homogeneous contents [96, 116]. However, profiling procedures also pose
several challenges about anonymity and privacy of the users [98, 99]. In particular, among the many
challenges related to this problem, we focus on the detection of group structures, which is an interesting
application of social network analysis. From the mathematical standpoint, the identification of group
structures in social networks can be seen as a clustering optimization problem [100, 101, 102]. Also in
the context of mobile networking, clustering has been widely investigated and is not an entirely new
problem [103, 104]. However, what makes our investigation for social networks challenging is that we
do not want to cluster mobile nodes based on their technical attributes (such as radio technologies
or energy consumption) but rather on some independent application-driven parameters, such as their
individual preferences or the societal relationship among them (e.g., who are their “friend nodes”).
Most of the theoretical analysis in this field is implicitly based on the assumption that online social
networks are able to collect massive amounts of information on their users. The problem resides in
mining these data, rather than improving their availability, since the network owner is generally able
to collect lots of data on every single user; most of the times, it happens that the users themselves are
willingly sharing their preferences and attributes across the entire network [105].
In this Section, we adopt a different perspective by considering a mobile network where discovery
of these individual traits of the users is only partial. There are several possible motivations for this
scenario; we argue that mobility can be a primal cause. For example, it is reasonable to assume that
mobility hinders communication and therefore limits the collection of data. At the same time, mobile
networks can also have a temporary character and therefore most of the nodes only gain knowledge
on their immediate neighbors only.
We remark that the two attributes of “mobile” and “social” networking have a complementary
relationship, in that, for example, the latter can improve the former. In some papers [106, 101] it is
studied how social relationships can help the routing algorithms. Again, this approach can be seen as
a byproduct of context-aware networking. At the same time, social connections are used, for example
by [96], as a way of further profiling users, since it can be assumed that users are likely to connect with
each other if they share similar preferences, and their behavior is akin to those who they recognize as
friends.
The novel aspect of this work is that we see mobility of the nodes as a detrimental to the information
extraction, since it causes the network view to be only partial. In this sense, our claim is that the
problems caused by such a partial information can only be overcome thanks to social collaboration
among the nodes. Thus, we investigate how the collaborative exchange of information about each
user’s preferences can help recognizing the group structures in the network.
In particular, the scenario on which we focus, and that will be better detailed in the following,
involves a network where nodes are element of a graph (representing a network snapshot) and are
classified a priori as belonging to a group, which, in graph theory terms, is seen as a color. Colors
5This section is taken from “Social Communication to Improve Group Recognition in Mobile Networks” published in
IEEE GLOBECOM.
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have pre-defined bindings, which can be regarded as a binary friendship relationship over the social
networks. However, nodes only have awareness of their relationship with their immediate neighbors on
the graph. Since the network is not fully connected, the extraction of group information is therefore
noisy. Here is where social collaboration applies. We devise a simple iterative procedure where the
estimate about unknown nodes is further improved through periodic reporting that nodes make about
their neighbors, on a random basis, as a social diffusion of context information.
We believe that such a procedure can be useful in any scenario where social exchange of information
is useful, but a centralized coordination is difficult and therefore it is more convenient to resort to
distributed exchange of signaling among the nodes. This may be the case for machine-to-machine
communication in vehicular scenarios [107], that can be applied to exchanging road safety information,
but where exchanges are only made among devices with compatible service (which represents our
friendship relationship). More in general, delay-tolerant networks can experience disconnections but
they can benefit from social relationships among the nodes to establish a routing backbone [108].
As a result, we show that, while estimating clusters from the initial incomplete data can be
highly ineffective, the iterative procedure is much more accurate in identifying clusters and classifying
individual nodes’ preferences. Even better, a combination of this procedure used as a preliminary scan
to improve the data, and a standard clustering approach applied on top, is even more effective. Since
our goal is to show the effectiveness of social collaboration as a principle, both the social diffusion
procedure and the clustering technique are intentionally kept simple; their detailed analysis would be
out of the scope of the present analysis. However, both strategies can actually be refined and different
choices of the pattern recognition technique can be made [102]. From our preliminary investigations
we expect the effectiveness of social collaborative networking to hold with more complex strategies.
The problem of recognizing groups of similar nodes within a mobile social network can seen far
away to what has been previously discussed in this Chapter. However, it is strongly related to the
current topic. Indeed, this approach can be enriched considering the presence in the network of a
given number of malicious nodes, and, this is the key factor that allows us to link this analysis to
the previous investigations. The intent of these malicious nodes might be, for example, to forward
erroneous social information to a chosen set of nodes in the network in order to compromise the
network information that this set of nodes has. With this assumption, it is still possible to evaluate
the effects of transmitting/forwarding malicious information in a network.
The rest of this Section is organized as follows. In Section 3.6.1 we formalize the model under
investigation. In Section 3.6.2 we describe our proposed approach, as opposed to a standard k-means
clustering, to recognize groups of nodes with similar preferences. Section 3.6.3 shows the numerical
results. Finally, Section 3.6.4 concludes the analysis.
3.6.1 System model
We consider a network with N nodes spread over a planar area, that are labeled with integer numbers
1, 2, ..., N . For simplicity, we consider that neighborhood relationships of the network nodes are based
on a distance criterion. In particular, we define a coverage radius r and we define two nodes to
be neighbors if and only if their Euclidean distance is lower than r. Note what follows. First of
all, it is not restrictive to consider a higher number of dimensions, or a different distance than the
Euclidean one. Also, our distance-based criterion can be directly linked with more realistic connectivity
relationships based on path-loss and signal attenuation, which ultimately depends on the distance
between the transmitter and the receiver. Naturally, more realistic radio communication models
would also include other effects such as shadowing and fading, and capture node interference but the
results will be analogous. In other words, we do not claim that a simple unit-disc model is particularly
suitable for wireless communication; it is just that the specific investigations made in this work do not
critically depend on this characterization, which however, offers the advantage of representing network
connectivity with a simple parameter, the coverage radius r.
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The network connectivity as a graph can be represented by an N x N adjacency matrix A, where
entry aij at the ith row and jth column of A is equal to 1 if i and j are neighbors and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, we assume the existence (a priori) of C non-overlapping groups of nodes, which
randomly partition the set of the N nodes. For the ease of terminology, we define each of the C
groups as a “cluster” or also a “color” (we will use these two terms interchangeably), so that we can
see the recognition of group structure as a clustering problem or a graph coloring problem. The color
of each node is assumed to be randomly and independently determined. In the following, we will
also assume that all the colors are equiprobable for a node, even though this is not necessary for our
procedures. The color of each node can be described by vector v where ith element vi is an integer
between 1 and C which is the id of i’s cluster.
Colors are related by a relationship, which will be referred to as “friendship.” However, this naming
is just again chosen for the sake of exposition, it can actually refer to any reflexive and symmetric
(but not necessarily transitive) property that can relate a pair of nodes. In particular, we assume
that a node is a friend of itself, and actually all nodes of the same colors are friends. Also, the same
friendship relationship (or lack thereof) is symmetric and shared by each pair of nodes with the same
colors. However, it is not transitive since we allow for colors a and b to be friends with each other, as
well as for colors b and c to be friends with each other, without necessarily implying that two nodes
of respective colors a and c are also friends. The specific aspect of our work is that, due to mobility,
this relationship among an arbitrary pair of nodes is not known in general; it is so only for neighbor
nodes, and the goal of our algorithms is to infer this relationship correctly also between non-neighbors
[105, 96].
Importantly, the naming of this relationship just mimics an important relationship on online social
communities (alternatively dubbed as belonging to the same “circle” or “professional network”) but, at
least to the extent of the present work, has nothing to do with collaborative behavior among the nodes,
which we assume to exist regardless of their friendship relationship; indeed, we will implicitly show that
it is beneficial also for non-friend nodes to collaborate. As a possible extension of the present work, it is
possible to consider a scenario where social collaboration is limited to actual “friend” nodes. However,
our connection of same color nodes as belonging to the same “logical” group is entirely separate from
(and actually independent of) considering “physical” relationships of neighborhood [106].
We can define a C x C symmetric matrix B to describe the relationships between different clusters,
in particular its entry bfg, with f, g ∈ {1, 2, ..., C}, is set to +1 if the nodes in cluster f and those in
cluster g are friends, and to −1 otherwise. Note that actually the choice of two values representing
friendship and non-friendship are arbitrary, but using +1 and −1 allows for a consistent mathematical
representation of the remaining procedures. In particular, value 0 will be used to represent indeter-
minacy between the two values.
We further remark that, in order to have an interesting problem, we require that all the rows in
matrix B are different, since otherwise there were two colors that have identical relationship with
the others, and therefore can be “merged” in a single one. Also, due to the reflexive requirement,
matrix B must have all diagonal elements equal to 1. However, these properties still leave open the
characterization of B for the off-diagonal elements. Intuitively speaking, a case where B contains
many elements equal to −1 is easier to manage, since it means that nodes are only friends with those
of their same color and, therefore, knowing that a neighbor node is a friend is more descriptive. In the
following, we will consider two different choices to determine B. We will always consider it to be an
arbitrarily determined full-rank symmetric matrix with an all-1 diagonal, but we constrain it to have
either 25% or 50% of its elements equal to 1. We refer to these cases as “low inter-color friendship”
and “high inter-color friendship,” respectively.
Generalizing the idea behind matrix B, we can also define an N x N matrix F which describes
friendship between each node of the network. Specifically, we can combine the information in v and
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B to derive every entry in F; for example, we can notice that
fij = bvivj . (3.78)
However, as clear from the premises, such a matrix F is not available. We only know a partial estimate
F˜, where non neighbor do not have a 1 or −1 at their entry. Formally,
F˜ = FA (3.79)
where  denotes the element-wise scalar multiplication.
3.6.2 Proposed social communication technique
The purpose of the present work is to identify, based only on F˜, an estimate of the full-network matrix
F denoted as Fˆ. Since the real F is not used but it is actually known, it can be compared with its
estimate Fˆ by determining the Frobenius norm ||Fˆ− F||F . However, to have a normalized value and
also since we can remark that the accuracy of the diagonal elements is always 100%, we define the
following estimate efficiency parameter η as
η = 1− ||Fˆ− F||F
2N(N − 1) , (3.80)
so that the maximum efficiency of 1 is reached when all the elements of the estimate Fˆ coincide with
those of F.
A straightforward solution to our problem is to apply an out-of-the-box clustering procedure. The
elements of F˜ can indeed be seen as points in an N -dimensional space. In this sense, indeterminate
points have been set to 0, which is the intermediate value between possibilities +1 and −1; thus, a
direct application of a clustering process makes sense. For example, we can apply a k-means clustering
[103], which is a standard reference technique for this kind of investigation. As a side note, however,
that this choice poses some theoretical questions, especially in that it requires to know in advance
the number of clusters. However, we choose it due to its widespread knowledge and since it involves,
as many other cluster techniques, a direct drawback if applied to this scenario. In fact, applying
such a clustering scheme would totally ignore the underlying social structure of the network, treating
each row of F˜ as a different point in the data space. We expect that the conclusions drawn for the
k-means technique would be applicable also to different and possibly more sophisticated clustering
procedures, such as the Chinese restaurant clustering or affinity propagation [102, 111]. Also, note
clustering actually does not directly determine Fˆ , which would be needed to apply 3.80 but rather
gives a cluster id for all the nodes, which can be seen as an estimate vˆ of vector v, and also an estimate
of B by considering the centroids of the k-means. These points do not generally have values equal to
either −1 or +1, but can also have intermediate values. Thus, it is required to round them (up or
down, accordingly) to the closer one. Finally, Fˆ is derived, see 3.78, as
f̂ij = b̂vˆivˆj . (3.81)
It will be shown in the next section that the k-means clustering does not achieve a very good per-
formance. Thus, our goal is to see whether we can improve the efficiency of group detection by
considering a system in which the nodes can communicate with each other and update their current
friendship estimates based on the information that the other nodes spread in the network. To this end,
we develop an iterative algorithm where we set an initial matrix X(0) = F˜ and we update its entries
from the information communicated by a row (representing a node disseminating its data) chosen at
random, so as to obtain matrix X(1). After that, another row of X(1) is chosen and the iteration is
repeated to obtain X(2) and so on. In principle, this can keep going on until a matrix X(T ) is obtained
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where all the elements are either +1 or −1. However, the evaluation of the efficiency is based on the
Frobenius norm that works element-wise and can be computed even if some elements have not reached
the border values. We find out that it is more convenient for computational reasons to perform a given
number of iterations; generally, we can get very close to the stopping point of the algorithm even in
this way, but with a faster execution time.
We propose a policy based on a social collaborative exchange of information, where we also involve
the following parameters: a threshold k chosen between 0 and 1, an integer value M , which jointly
determine whether to update a value or not, and finally a real positive value ∆ that describes the
(initial) amount of the update.
Each iteration works in the following way. We choose at random the pth row of the temporary
estimate X(t) and we update from it all other rows (i.e., the friendship estimate of all other nodes)
to determine X(t+1). By looking at X(t), we take a generic row i and we call those nodes j for which
element f̂ij = +1 as the sure friends of i, and similarly we define those for which f̂ij = −1 as its sure
enemies. Threshold k is used to label those nodes j that at the ith row have an entry f̂ij > +k as
likely friends and similarly those for which f̂ij < −k are said to be likely enemies.
Note that these are just labels used while the algorithm is running. At the beginning of the
iterations, all sure friends or enemies are identified correctly since they are based on authentic values
of F. After some iterations, there is no guarantee that this labeling is correct anymore.
To decide whether a specific row q different from p can be updated, we consider the element-wise
product between the pth and qth rows. The result of this product can give three different outcomes:
o1) node q likely has the same color of node p; o2) node q and node p likely belong to different clusters;
o3) there is nothing that can be said. To call the first outcome, o1, we must have all the sure friends of
p (i.e., their corresponding entry of the pth row is equal to +1) are not that sure enemies of q, and also
the converse relationship must hold (sure enemies of p cannot be sure friends of q). Moreover, node
q cannot have a likely friend that is a sure enemy for node p, or node q cannot have a likely enemy
that is a sure friend for p. If any of these conditions is violated, then the outcome is o2. However,
we do not consider sufficient not to violate any of these condition to have outcome o1 ; for example,
the element-wise product can be entirely made by zeros (if node p and q do not share any neighbors)
which is of little meaning but does not violate any constraint.
In our proposed procedure, o2 is declared as the outcome if at least one vector element is negative.
Else, o1 is declared if at least M elements of the product vector are greater than k. Otherwise, the
outcome is declared to be o3. Only if o1 is declared, an update is performed for the pth row of the
matrix, so that every qth element, for q ∈ {1, 2, .., N} whose value X(t)pq is strictly between −1 and
+1 is added the following quantity: ∆ ·X(t)pq . As can be observed, being ∆ ∈ (0, 1) this operation is
actually an addition if nodes p and q are friends, it is a subtraction otherwise. Also, if the updated
value exceeds the absolute value of 1, it is capped to either −1 or +1.
The procedure can be iterated until a matrix X(t) is obtained with only −1/+1 values, or when
t = Tmax. Then, we set F̂ = X
(t). Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode considered for our evaluations,
where the algorithm ends after Tmax updates of the matrix. Note that the input value denoted as
X(:, :, 0) corresponds to X(0) = F˜ and is derived from the network topology and the real nodes’
colors, in particular from parameters N , r, A, B as per the aforementioned unit-disc model and
equations (3.78) and (3.79). The output value X(:, :, Tmax) in the pseudocode corresponds therefore
to F̂ = X(Tmax).
Another possibility of applying our rationale towards an improved estimate than that obtained by
clustering the raw data is to still apply a clustering algorithm, in particular, we use again the k-means
procedure, but after an initial phase where social communication has improved the data. In other
words, we run our proposed heuristic iterative procedure for a given number of times. We update
matrix X(t) but (regardless of whether convergence is perfectly reached or not) we apply at the end
a k-means clustering algorithm. Our goal with this last strategy is to verify whether the iterative
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procedure of social collaboration improves the data per se, and enables the clustering algorithm to
obtain a more efficient result.
Input : N,M, k,∆, Tmax, X(:, :, 0)
Output : X(:, :, Tmax)
t← 0
while t ≤ Tmax do
randomly choose n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
for every m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} \ {n} do
a(:) = X(n, :, t)X(m, :, t)
`← 0
for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} do
if a(i) > k then
`← `+ 1
end if
if a(i) < 0 then
`← 0
break
end if
end for
if ` ≥M then
for every node i do
X(n′, i, t) = X(n′, i, t) + ∆ ·X(n, i, t)
if X(n′, i, t) > 1 then
X(n′, i, t) = 1
end if
if X(n′, i, t) < −1 then
X(n′, i, t) = −1
end if
end for
end if
end for
t← t+ 1
end while
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode of the iterative process
3.6.3 Performance analysis
We present some numerical results, all obtained for a scenario with a square area of side equal to 100
reference units. In particular, our purpose is to compare the performance considering a system that
exploits the collaborative spreading of information in the network and another that does not, and just
uses the clustering on the initial data.
We set the parameters introduced in the previous sections as k = 0.4, M = 4, and ∆ = 0.01. These
values were chosen by heuristic trial-and-error procedures. Moreover, for this comparison we assume
different values for the coverage radius r, the number C of clusters, and the number N of nodes in
the entire networks.
All the figures shown consider the normalized efficiency parameter previously defined and compare
three different approaches: the plain k-means algorithm; the heuristic iterative procedure based on
collaborative exchange of information about friendship between nodes; finally, a joint approach where
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Figure 3.25: Normalized classification efficiency as a function of the coverage radius for N = 200
nodes, C = 8 colors, high inter-color friendship.
the iterative procedure is preliminary applied, and afterwards a k-means clustering is employed. Every
result has been derived from a very large number of simulation runs, so that confidence intervals of
the results, not shown in the plots, are extremely narrow.
Figs. 3.25 and 3.26 show the results obtained considering a network with 200 nodes, 8 clusters,
and high and low inter-color friendship respectively. A general trend, found in all the results, is that
an increase of the communication range r, which causes matrix A to become less sparse and therefore
the initial estimate F˜ to be more similar to F, generally improves the efficiency of the estimate; this
conclusion holds true for all the three compared approaches, albeit to a different extent.
From the results, it is clearly visible that our proposed approach outperforms the standard k-
means clustering by increasing the estimate efficiency. The application of the k-means algorithm in
order to update again the estimate of F after the iterations improves the efficiency even more, albeit
only slightly. Also, even though the differences are not that striking, the case with high inter-color
friendship is characterized by a more difficult recognition of the clusters, especially for the k-means
algorithm. In the following, we will report only results related to this case; we checked also the cases
with low inter-color friendship and similar conclusions can be drawn there as well.
Fig. 3.27 allows the comparison of the results obtained changing only the number of clusters
considered. Therefore, we consider not only the case with 8 clusters, but also the cases with 6 and
10 clusters. As it can be noted, considering a different number of clusters changes the corresponding
efficiency value for each coverage radius. In particular, we can state that a higher number of clusters
involves a lower efficiency, and therefore a higher error.
Finally, Fig. 3.28 compares the results obtained by changing the number of nodes from 200 to 500
in the network. Comparing Figs. 3.25 and 3.28, we infer that increasing the number of nodes does not
significantly change the performance. Therefore, we can conclude that these algorithms are scalable
with respect to the number of nodes in the network, and can be applied even to large scale scenarios
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Figure 3.26: Normalized classification efficiency as a function of the coverage radius for N = 200
nodes, C = 8 colors, low inter-color friendship.
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Figure 3.28: Normalized classification efficiency as a function of the coverage radius for N = 500
nodes, C = 8 colors, high inter-color friendship.
of the Internet of Everything.
3.6.4 Conclusions
We considered a problem of group detection in social mobile networks, where network mapping by
each individual node is assumed to be partial, i.e., limited to its neighbors. We showed how traditional
clustering procedures fail to efficiently identify the existing group structures, while a simple heuristic
procedure based on the concept of social diffusion of information achieves a much higher efficiency
of cluster recognition. Also, the efficiency is further enhanced by combining our proposed procedure
with a standard clustering technique.
The work reports preliminary results related to a standard k-means clustering technique and a
simple heuristic approach, since the purpose is to show the benefit of social communication. More
results can be shown also exploring the parametric dependence of the inner values of the proposed
technique (e.g., the update step ∆ or threshold k). Future developments also include the evaluations
of more sophisticated clustering techniques, especially avoiding the need of k-means clustering to know
the number of colors in advance (an element that is, however, not required by our proposed original
approach).
Moreover, different heuristic approaches can surely be investigated. While keeping the same ratio-
nale of a social communication where nodes collaboratively exchange information about their relation-
ship so as to inform distant nodes, more complex techniques can be thought of, especially exploiting
the inherent characteristics of the assumed friendship relationship. For example, contradictions in the
self-declared friendship (node i reports being a friend of node j while node j reports the opposite
about node i) should be identified and resolved.
Finally, the logical relationship of collaboration is (intentionally) kept separate from routing aspects
and friendship connections. However, one can think of applying the same rationale to scenarios where
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these aspects are interconnected, i.e., for example nodes only forward data coming from their friends,
or they may even disseminate false or malicious information about their enemies. All these open
challenges demonstrate the importance of this kind of quantitative investigations to realize efficient
mobile Internet paradigms.
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Chapter 4
Novel applications of Network Science
In this Chapter we give an overview of the future research interests. In particular, we continue the
investigation by means of game theoretic approaches with particular reference to mobile computing
scenarios. However, we also discuss some guidelines representing an effort to start a new research path
where a telecommunications point of view might be used to deal with problems not directly related to
telecommunications networks. In more details, one of our future aim is to study the brain connectivity
using concepts and methods commonly related to an information technology background according to
the basic principles of the Network Science.
4.1 A Bayesian game theoretic approach to task oﬄoading in edge
and cloud computing
The growing complexity of data analysis and processing algorithms makes their deployment in resource
constrained devices (e.g., sensors and mobile devices) increasingly challenging. The recent fog and edge
computing paradigms [115] address this issue by placing compute-capable devices within low-latency
one-hop wireless topologies.
Oﬄoading local computation tasks to the edge processors can significantly speed-up their com-
pletion, but necessitates to transport the data over local wireless networks. Especially in modern
architectures, where multiple technologies share the same spectrum resource, interference from exoge-
nous wireless terminals, or from other mobile users oﬄoading tasks, may heavily affect the capacity
of the wireless links, so that the delivery of data to edge or cloud processors becomes a relevant
component of the overall delay to completion.
Herein, we analyze a three-tiered communication/processing infrastructure, consisting of a local
tier of mobile nodes, a middle tier of nearby computing nodes (i.e., edge servers), typically co-located
with the wireless Base Stations (BS) and characterized by a limited amount of processing resources,
and a remote tier of cloud servers connected to the BS through the core wired network. The mobile
users can choose to locally process the data, or oﬄoad computation to edge or cloud resources. If
the mobile devices decide to oﬄoad the processing task either to the edge or cloud server, then the
associated data need to be transmitted over the local wireless network. As the wireless links have
finite capacity, this first step introduces a delay, but also a coupling between the users, as the decision
to oﬄoad the processing task of one user increases the network load and, thus, the delay to the
completion of the task of all the other users.
The main challenge is that in practical cases, mobile users do not have a priori knowledge of the
interference load and computation power of edge and cloud processors. Additionally, the decision
of each mobile device influences the overall network load. In fact, unlike in-device processing, if a
mobile user oﬄoads a computational task to the edge or cloud resources through the BS, it creates
interference that reduces the capacity of the wireless links of the other users.
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To model and optimize this distributed decision making process with partial information, we
propose a game theoretic framework. Specifically, due to the stochastic characterization of some of
the influential variable of the system, such as exogenous interference load and channel gain, we adopt
a Bayesian Game (BG) formulation. Each user can decide if locally execute the task on its mobile
device, or oﬄoading the task computation towards either the remote cloud or an edge server through
the BS. The objective of each user is to minimize its computation cost, evaluated both in terms of
computation time and energy needed to accomplish the task execution.
Under this game-theoretic analysis, we characterize the equilibrium for different parameter regions,
as well as evaluate the impact of selfish actions by the users. Our result indicate that the uncertainty
on network parameters of the other players can actually be beneficial to the overall social welfare
as it deters users to aggressively cause interference to others, which would result in a low-efficiency
equilibrium. This suggests that preventing the users from gaining information about the other nodes
in the network may actually be a good strategy to avoid that the oﬄoading option is abused by the
terminals.
As already pointed out, game theory is a tool from applied mathematics that has been widely used
to study how rational players, whose objective is usually seen as the maximization of a utility function,
interact to determine an equilibrium point. In the context of network communication, this can be
seen as the problem to obtain a distributed resource allocation procedure upon which nodes, seen
as individual agents, agree. Recently, there has been soaring interest in this kind of applications to
wireless communication and networking scenarios [116]. For instance, in [117] a game theoretic model
for random access with carrier sensing is investigated. Games for resource management, network
selection, and admission control in wireless systems were studied in [118, 119]. In [120], the authors
investigate opportunistic communications in hierarchical cognitive networks. Finally, evolutionary
coalition games for wireless networking and communications were studied in [121]. A comprehensive
literature review of game theory formulations for energy efficiency in wireless sensor networks can be
found in [122].
Closely related to this contribution, [123, 124] consider oﬄoading problems and propose techniques
to determine which tasks should be oﬄoaded to improve the overall system performance. Most of
the formulations presented in those papers focus in a single node scenario, where an application is
represented as a weighted graph, whose nodes are tasks.
To the best of our knowledge, a relatively small number of contributions addressed a multi-users
scenario in the context of edge and cloud computing. In [127], the authors propose a cooperative
centralized optimization problems aiming at distributing the processing tasks of multiple users among
the computation resources available locally at the mobile devices and globally at the cloud level.
The objective is to minimize the average application delay for all users. A Mixed Integer Linear
Programming formulation is used. In [128], the problem of distributing computation resources among
data streams is studied. Multiple users share the wireless network as well as the computation resources
in the cloud. The goal is that of maximizing the throughput of the data streams. Different from the
present contribution, a heuristic genetic algorithm is used to solve the optimization problem, and a
two-tier architecture composed of mobile users and remote cloud servers is considered.
Analogous to that adopted here, [125, 126] considers a three-tier architecture with multiple mobile
users. The authors assume that the cloud resources are constrained. The optimization problem is
solved using a greedy centralized heuristic. In [129], a three-tier architecture with no centralized
control is studied, and game theory is used to study a scenario where multiple selfish users whether
and where to oﬄoad their computation tasks. Different from our study, a non-cooperative, and non-
Bayesian, formulation of the game is used, and there is no consideration of the interactions between
the users from a wireless communications standpoint. In other words, all of the previous papers
applying game theory to this scenario apparently do so from an idealized perspective where network
nodes not only avoid causing congestion to each other but also are fully and instantaneously aware of
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all the network parameters and can therefore make fully-informed rational (that is, selfish) decision.
This aspect is particularly relevant for what concerns the contribution of the present work, since, as
will be shown in the following, the Bayesian component of the game, used to determine incomplete
information available to the users, actually lead to an improvement in the overall resulting efficiency
of the allocation, an aspect related to the fact that selfish users only act for their own good.
The rest of the Section is organized as follows. Sub-section 4.1.1 and Sub-section 4.1.2 describe the
system model and provide a game theoretic analysis, respectively. Numerical results and computation
of the equilibria are presented in Sub-section 4.1.3. Sub-section 4.1.4 concludes the Section.
4.1.1 System model
We consider a scenario where a set of M mobile devices indicated as ni, i ∈ {1, 2, ..,M}, are connected
to a BS s providing access to the global network infrastructure. The BS is attached via a high capacity
link to an edge processor, which provides low-latency computation services to the users. The BS is
also connected to a more powerful cloud computing resource through the Internet.
We assume that each user has a computationally intense task to be completed. A three-tier
architecture is considered, where user can decide to compute the task locally in-device or to oﬄoad
the task to the edge or cloud servers. We define a quasi-static scenario, in which the set of mobile
device users remains unchanged for a period comparable to the completion of their tasks. We leave to
future studies the analysis of scenario case where mobile users can depart and leave dynamically.
The mobile device users share the wireless channel to the BS s. Cni = (bni , dni), i ∈ {1, 2, ..,M},
describes the computation task of the node ni, where bni and dni are the size of the input data and
the total number of CPU cycles necessary to complete the task Cni .
We denote the computation oﬄoading decision of mobile device user ni as ani . Specifically, ani = 0
if ni computes the task locally, ani = 1 if ni oﬄoads the computation task to the remote cloud server,
finally, ani = 2 if ni oﬄoads the computation task to the edge server. The vector a = (an1 , an2 , .., anM )
is the decision profile of the mobile device users.
Since the users share the wireless resource, we adopt an interference model to capture the degra-
dation of individual user links when other transmissions are active. In particular, we define the uplink
data rate of ni, i.e., rni , as
rni = Wlog2
(
1 +
qnigni
ω0 + I
)
(4.1)
where I = ∑nj∈M−{ni} qnjgnjI{ani , anj ∈ {1, 2}}, W is the channel bandwidth, qni is ni’s transmission
power, gni is the channel gain between ni and s, ω0 is the background noise power, and I{ani , anj ∈
{1, 2}}, with i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..,M}, is the indicator function representing the interference from the other
user conditioned on its transmission decision.
We define fLCni , f
EC
ni , and, f
CC
ni , as the computation capability measured in terms of CPU cycles
per second of the mobile devices, the computation capability assigned by the edge server to ni, and
the one assigned by the cloud, respectively. We assume that fECni < f
CC
ni . If ni decides to locally
compute Cni , the computation execution time is t
LC
ni =
dni
fLCni
. On the other hand, if ni oﬄoads the
computation task it would incur the extra overhead for transmitting the input data either to the edge
server or remote cloud through the wireless access behind the time needed to execute Cni .
To assess the oﬄoading decision, we define two cost metrics corresponding to the time and energy
consumption to complete the task execution. In particular, the total time to complete the task in the
edge and cloud computing are
tECni,off + t
EC
ni,exe =
bni
rni
+
dni
fECni
(4.2)
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and
tCCni,off + t
CC
ni,exe =
bni
rni
+Di +
dni
fCCni
, (4.3)
where Di is the delay caused by propagating the data through the wired data transmission to the
cloud server.
If the task is completed locally, the energy expense is equal to eLCni = αnidni , where αni the con-
sumed energy per CPU cycle. If the task is oﬄoaded to the edge server, then the energy consumption
is eECni,off = qni
bni
rni
+Lni , where Lni denotes the tail of the transmission energy due to the fact that the
mobile device user will continue to occupy the channel for a while even after the data transmission.
Finally, for the oﬄoading towards the remote cloud we assume that eCCni,off = qni
(
bni
rni
+Di
)
+ Lni .
Consequently, we define the computation cost for each of the three possible computing decisions
as
KLCni = λ
t
nit
LC
ni + λ
e
nie
LC
ni ,
KECni = λ
t
ni
(
tECni,off + t
EC
ni,exe
)
+ λenie
EC
ni,off
,
KCCni = λ
t
ni
(
tCCni,off + t
CC
ni,exe
)
+ λenie
CC
ni,off
.
(4.4)
λtni , λ
e
ni are positive weights in the continuous range [0, 1] associated with the computational time and
energy for ni. The weights can be adapted to the state of the devices. For instance, if a mobile user’s
battery is close to depletion, λeni can be set to 1 and λ
t
ni to 0. Instead, when the tasks generated by a
mobile device are delay-sensitive, then the delay can be set to λtni = 1 and λ
e
ni = 0. We neglect in our
analysis the time needed to receive the outcome of processing. This component is typically smaller
compared to cost of transporting the data due to the smaller size of feedback, but can be easily added
to our metrics.
4.1.2 Bayesian game theoretic approach
In game theory, players perform actions purely based on their individual interests, which may differ
from those of the other players [72]. Each player usually acts towards the maximization of its own
utility; however, this is jointly determined by the actions played by all players. Throughout this
Section, for readability reasons, we will actually consider an individual cost function that the players
try to minimize; therefore, the same reasoning of classical setups apply but to consider a “utility
function” or a “payoff” one should take the opposite value to what we consider here. Thus, in a first
place we consider a static game of complete information as defined by a triple G = (A, S, K), where
A is the set of players, S is the set of all strategies allowed to the players, and K is a set of cost
functions, one per each user, depending on the strategies chosen by the players. Note that this reflects
that a player’s chosen strategy influences the cost paid by the other players; at the same time, rational
players are in turn able to anticipate the effect of the strategies chosen by the other players. We search
for a Nash Equilibrium (NE) seen as a joint strategy profile where all players locally minimize their
paid cost.
However, we will also focus on a Bayesian game, i.e., a game of incomplete information in which
rational anticipation of the game outcome made by the players is hindered by the lack of precise
knowledge of the cost function of the other players. This is usually modeled by introducing a type for
the players, which in turn translates in a different cost function; in our case the type will be given
by a specific parameter that affects the transmission costs, and specifically we will consider the node
distance from the BS as this parameter. Players are clearly aware of their own type, but as for the
others they can only treat them as random variables; still, they can exploit a prior distribution on
the other players’ types, that is common knowledge. Note that this description is more accurate to
describe mobile computing systems where many parameters such as the channel gain, can only be
estimated but never known with certainty. Even though a mobile user can reasonably well estimate
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its own channel gain, it is simplistic to assume that it knows with perfect precision that parameter for
the other players; thus, a Bayesian setup is definitely more realistic.
In our scenario, we consider two mobile devices corresponding to the set of players, i.e., {n1, n2}.
The set of actions for each player is {Local, Cloud, Edge}, where Local, Cloud, and Edge are associated
with executing the task locally on the device, oﬄoading the computation task to the remote cloud,
and oﬄoading the task execution to the edge server, respectively. Each player acts towards the
minimization of its computation cost.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider a symmetric system, where all the following parameters are
the same for both users (and thus we drop subscripts “n1” and “n2” for better readability: q, b, α,
fLC , fEC , fCC , λt, λe. Moreover, we assume Ln1 and Ln2 to be negligible.
In the Bayesian context, each player has a type defined by its corresponding channel gain, whose
value is not known to its opponents. However, we assume that the prior distribution of the types is
known, for instance based on historical data accumulated at the edge processor. Types of player 1
and 2 are channel gains gn1 and gn2 , respectively. In the literature, multi-path propagation is usually
considered and modeled, e.g., as Rayleigh fading. For the sake of simplicity, we evaluate the channel
gain as determined by path loss only, i.e., gni = δ(ni, s)
−γ , for i ∈ {1, 2}, where δ(ni, s) is the distance
between ni and s, and we choose exponent γ = 4 to describe a sub-urban scenario. We assume that
distance δ(ni, s) is uniformly distributed in [δmin δmax]. This assumption is made only to simplify the
computations in what follows (especially to determine the Bayesian NE) but the conclusion we draw
are actually valid as long as there is any kind of uncertainty on the channel gain. In particular, note
that none of our conclusions are limited to the choice of uniform distribution for the positions and/or
only considering the path loss in the evaluation; those are choices that can easily be relaxed and would
just lead to more complex computations with analogous conclusions. Also for notational brevity, put
A =
b
W log2
(
1 +
qgni
ω0+qgnj
) (4.5)
B =
b
W log2
(
1 +
qgni
ω0
) . (4.6)
Now, the cost paid by the two players depending on their moves can be directly written. Specifically:
– if both players choose Local, they both incur a cost equal to λt d
fLC
+ λeαd;
– if both players choose Cloud, their cost is also the same: λt
[
A+D + d
fCC
]
+ λe [q (A+D)];
– if both players choose Edge, their identical cost is: λt
[
A+ d
fEC
]
+ λeqA;
– if one player chooses Local and the other Cloud, then the cost paid by the former is λt d
fLC
+λeαd,
instead for the latter λt
[
B +D + d
fCC
]
+ λe [q (B +D)];
– if one player chooses Local and the other Edge, then the cost paid by the former is λt d
fLC
+λeαd,
instead for the latter λt
[
B + d
fEC
]
+ λeqB;
– if one player chooses Cloud and the other Edge, then the cost paid by the former is λt
[
A+D + d
fCC
]
+
λe [q (A+D)], instead for the latter λt
[
A+ d
fEC
]
+ λeqA.
Importantly, the value of channel gain gni in the numerator of (4.1) is known to player i. Conversely,
the term gnj at the denominator is not known to player i as it represents the type of player j. In this
Bayesian setup, we aim at the evaluation of the expected costs computed weighing the costs defined
above with respect to the distribution of types. Before proceeding with the Bayesian evaluations, some
considerations arisen from the complete knowledge case follow. In this case, we assume that players
have complete knowledge of the system, meaning that each of them knows its opponent’s type.
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Figure 4.1: Validity regions for NEs.
For symmetry reasons, a NE in pure strategies must be to one of the three outcomes (Local, Local),
(Cloud, Cloud), and (Edge, Edge), where the first action in the brackets refers to player 1 and the
second to player 2. Moreover, a relationship between the value of D and the two outcomes (Cloud,
Cloud) and (Edge, Edge) has been observed. If and only if D < Dthr, where
Dthr =
d(fCC − fEC)
fCCfEC(1 + Λq)
, (4.7)
then (Cloud, Cloud) has lower computation cost than (Edge, Edge). Thus, we can compare possible
outcome (Local, Local) with the “non-local” outcome (N,N) where N can stand for either “Cloud” or
“Edge” depending on (4.7).
4.1.3 Equilibrium and Numerical results
We now consider a system with specific parameter choices reported in Table 4.1. According to the
table, δ(ni, s) is uniformly distributed between δmin = 10 m and δmax = 100 m. Moreover, we
considered D in [4 13]ms.
First of all, we consider a baseline solution of the game with complete information, against which
we assess the performance of our Bayesian setup. According to what discussed previously, rational
players in this setup end up in playing a symmetric outcome. To determine whether in this scenario
the players will eventually both play the Local strategy or strategy “N,” we remark that the game is
isomorphic to a Prisoner’s dilemma [72]; however, the choice of which one of the symmetric allocations
is the Nash equilibrium (and whether this is also Pareto efficient) depends on the channel gain, and
in turn on the distances. Thus, we numerically computed the resulting equilibrium for all the possible
values of δ(n1, s) and δ(n2, s). We recall that we are under the assumption of full knowledge on both
users of their mutual positions, so both values are known to both players. The result is shown in Fig.
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Table 4.1: Values of relevant parameters
Parameters Values
b 40 kBytes
d 109 CPU cycles
fLC 0.5 GHz
fEC 102 GHz
fCC 104 GHz
q 0.01 W
ω0 5 µ W
W 1 GHz
λt 0.5
λe 0.5
α 4
g 30−4
δ(ni, s) U([10 100] m)
4.1: the figure reports, for all pairs (δ(n1, s), δ(n2, s)), what would be the NE of rational (i.e., selfish)
players, with the black region corresponding to the choice of locally executing the computation task,
and the white region representing task oﬄoading towards either the cloud or edge server, according
to D.
Aside from some border effects, we can infer that a threshold behavior is present, meaning that
the players will oﬄoad their computation only if they are close enough to the BS. Such a threshold
δthr, which can be numerically computed (see later Fig. 4.2) to be around 65 meters, is also plotted
in the figure. The presence of this threshold is not coincidental, as we will show next.
For the Bayesian case, it is possible to prove that a threshold behavior is indeed present, according
to the following reasoning. Player i does not know whether player j is actually playing an oﬄoading
move; nevertheless, i may get a Bayesian belief that j will be playing according to a threshold strategy
(meaning that j will oﬄoad only if close enough to the base station). Actually, this is the kind of
self-enforcing assumption that automatically gets confirmed due to the symmetry of the players, and it
is also easy to see that this threshold strategy would be the best response to itself. Hence, in Bayesian
game terms, this is a Bayesian NE. Note that a similar reasoning has been formally proven in Section
3.2 of the present thesis.
This remark can serve to compute the expected cost obtained by the players in the Bayesian case.
In particular, for each player i, if δ(ni, s) > δ
thr, player i will decide for the local computation of the
task execution, choosing oﬄoading otherwise. The actual value of the threshold δthr can be found by
imposing symmetry between the two outcomes as NEs, and therefore considering: δ(n1, s) = δ(n2, s)
and also that the cost of local computation is exactly equal to oﬄoading. The value of δthr can be
precisely found in this way.
Consequently, for the computation of the Bayesian expected cost we need to sum 4 different
contributions denoted as K1 – K4. Specifically, looking at Fig. 4.1 and considering for example player
1, they are:
K1 =
∫ δthr
δmin
∫ δthr
δmin
(
λt
[
A+D+
d
fCC
]
+λe
[
q(A+D)
])
dxdy
if D < Dthr,
K1 =
∫ δthr
δmin
∫ δthr
δmin
(
λt
[
A+
d
fEC
]
+λeqA
)
dxdy
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Figure 4.2: δthr development varying D.
otherwise,
K2 =
∫ δthr
δmin
∫ δmax
δthr
(
λt
d
fLC
+ λeαd
)
dxdy
K3 =
∫ δmax
δthr
∫ δmax
δthr
(
λt
d
fLC
+ λeαd
)
dxdy
and
K4 =
∫ δmax
δthr
∫ δthr
δmin
(
λt
[
B+D+
d
fCC
]
+λe
[
q(B+D)
])
dxdy
if D < Dthr,
K4 =
∫ δmax
δthr
∫ δthr
δmin
(
λt
[
B+
d
fEC
]
+λeqB
)
dxdy
otherwise. Player 1 expected cost is given by K1 + K2 + K3 + K4. Player 2 expected cost can be
evaluated in a similar way.
Fig. 4.2 shows how the distance threshold δthr varies considering several D’s values. Figs. 4.3
and 4.4 depict player 1’s cost considering the complete knowledge case and player 1 expected cost,
respectively, as a function of D. In general, we can observe that as D increases, the computation cost
increases until it reaches a saturation value. When the value of D is small enough (i.e., D < Dthr), the
best action for the mobile device is to oﬄoad the task execution to the remote cloud instead of the edge
server as the additional delay is compensated for by the larger computation speed. When the threshold
Dthr is reached, the best action is to oﬄoad to the edge server. However, it is relevant to notice that
the Bayesian case implies that the nodes incur a lower cost when they have imperfect knowledge on the
distance of the other player. The reason for this apparently counterintuitive behavior is a consequence
of multi-agent multi-objective optimization performed via game theory. Recalling that different users
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Figure 4.3: Player 1 cost in a complete knowledge scenario varying D.
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Figure 4.4: Player 1 expected cost varying D.
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Figure 4.5: Ratio between player 1 optimal cost and player 1 expected cost varying D.
have a different objective in the game (i.e., minimization of their individual cost in a selfish way), the
“ignorance is bliss” principle applies [72]. Differently from single-person optimization, where more
knowledge always corresponds to a better outcome, in a game theoretic setup having less information
about the other players may turn out, as in this case, to be advantageous, as players will be less
aggressive and do not tend to abuse oﬄoading if they are not sure that the other player is doing it
too. Given the symmetry of the setup, it turns out that the best course of action for the players may
be to abstain from unnecessary (or harmful for the other player) oﬄoading operations.
Fig. 4.5 evaluates this further by considering the ratio between the ideal scenario with full knowl-
edge and the expected cost in the Bayesian setup. Again there is a dependance on D that keeps
increasing until a ceiling level is hit. In general, in the complete knowledge case, each player i know-
ing the opponent j distance δ(nj , s) decides to oﬄoad the computation task only when this choice
represents a NE, i.e., (Cloud, Cloud) or (Edge, Edge). In the Bayesian case, player i does not know
δ(nj , s), as a consequence, it might happen that it decides to oﬄoad the computation task even if the
other player j choice is to locally execute its own task. In this way, player i has a lower computation
cost. Indeed, the pairs of actions (Cloud, Local), (Edge, Local), (Local, Cloud), and (Local, Edge)
give a lower computation cost with respect to (Local, Local) for the player that is choosing the task
oﬄoading. These asymmetrical pairs are not considered in the optimal case since they do not represent
NEs, however they might arise in the Bayesian case due to the uncertainty on the players’ distances
from the BS.
4.1.4 Conclusions
We applied Bayesian game theory to a network scenario where mobile users can oﬄoad computations
task to edge or cloud resources. Our objective was to make efficient oﬄoading in a scenario where
the mobile devices are unaware of the network load and mutual interference reduces the capacity of
the wireless links connecting to the local base station. Numerical results illustrate regions where the
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strategy of the devices converges to different points of equilibrium.
The remarkable finding of our analysis is that a Bayesian scenario, i.e., with imperfect informa-
tion, actually achieves better welfare (or lower social cost) than one with full knowledge by the users.
This is due to the competitive nature of the game, where selfish rational users would try oﬄoading
computational task even when it is not efficient for the entire network that they do so. Our results
suggest an interesting guideline in the design for oﬄoading strategies, i.e., to make network parame-
ters less known to the users in order to improve their cooperative participation to resource sharing.
However, it is worth underlining that this is only a preliminary study concerning this topic. It might
be thought to empower the described analysis considering more sophisticated game theory approaches
taking into account, for example, the human aspect behind the mobile device. This can be done by
means of evolutionary games according to which the actions choices are influenced by the dynamics
of the system in terms of what the other agents in the system may think that is the best choice to do.
In this way, the dynamics of the system changes towards the direction of choosing, for example, the
most popular action, i.e., the action that has been more frequently chosen.
Moreover, a combination of reinforcement learning, in particular dynamic programming, and game
theory can be considered as well using the former to investigate on the internal system dynamics and
define the set of possible policies by means of the latter.
4.2 Brain network analysis
In the literature, it can be found several examples of network structure analysis related to the nature
of the living beings in terms of complex network. One of these is the cells network structure with
particular reference to the investigation on the behaviors and interactions of the cells [133]. Above
all, in the last years there has been an exponential increase in human neuroscientific research due to
the extensive availability of non-invasive techniques for measuring brain activity and structure, such
as neuroimaging and neurophysiological recordings, producing large datasets of spatio-temporal data.
It is generally accepted by the scientific community that the brain can likely be modeled as a complex
network and descriptions of the relationship between the brain system and a complex network are
available in the literature.
One of the directions of our future path of investigations is related to the concept of bio-inspired
networking according to which biological systems and network processes have similar interesting char-
acteristics. As a consequence, it is possible to use solutions inspired by biological system for different
networking paradigms associated to similar problems developed in the biological field and vice versa.
The objective on which bio-inspired networking is based is to capture the dynamics and understand
the fundamental characteristics of biological systems to design new methods and tools to manage
communication systems and information networks. These must be suitable for dynamic environments
that are able to self-management and that can easily evolve.
In this context, it is first necessary to determine the common aspects between the biological system
and the computational (or network) system. Then, the model capturing the biological behavior
can be designed, later, if needed, simplified and conformed to the system on which the analysis
focuses. In the literature, we can find different examples of this kind of approach. An instance
is the Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) based on the observation of the collective behavior of ants
when they are searching food. This is an example of distributed self-organized system constituted
by a population, whose components interact and communicate through changes in the surrounding
environment, i.e., pheromones wake. We can find also several examples of applications of this ACO
algorithm [135]. The most known in the ICT world is the AntNet routing protocol. At the same
time, the integrated task for the allocation and the routing in Sensor Networks and in Actor Network
are based on this concept. We further refer to biological principles even when we talk of Artificial
Immune System, based on the mammalian immune system. It has the purpose to efficiently underline
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in complex problems the changes in the environment or the deviations of the behavior from the normal
system. This type of algorithm can be used for evaluations regarding computer or communication
systems, or it can be applied to sensor networks [136]. Another example of bio-inspired networking
is related to the concept of signaling, which accurately describes the interactions between certain
molecules. Indeed, this is a case of efficient and specific communication that is used in Rule-based
Sensor Network, programming scheme for SANETs. Recently, this research field is also growing
in nano-scale communications and networks implying, in turn, that the communication techniques
conventionally used, such as electromagnetic or acustic waves, are not applicable due to the limitations
given by the channel and antenna size.
In general, techniques for metaeuristic optimization, such as Genetic Algorithm and Simulated
Appealing, can be seen as bio-inspired methods. Indeed, they have been successfully used to solve
networks problems; in particular, these models are suitable for solving problems on the cross-layer
optimization in networks.
In this context, our main purpose is to concretize the study of several network intelligence paradigms,
with a twofold meaning: analysis of the intelligence of the network referring, in particular, to the char-
acterization of the neural systems, and analysis of the intelligence in the network, i.e., the possibility
to insert in communication networks some processes similar to the human thinking, to improve their
performance.
After a broad study of the structure and the behavior of complex networks, with particular ref-
erence to neural systems, a comparison between the advanced telecommunications techniques and
complex network-based techniques might be useful. In this way, the key common points and the
principal differences can be highlighted. In general, one of the goals might be to design distributed
management and anomaly detection methods for neural systems; these methods may help understand-
ing medical fenomena, such as schizofrenia and Alzheimer (typical brain diseases). It is not excluded
that this comparison would involve an increase in the knowledge on telecommunications networks
as well, implying the designing of new distributed communication protocols or expanding protocols
already existing in the literature that can allow a better management of the networks being more
robust and efficient. Therefore, there could be an improvement on the expertises in both scientific
fields, neural and communication, in a interdisciplinary manner. Furthermore, it could be interest-
ing to investigate machine learning techniques and genetic programming to design techniques with
the purpose of optimizing and strengthening the actual interconnection between brain networks and
telecommunications networks.
Nowadays, one of the areas that is raising significant relevance in the scientific community is that of
brain connectivity. One of its goals is to make the most of the rich datasets that neuroscientists collect
by evaluating the spatio-temporal dynamics present in the data [134]. In particular, we are interested
in the investigation of functional and effective connectivity in the brain, that is on the temporal
correlation in the activity of two brain regions, regardless of whether they have direct anatomic links
(functional connectivity, FC), and the directed causal influences one brain area produces in another
(effective connectivity, EC). The common denominator to these different types of brain connectivity is
that, in all instances, the system can be characterized and described as a network and in this way brain
properties can be examined under formal mathematical network theories. As it can be clearly noticed,
complex network analysis has emerged as an important tool to characterize brain connectivity.
The rest of this Section is organized as follows. In Sub-section 4.2.1 we discuss some preliminary
results obtained investigating on the brain FC using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
data; in Sub-section 4.2.2 we describe an alternative EEG-based method to evaluate brain connectivity
and we introduce more deeply our future interests on the study of the brain as a complex network.
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4.2.1 Frequency-dependent functional connectivity of brain networks from resting-
state fMRI
Network connectivity of the brain can be approached from several perspectives [140]. For the purposes
of this work, we focus on FC, i.e., the analysis of how the activity of different (possibly distant)
brain regions is sinchronized to accomplish to specific functions. This can be formally defined in
terms of the correlation between signals, taken from different regions of interests (ROIs), describing
neurophysiological events. Several electrophysiological and imaging techniques can be used to acquire
this kind of signals; fMRI is one of the most widely employed. Common trends in these signals are
checked against statistical independence, and the presence of relevant correlation can be interpreted
as a measure of synchronization. The resulting pairwise value can be collected in a FC matrix, that
gives a snapshot-like representation of how different regions in the brain supposedly interact.
The objective is to shed some light on the role of different frequency components in determining
these FC relationships. In particular, we argue that the general approach of considering FC values on
predefined frequency bands may neglect some aspects of the interaction among different brain regions.
It seems sensible to think of this synchronism among different areas to happen via interactions at
different timescales (and thus different frequencies). To better highlight this aspect, and also to give
a richer description of the functional connectivity, it may be worth considering some proper filtering
of the signals, from a resting-state fMRI experiment in our case, that are used in the FC analysis.
After a description of the context in which we frame our analysis, and the tools employed, we will
detail our research contribution that consists in applying several filtering, with tunable parameters,
to the fMRI signals, so as to highlight a possible differentiation based on frequencies in the resulting
connectivity matrix. More specifically, we will show that the FC matrix that we can obtain via
standard tools for the analysis is actually heavily dependent on filtering. For example, we are able
to show that lower frequencies exhibit structural connectivity properties that are quite different from
higher frequencies counterpart, to the point of configuring an entirely disjoint connection pattern, and
these specific aspects are hidden when the entire frequency range is considered.
Methodological issues aside, this may also hint at a more colorful description than a mere FC
matrix, where not only the plain connectivity relationship is considered, but also the frequencies
involved in the connection (which, in turn, may hint at a faster or more slow-paced interaction among
brain regions). Thus, it makes sense to think of this kind of analysis as a further research direction in
modeling the brain network, possibly including frequency-differentiated interactions, which may lead
to a better characterization and improved explanation of brain phenomena.
The remaining part of this Sub-section is organized as follows. In Sub-subsection 4.2.1.1 we give
a general background of the topic; Sub-subsections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3 describe the toolbox and the
dataset used, respectively; in Sub-subsection 4.2.1.4 some preliminary numerical results are shown;
finally, Sub-subsection 4.2.1.5 draws some concluding observations and discussion on possible future
development of the present analysis.
4.2.1.1 Background
FC has been studied with several electrophysiological and imaging techniques, ranging from local field
potentials (LFP) to EEG, magnetoencephalography (MEG) and fMRI [141, 140, 137].
In over twenty years of fMRI experiments, FC has been quantified both in healthy and in patho-
logical conditions. FC can explain relationship between different areas of the brain during task-
related activities. This long-time research activity led to the identification of several functional net-
works: the sensorimotor, visual, amygdala, and hippocampus, among others[142]. Besides, FC studies
further provided insights on the pathological behavior of these networks in case of diseases, e.g.,
schizophrenia[143], major depressive syndrome [144], Alzheimer’s disease [145], as well as on changes
in the normal healthy brain during development [146] and aging [147, 148].
106
FC has been correlated with the so-called structural connectivity (SC) [149]: generally, two regions
that are physically connected (with significant SC values) usually show some degree of FC, too.
Conversely, and even more intriguingly, literature has shown significant functional coupling between
areas that are not directly connected; this strongly unravelled the underlying network organization of
the brain that can exploits indirect paths to make effective communications between areas.
Another measure frequently associated with FC is the EC, that gives direction of the information
flow between two areas where FC is established. This could represent an important outcome from the
EC measure since it can provide support, e.g., to stimulation and neuromodulation [150] protocols
targeting the normalization of a specific function, i.e. motor, cognitive or others.
Recently, increasing attention has been given to the behavior of the brain and its oscillatory
activity during the resting-state, i.e. the condition in which no task is required to the subjects except
for relaxing while staying awake. In this case, no particular task-related response is expected; however,
an undergoing default-mode network (DMN) [147] has been robustly identified. It seems to account for
an active-idling state where the subject is doing nothing, but can be reactive to any external stimulus.
FC largely served to the study of DMN in many kinds of studies: particularly promising is the
use of FC for the investigation of the DMN at resting state. Indeed, this approach allows to dig into
the functional segregated-integrated organization of the brain: specifically, high values of FC among
some areas of the brain can identify them as a highly-connected, i.e. segregated, network. Such kind
of networks are then functionally integrated each others through smaller FC values, giving rise to a
complex network-of-networks[151].
Quantitatively, FC can be computed in many ways: correlation between time-series from pairs of
ROIs has been firstly employed; then, other methods such as covariance and mutual information were
exploited[140].
Some more recent works have hinted at the dependence of connectivity, especially meant as FC
and EC, on frequency. In [152], the most interesting frequency bands were discussed, that can explain
many neurophysiological human behaviors, from the ultra-slow frequencies (around 0.01 Hz) up to
the ultra-fast oscillations (around 600 Hz). An inverse relationship was also pointed out between
networks extension and frequency: high frequencies, i.e., small wavelengths, are usually confined
in small neuronal areas, while low frequencies, i.e., large wavelengths, are generally involved in the
functioning of larger-scale networks.
Reasonably, the latter implies the time-varying characteristic of FC: specifically, studies on LFP,
EEG, and MEG made possible to follow FC changes in time at frequencies in a broad range between
0.01 Hz up to 600 Hz. Nevertheless, among non-invasive neurophysiological techniques, MEG and
EEG are known to be affected by low spatial resolution: therefore, fMRI has been also employed
in the study of FC of the brain. However, fMRI cannot provide such high frequency information as
given by MEG and EEG (and, invasively, by LFP). The typical time-course of FC is sampled in the
range of 5 to 10 minutes with the consequent possibility to only track very slow changes of the brain
connectivity.
Recently, new studies are exploring the dynamic range of the fMRI signal during resting-state,
assumed to be a steady-state. Along this way, the chronnectome of Calhoun et al. [153] has suggested
the near-future direction and challenge of fMRI: in fact, time and frequency changes has to be tracked
and quantified in order to unravel the spatial properties of “mutually informed activity” that is
processed in the brain at any time, in any place [154].
Attempts in the same direction have been made also in the recent past by means of the decompo-
sition of the fMRI signal in specific frequency bands related to physiology: 0.01 − 0.027 Hz (slow-5)
and 0.027 − 0.073 Hz (slow-4) band [152] were considered in a study on resting-state FC to assess
differences between normal subjects and a group of mild cognitive impaired patients[155]. With the
investigation of FC, authors could suggest the involvement of a functional impairment rather than a
structural difference in the amount of gray matter between the two groups.
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Furthermore, the study of the five well-known functional brain networks mentioned above into the
largest 0 − 0.24 Hz available frequency band shows a higher value of correlation of cortical networks
in the range 0.01 − 0.06 Hz, whereas a limbic activity, i.e. deeper brain level, spread in the wider
0.01− 0.14 Hz frequency range [142].
Finally, low frequency fluctuations (0.01 − 0.08 Hz) of resting-state fMRI signal were reported
to reflect spontaneous neuronal activity [156]. Moreover, it is known that low frequency oscillations
(0.01 − 0.073 Hz) can be detected in the gray matter, while relatively high frequency oscillations
(0.073− 0.25 Hz) are related to white matter [157].
Therefore, our contribution represents an exploratory effort on the way to dig out the relationship
between any possible pair of ROI in the brain in the full band of the fMRI signal.
4.2.1.2 DPARSF toolbox
Data Processing Assistant for Resting-State fMRI (DPARSF) is a MATLAB toolbox developed for
pipeline data analysis of resting-state fMRI. This tool, available at [158], is an open source package
based on some functions in Resting-State fMRI Data Analysis Toolkit (REST) and Statistical Para-
metric Mapping (SPM). Data are preprocessed by SPM and then entered into REST. SPM is known as
a powerful tool, however lots of time-consuming and complex operations are required when analyzing
a large data set.
The manual procedures needed to set (step-by-step and subject-by-subject) the SPM parameters
may be cumbersome and could lead to making unintentional mistakes. DPARSF is designed to solve
this problem and supply a user-friendly software. Indeed, after arranging the Digital Imaging And
Communication in Medicine (DICOM) or Neuroimaging Informatics Technology Initiative (NIfTI)
file formats, the user is required to click a few buttons to set parameters and DPARSF will give all
the preprocessed data, i.e., by slice timing, realigning, normalizing, and smoothing, and eventually
producing results for FC, Regional Homogeneity (ReHo), Amplitude of Low Frequency Fluctuation
(ALFF), and Fractional ALFF (fALFF). As a matter of fact, while FC is used in resting-state fMRI
studies to measure the signal synchrony among remote brain areas, other aspects of the regional
spontaneous activity could be investigated using several metrics, such as the ReHo, ALFF, and fALFF.
DPARSF may also exclude subjects with excessive noise due to head motion and generate a set of
images to easily check the effect of normalization. Our detailed usage is as follows.
Convert DICOM files to NIfTI images – Most data are produced in DICOM format and,
before data analysis, these DICOM format data are usually transformed into other formats, for example
NIfTI file format. These kind of files contain affine coordinate definitions that relates voxel (i.e., a
tidy cube of brain tissue) index to spatial location, in particular the noteworthy information of left
hemisphere and right hemisphere. For this reason, DPARSF will convert the data by calling dcm2nii
in MRIcroN software if users do not convert the data previously.
Remove first N time points – It is common to discard the first few volumes of the functional
images to allow the subjects to get used to the scanning noise. If the user select this option, DPARSF
will delete the number of time points specified for each subject.
Slice timing – Since most fMRI data are acquired using two-dimensional pulse sequences obtain-
ing images one slice at a time, all brain slices are obtained at different time within a repeat time (TR).
These timing differences can be a problem for a long TR. As a consequence, the differences in image
acquisition time must be corrected. Specifying the number of slides, the slice order, and the reference
slice, DPARSF will perform slice timing by calling some SPM functions.
Head motion correction – Motion correction is used to adjust the time series of images so as to
have the brain in the same position in every image. If user select this option, DPARSF will motion-
correct the time series of images by calling functions in SPM. DPARSF allows to exclude from further
analysis subjects with excessive head motion; indeed, too much head motion may induce large artifact
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in fMRI time series. As a consequence, DPARSF will create a report of head motion considering the
realign parameters estimated by SPM.
Normalization – Different subjects have different brain size, shape, orientation, and gyral anatomy.
Therefore, the individual brain is usually spatially normalized into a standardized template. Two op-
tional normalization of the functional images into the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space
are provided: using echo-planar imaging (EPI) template and using unified segmentation on T1 image.
Smoothing – Since there could be residual differences in functional and gyral anatomy during
inter-subject averaging, smoothing is usually used in pre-processing to suppress this residual noise.
The Gaussian filter is the most common smoothing technique used. DPARSF will smooth the data
with the specified width at half of the maximum value using SPM.
Remove linear tread – There could be a systematic increase or decrease in the signal with
time due to long-term physiological shifts, movement related noise remaining after realignment or
instrumental instability. For this reason, DPARSF will remove the systematic drift using a linear
model by calling some REST functions.
Filtering – In [156], low fluctuations (0.01-0.08 Hz) of resting-state fMRI signal are reported
to be of physiological importance reflecting spontaneous neuronal activity. Moreover, low frequency
oscillations (0.01-0.073 Hz) are detected in the gray matter and, in contrast, relatively high frequency
oscillations (0.073-0.25 Hz) are related to white matter [157]. Respiratory and cardiac signals fall
within high frequency ranges [160]. DPARSF is able to filter the data, and its passband can be tuned
at will, by calling ideal filter REST functions.
Remove effect of nuisance covariates – Recently, many researchers focused on the anti-
correlation phenomenon of resting-state fMRI. A typical example is that significant anti-correlations
between the components of the default-mode and attention networks are consistently observed, even
though the global whole-brain signal is removed [161]. Therefore, this whole-brain signal would be
removed by a regression analysis before the evaluation of the functional connectivity in order to
reduce the effect of the physiological artifacts. Beyond this, the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), six motion
parameters, and the white matter signals could also be removed as nuisance variables to limit the
effects of non-neuronal Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) fluctuations and head motion.
4.2.1.3 Dataset
The fMRI data that we used are all provided within the DPARSF tool. The full set of data is available
at [159]. They were acquired using a SIEMENS TRIO 3-Tesla scanner in the Beijing Normal University
Imaging Center for Brain Research from three subjects. They laid supine with the head fixed by straps
and pads to minimize head motion. The subjects had to keep as motionless as possible and not to
think systematically during the resting-state session.
The functional images are obtained using an EPI sequence with 33 axial slices, 3/0.6 mm thick-
ness/gap, 64 × 64 in-plane resolution, TR of 2 ms, TE of 30 ms, flip angle of 90 degrees, 200 × 200
mm FOV. Moreover, a T1-weighted sagittal 3-dimensional magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo
(MPRAGE) sequence is acquired covering the entire brain with the following parameters 128 slices,
TR of 2530 ms, TE of 3.39 ms, slice thickness of 1.33 mm, flip angle of 7 degrees, inversion time of
1100 ms, 256× 256 mm FOV, and in-plane resolution of 256× 192.
We use DPARSF pipeline analysis to process the data. After converting DICOM files to NIfTI files,
the first 10 time points are discarded. Then, slice timing and head motion correction are performed
and data are normalized according to the MNI space by using unified segmentation of T1 image and
re-sampled to 3 mm isotropic voxels. Then, after smoothing with a 4 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel,
the linear trend of time courses is removed and temporally low/high-pass filtering is performed.
Once this processed phase is finished, DPARSF extracts ROI time courses and compute the cor-
relation matrix between the ROIs obtained. Since our purpose is to compare the ROI correlations
obtained applying different filtering procedure to fMRI signals, we define several frequency bands with
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Figure 4.6: Subject 3 ROI correlation matrix considering the fMRI signal in its full band [0.01 0.5]
Hz.
different cutoff frequencies. In particular, we consider a low-pass filter and a high-pass filter whose
cutoff frequency (called β in both cases) is a tunable parameter, as detailed in the following.
4.2.1.4 Numerical Results
Once selected all the parameters required for the data processing, we can obtain the ROI correlations
matrix. Prior to extracting the ROI signals, we filter our original fMRI data using low-pass and
high-pass filter with different cutoff frequencies. Note that since TR = 2 ms, the sampling frequency
Fs is 0.5 Hz; thus, in the frequency domain, the signals of interest can be found up to that value. In
particular, we refer to [0.01 0.5] Hz as full band, since given the duration of our signals it is reasonable
to ignore extremely low frequencies for functional interactions. Using a low-pass filter, we attenuate
the signal outside the band [0.01 β], where, for our evaluations, we consider β as the independent
variable, that goes up to 0.5 thus reaching the full band. Conversely, we also consider a high-pass
filter in the band [β 0.5] with a similar approach.
Fig. 4.6 shows the 160 × 160 ROI correlation matrix obtained considering the full band fMRI
signal related to subject 3. In the colorbar, we represent positive correlations with red-like pixels and
negative correlation with blue-like pixels. Fig. 4.7 describes instead the ROI correlation matrix of the
same subject 3, but after having filtered the relative fMRI signal with a low-pass filter with cutoff
frequency 0.02. This comparison immediately shows that the two matrices are quite different, which
means that correlations between ROI pairs may significantly change if we consider a filtered version
of the signals, and the overall holistic connectivity description is heavily influenced. In other words,
considering the fMRI signals at different frequency bands produce different connectivity relationships
between different areas of the brain. Thus, depending on the frequency band to which the fMRI signals
are considered, some functional links may or may not be present, and some links can even specifically
appear stronger in a given frequency range.
110
Subject 3 ROI correlations matrix LOW PASS filtering [0.01 0.02]Hz
 
 
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Figure 4.7: Subject 3 ROI correlation matrix considering fMRI signal filtered within [0.01 0.02] Hz.
To quantify the difference between ROI correlations corresponding to different bands of interest
for the signal, we use the following approach. We take the ROI correlation matrix for the full band,
denoted as R(FB), and the same matrix obtained for any filtered version of the input signals, which
we call R(β); this can actually either be RLP(β) or RHP(β), depending on the filtering being low-pass
or high-pass, respectively. We compute the difference matrix ∆R(β) = R(β)−R(FB) that quantifies
the difference between the connectivity description of the filtered version and the original full-band
signals.
Once computed this difference, we define a Normalized Distance Index NDI as:
NDI =
||∆R(β)||F
||R(FB)||F
(4.8)
where || · ||F denotes the Frobenius norm operator. In other words, we consider the Frobenius norm
as a measure of the diversity of the two matrices, and we normalize the result to the Frobenius norm
of the original full-band matrix. This value is meant to give a rough idea of the difference between
the resulting connectivity matrix and the original full band case. Note that this value is “normalized”
and therefore can be roughly seen as an index of separation (more or less as a percentage). However,
correlation values of the FC can possibly be negative (and close to −1), and also the normalization
factor, i.e., the Frobenius norm of the full band matrix, may be not too high. This would correspond
to a case where the NDI is larger than 1, which simply means that the matrices are significantly
different.
Fig. 4.8 shows the results obtained for each of the three subjects considering low-pass filters and
varying the value of β. First of all, it is possible to notice that the three fMRI signals give quite
consistent results for the same value of β. This seems to imply that the conclusion we have previously
drawn for a specific subject are actually more general. For a low-pass filtering, it seems that most of
the FC information is actually limited to the frequency range [0.01 0.25] Hz. In this case, indeed, if
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Figure 4.8: Low-pass filtering: comparison of the Normalized Distance Index.
β = 0.25 there is little difference with respect to the full band case. However, there are significant
differences showing up when β is further decreased and only the low-pass components are kept. Already
in the band [0.01 0.1], the figure shows a value of NDI quite higher than 0. Moreover, the lower is the
cutoff frequency, the higher is the difference, in terms of NDI, between the functional connectivity
related to the full band fMRI signal and the filtered fMRI signal. For extremely low values of β, the
resulting connectivity matrix is significantly different, with an NDI larger than 1, which may suggest
that there are entirely separate connectivity phenomena, which become evident if only low-frequency
interactions among the brain regions are considered.
Fig. 4.9 considers instead a similar analysis, but for the case of high-pass filtering, with a tunable
parameter β that still represents the cutoff frequency, so that, this time, the resulting passband is
[β 0.5] Hz. Again, we plot NDI versus β and the results are analogous to those of Fig. 4.8: for
example, there is a strong consistency of the results across different subjects. The maximum value
of the NDI is even higher than before, which seems to suggest that a intra-region FC has a limited
activity for higher frequencies. This was also visible from the low-pass filtering case showing almost no
difference if β = 0.25. On the other hand, the values for relatively low cutoff frquency β, the high-pass
filter may obtain better results.
Still, connectivity phenomena are significantly different at lower and higher frequency, to the point
that they can be seen as entirely unrelated functional trends. While most of the FC relationship is
captured by a filtered version of the signals with sufficiently large passband, on the other hand, just
considering the full band of signals without any frequency differentiation may lead to hiding some
existing correlation trends that only happen and are relevant at certain frequencies.
We remark that for the purpose of being systematic and since this is just a preliminary study on
the topic, our analysis focuses on a variable β without searching for any specific physiological correlate.
However, it may be worth considering specific frequency values or bands, with a precise physiological
role: this kind of investigation, which is left for future work, may give an even better explanation of
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Figure 4.9: High-pass filtering: comparison of the Normalized Distance Index.
the difference of values existing across the entire frequency axis.
4.2.1.5 Discussion
To get a dataset of signals that are usable within a toolbox, several pre-processing procedures are
required, most of the times including a filtering to limit the signals within a proper frequency band.
The resulting “polished” signals feed the toolbox so as to achieve a quantification of FC (or any similar
metric). So, a first immediate conclusion of our study is that this kind of preliminary operations on
the signals requires special care, in particular it must be done avoiding filtering out some relevant
frequencies, as this can strongly affect the conclusions on the undergoing physiological phenomena
that the researcher desires to observe.
Moreover, it is worth noting that some other operations, e.g., avoiding head motion correction
or similar adjustments on the signals, definitely play a role here. We verified that changes in the
pre-processing pipeline lead to a slightly different FC matrices, the bulk of our conclusions, i.e., that
the holistic representation of the FC matrix heavily changes at different frequencies, still holds true.
Beyond the importance of a correct pre-processing of fMRI signals, our analysis can also motivate
the efforts towards gaining a systematic understanding of the role played by frequency components
with respect to FC. The most striking aspect of our evaluation graphs is that, apparently, a linear
relationship exists in the presence of links (i.e., what represented by the NDI) and the width of the
considered frequency band. This result has also been validated for other kinds of filtering besides the
low-pass and high-pass shown before.
Should this trend be confirmed by more investigations, a distribution law of FCs in the brain
across different frequencies may be estimated. This aspect, if ultimately proven, would be extremely
suggestive in implying that functional connectivity is not a static property of the brain, but rather
is variegate and describes a plethora of different functions, that are themselves frequency-dependent.
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An in-depth discussion of these features may therefore suggest interesting implications from signal
processing to physiology that can open up further contributions in the fields of neurosciences.
4.2.2 Multiplexing applied to brain network
Over the past few decades, a variety of techniques for non-invasive measurement of brain activity
have been developed. As mentioned before, one of these techniques is EEG, a high time resolution
measurement of the voltage potential in the order of microvolts at various locations on the scalp. Using
EEG and applying signal processing methods, it is possible to estimate the current sources inside the
brain that best fit the measurements data. This estimation is known as source localization and it
might be useful to investigate on the brain connectivity.
The neural activity can be modeled by currents and the activity can be well approximate by current
dipoles. At any given time, the signal recorded at the scalp is a spatial summation of current density
induced by synchronized post-synaptic potential occurring in large clusters of neurons. Therefore, it
is clear that to detect an EEG signal at the scalp, many neurons must be activated synchronously.
Indeed, in the generation of an EEG oscillation, tens of thousands of synchronously activated pyramidal
cortical neurons are involved. The parallel orientation of their dendritic trunks to each other and the
perpendicular orientation of them to the cortical surface, allow summation and propagation to the
scalp surface. Several animal studies describe substantial synchronization among neighboring neurons
(the so called large-scale synchronization). As a consequence, synchronization of oscillations is a key
mechanism for neuronal communication between spatially distributed brain networks. It has been
found that higher frequency oscillations (e.g., gamma oscillations) appear to originate from smaller
neuronal assemblies, whereas low frequency oscillations (e.g., theta oscillations) span larger neuronal
populations.
The procedure of source localization consists of two steps. First, the so called forward problem with
the goal of finding the scalp potentials that would result from hypothetical dipoles (or, more generally,
from a current distribution inside the head). Then, the second step is the inverse problem consisting
in estimating the sources that fit the actual EEG data measured at specified positions of electrodes
on the scalp. The accuracy with which a source can be located can be affected by several factors; for
example, head modelling errors, source modelling errors, and EEG noise that can be instrumental or
biological. It is worth noting that if the configurations of intracranial sources and the conductivity
proprieties of the tissues are known, then the distribution of the scalp potential can be calculated using
basic physical principles. As a consequence, the forward problem can be unambiguously solved. On
the other hand, the inverse problem is ill-posed. Indeed, scalp-recorded electromagnetic measurements
do not contain enough information about the 3-D distribution of the electric neuronal activity: the
current distribution in a conducting volume can’t be uniquely determinated by the field and potential
information outside it. Therefore, it is clear that scalp-recorded EEG measurements can be described
by an infinite number of different generating distributions (even if we consider an infinite numbers of
recording electrodes). To explain better this point, we will proceed describing in more mathematical
details the inverse problem formulation needed to solve source localization to investigate on the brain
connectivity using EEG data.
The remaining part of this Sub-section is organized as follows. In Sub-subsection 4.2.2.1 we give a
description of the inverse problem; in Sub-subsections 4.2.2.2 we examine the measures of connectivity
considered; finally, in Sub-subsection 4.2.2.3 our future research interests are explained.
4.2.2.1 Inverse problem formulation
A dipole does not reflect the presence of a discrete and unique source, but it is rather a convenient
representation of synchronized activation of a huge number of pyramidal cells likely extending larger
patches of gray matter. In this context, the cortical pyramidal neurons are thought to be the in-
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tracranial sources of scalp electric potential differences. These neurons are subjected to post-synaptic
potentials that create an active impressed current density. The relationship between the current
density vector field and the scalp potentials is
Φc = KcJ + c1, (4.9)
where Φc, denoting the potentials at NE scalp electrodes all measured with respect to the same
reference electrode, is a vector with NE elements; J describes the current density at NV cortical
voxels and, therefore, it is a vector of NV elements; c is a scalar value defined by the reference
electrode arbitrarly chosen when the EEG signal is recorded; 1 is a vector of NE ones; finally, the NE
x NV matrix Kc is the lead field determined by the geometry and conductivity profile of the head.
Eq. 4.9 represents the forward equation. For the sake of clarity, the subscript c is used to emphasizes
that potentials are determined up to an arbitrary additive constant related to the reference electrode
choice. Eq. 4.9 is an instantaneous discrete sampling of the measurement space (i.e., scalp electrodes)
and the solution space (i.e., cortical voxels).
The estimation of the unknown electric neuronal activity J given the lead field Kc and the scalp
potential measurements Φc defined the inverse problem.
First of all, it is necessary to solve the so called reference electrode problem that correspond to
solve
c = arg min
c
||Φc −Kc − c1||2 (4.10)
with || · || being the Euclidean norm. This means that c must satisfy, as best as possible, Eq. 4.9.
Solving the problem in Eq. 4.10 and plugging the solution back into Eq. 4.9 we obtain
HΦc = (HKc)J (4.11)
where H is known in statistics as a centering matrix whose effect is to subtract the average value and
it is defined as
H = 1− 11
T
1T1
. (4.12)
This has a relevant implication, since it demonstrates that inverse solutions are reference-independent
as they must be obtained from the reference-independent forward equation 4.11, which is invariant to
any change of reference. Given H, it is possible to define Φ = HΦc and K = HKc and, then
Φ = KJ. (4.13)
In the literature regarding the EEG, the effect of H is known as the average reference. It is
worth noting that an inverse solution changes considering different samplings, which means that it
will change if we consider a different number and different locations of the scalp electrodes. On the
other hand, given the sampling, the solution to an inverse problem modeling the reference electrode
will not depend on the choice of the reference electrode.
At this point, our goal is to solve the linear forward equation 4.9 for the unknown current density
J. This is a multivariate problem. It usually holds that NE << NV , meaning that the electrodes
number is much smaller than the voxels number. As a consequence, the problem is undetermined with
an infinite number of solutions.
In more details, we are looking for particular linear solutions of the form
J = arg min
J
||Φ−KJ||2 + αJTWJ. (4.14)
This is a regularized, weighted minimum norm problem, where α ≥ 0 is the Tikhonov regularization
paremeter, and W is a NV xNV symmetric positive definite weight matrix.
J = W−1K(KW−1KT + αH)+Φ (4.15)
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Eq. 4.15 is the general solution to this problem. The operator + on the top of the bracket represents
the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse.
As shown in [163] both empirically and theoretically, the non-weighted minimum norm (i.e., Eq.
4.15 with W = 1 the identity matrix) has very bad localization properties misplacing deep sources to
the surface. This is due to the fact that this solution is an harmonic function attaining its extreme
values only at the boundary of the solution space [164]. As a consequence, its use for localization is
invalidated by this basic physics property of the minimum norm, regardless of the fact that it is the
simplest solution.
Historically many attempts were made to improve the mislocalization of sources. The aim is to
find an appropriate weigth matrix W in Eq. 4.15 so that the distributed linear inverse solution has
zero localization error when tested with sources anywhere in the brain under ideal (i.e., no-noise)
conditions.
The nonlinear system of equations shown in 4.16 can be used to obtain the weights for exact
localization with zero error under ideal conditions.
ωi = [K
T
i (KW
−1KT + αH)+Ki]
1
2 (4.16)
ωi, for i = 1, ..., NV , are the elements of the diagonal weight matrix W and Ki ∈ RNE×1 denotes the
ith column of the matrix K. It is worth noting that, even if the weights are nonlinearly dependent
from K’s columns, the inverse solution remains linear. The following algorithm describes the way in
which the weights (which do not depend on the measurements) computation can be solved:
1. initialize W with elements ωi = 1, for i = 1, ..., NV ;
2. compute C = (KW−1KT + αH)+;
3. keeping C fixed, for i = 1, ..., NV , compute new weights ωi = [K
T
i CKi]
1
2 ;
4. using the new weights, go to step 2 until the change in the weight matrix is sufficiently small
(i.e., convergence).
For the sake of exposition, the theoretical proof for the exact localization property of the linear
inverse solution follows. The current density related to the ith voxel is
[J]i = ω
−1
i K
T
i (KW
−1KT + αH)+Φ = [KTi CKi]
− 1
2KTi CΦ (4.17)
where the second equality is obtained substituting the equation of the weights previously discussed.
The squared current density ([J]i)
2 reaches its maximum value when the actual scalp potential is
generated by a point source at the target. For example, a point source with a representing its strenght
at the jth voxel, gives Φ = aKj and ([J]i)
2 = a2(KTj CKi)
2(KTi CKi)
−1. The partial derivative of
([J]i)
2 attains the zero value when Ki = Kj proving that the linear tomography related to the equation
of the weights considered at the beginning solves the multi-variate invers problem. Furthermore, it
also achieves exact localization to test point sources under no-noise conditions. This method is known
as exact low-resolution electromagnetic tomography (eLORETA).
4.2.2.2 Connectivity measures: coherence and phase synchronization
As we already pointed out discussing the brain connectivity analysis based on fMRI data, the simi-
larity between time-varying signals recorded at two brain regions quantifies the dynamic functional
connectivity between these two regions [165]. The term similarity is generic and it allows for a variety
of measures that have been evaluated and used in the analysis of electric neuronal activity time series.
Herein, we focus on two different definitions of similarity: coherence, which provides a measure of linear
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similarity between signals, and phase synchronization, corresponding to a particular form of non-linear
similarity. These measures are usually expressed as the sum of lagged dependence and instantaneous
dependence. They are applicable to stationary and non-stationary time series and their values are non
negative and defined in the frequency domain. In neurophysiology, the time series represent the electric
neuronal activity at several brain locations. As a consequence, coherence and phase synchronization
are to be interpreted as “connectivity” between locations. Neverthless, in this setting, any measure of
dependence is substantially contaminated with an instantaneous, non-physiological contribution due
to volume conduction (i.e., the complex effects of measuring electrical potentials at distance from their
source generators) and low spatial resolution. Using eLORETA approach, the measures of dependence
can be applied to any number of brain areas jointly (i.e. distributed cortical network) and the activity
of these areas can be estimated.
Consider xjt and yjt as two stationary multi-variate time series, with j = 1, 2, ..., NR, denoting
the jth segment or epoch in which the EEG signal can be divided. Let Xjω and Yjω be their discret
Fourier transforms, Eqs. 4.18-4.21 define the cross-spectra, where SXXω and SYYω are Hermitian
matrices.
SXXω =
1
NR
NR∑
j=1
XjωX
∗
jω (4.18)
SYYω =
1
NR
NR∑
j=1
YjωY
∗
jω (4.19)
SXYω =
1
NR
NR∑
j=1
XjωY
∗
jω (4.20)
SYXω = S
∗
XYω =
1
NR
NR∑
j=1
YjωX
∗
jω (4.21)
For the phase-information cross-spectra the Fourier transforms must be normalized as shown in Eqs.
4.22-4.23.
X˜jω = (X
∗
jωXjω)
1
2Xjω (4.22)
Y˜jω = (Y
∗
jωYjω)
1
2Yjω (4.23)
Then, the definition of the cross-spectra is the same as previously discussed, with X˜jω and Y˜jω
replacing Xjω and Yjω, respectively.
The real part of the Hermitian covariance matrix at frequency ω, i.e. Re(Sω), represents the
instantaneous, zero-phase, zero-lag covariance matrix corresponding to a multi-variate time series
at frequency ω. Indeed, considering the multi-variate time series Xjt ∈ Rp×1, for a discrete time
t = 0, ..., NT−1, with j = 1, ..., NR, and filtering the time series to leave solely the frequency ω
component, XωFilteredjt (note that the spectral density of X
ωFiltered
jt is zero everywhere except at ω), the
instantaneous, zero-lag, zero-phase shifted, time domain, symmetric covariance matrix for XωFilteredjt
at frequency ω is
Aω =
1
NTNR
NR∑
j=1
Nt∑
t=1
(XωFilteredjt )(X
ωFiltered
jt )
T ∈ Rr×r. (4.24)
Finally, using the Parseval’s theorem for the filtered time series, it holds
Re(SXXω) = N
2
T
2
Aω. (4.25)
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These considerations are still valid in the case we cosider the normalized time series for the phase
synchronization evaluation, meaning that the instantaneous, zero-phase, zero-lag covariance matrix
corresponding to a normalized multi-variate time series X at frequency ω, is easily the real part of the
phase-information Hermitian covariance matrix at frequency ω, i.e. Re(SX˜X˜ω).
Eq. 4.26 shows the expression of the measure of linear dependence between time series X and Y
at frequency ω, where |M| denotes the determinant of the matrix M.
FX,Y (ω) = ln
∣∣∣∣SYYω ooT SXXω
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣SYYω SYXωSXYω SXXω
∣∣∣∣ (4.26)
It is worth noting that the matrix in the numerator of Eq. 4.26 is a block diagonal matrix of dimension
qxp, with o denoting a matrix of zeros. This linear dependence measure is expressed as the sum of the
lagged linear dependence, called FX
Y (ω), and instantaneous linear dependence, named FX·Y (ω), as
follows
FX,Y (ω) = FX
Y (ω) + FX·Y (ω). (4.27)
Eq. 4.28 and Eq. 4.29 define the measure of instantaneous linear dependence and the measure of
lagged linear dependence, respectively.
FX·Y (ω) = ln
∣∣∣∣Re(SYYω ooT SXXω
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Re(SYYω SYXωSXYω SXXω
)∣∣∣∣ (4.28)
FX
Y (ω) = FX,Y (ω)− FX·Y (ω) = ln
∣∣∣∣Re(SYYω SYXωSXYω SXXω
)∣∣∣∣/∣∣∣∣Re(SYYω ooT SXXω
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣SYYω SYXωSXYω SXXω
∣∣∣∣/ ∣∣∣∣SYYω ooT SXXω
∣∣∣∣ (4.29)
All these measures are non-negative and, moreover, they take the zero value only when there is
independence of the pertinent type (lagged, instantaneous, or both).
In general, the measure of linear dependence FX,Y (ω) can be interpreted as
ρ2X,Y (ω) = 1− e−FX,Y (ω) (4.30)
where ρX,Y (ω) is defined as the general coherence in [163]
ρ2X,Y (ω) = ρ
2
c = 1−
∣∣SYYω − SYXωS−1XXωSXYω∣∣
|SYYω| . (4.31)
In particular, we can define the instantaneous coherence ρX·Y (ω) as
ρ2X·Y (ω) = 1− e−FX·Y (ω) = 1−
∣∣∣∣Re(SYYω SYXωSXYω SXXω
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Re(SYYω ooT SXXω
)∣∣∣∣ (4.32)
Regarding the lagged coherence, it can be stated that the relationship shown in Eq. 4.33 holds.
ρ2X
Y (ω) = 1− e−FX
Y (ω) = 1−
∣∣∣∣SYYω SYXωSXYω SXXω
∣∣∣∣/ ∣∣∣∣SYYω ooT SXXω
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Re(SYYω SYXωSXYω SXXω
)∣∣∣∣/∣∣∣∣Re(SYYω ooT SXXω
)∣∣∣∣ (4.33)
118
It is worth stressing the asymmetry in the results regarding the instantaneous coherence ρ2X·Y (ω)
and the lagged coherence ρ2X
Y (ω). Indeed, while the instantaneous coherence is the real part of
the complex valued coherence, the lagged coherence is not the imaginary part of the complex valued
coherence: the lagged coherence is ideally not affected by instantaneous dependence, whereas the
imaginary part of the complex valued coherence is more affected by instantaneous dependence. As a
consequence, the lagged coherence is a much more adequate electrophysiological connectivity measure.
The reason is that it removes the confounding effect of instantaneous dependence due to low spatial
resolution and volume conduction.
Phase synchronization has a rigorous physics definition that has been adapted and used in the
neuroscience field. Other equivalent descriptive names for phase synchronization appear in the neuro-
science, such as phase locking, phase locking value, phase locking index, phase coherence, etc. Consider
two univariate stationary time series and xjω, yjω, with j = 1, 2, ..., NR, their sample data in the fre-
quency domain obtained using the discrete Fourier transform. Defining ∆φj = φ
x
j − φyj as the phase
difference, it can be stated that if ∆φj is stable over time segments j (independently from the ampli-
tude), then there is a connection between the locations at which the measurements are made. This
involves that phase synchronization can be seen as a measure of stability of phase difference. For
the non-stationary case, a similar definition exists based on the concept of time-varying instantaneous
phase and the definition of the stability over time instead of over segments. Furthermore, this measure
can be seen as the absolute value of the complex valued (Hermitian) coherency between the normal-
ized Fourier transforms. The normalization is done in a non-linear way before the calculation of the
coherency such as removing from the outset any amplitude affects and leaving only phase information.
This absolute value ranges between 0, i.e., no synchronization, and 1, i.e., perfect synchronization.
In the general case of two multi-variate time series, the measure of non-linear dependence GX,Y can
be defined as the sum of lagged non-linear dependence GX
Y and instantaneous non-linear dependence
GX·X . Similarly to what previously discussed, Eqs. 4.34-4.36 show the expressions of GX,Y , GX·Y ,
and GX
Y , respectively.
GX,Y (ω) = GX
Y (ω) +GX·Y (ω) = ln
∣∣∣∣SY˜Y˜ω ooT SX˜X˜ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣SY˜Y˜ω SY˜X˜ωSX˜Y˜ω SX˜X˜ω
∣∣∣∣ (4.34)
GX·Y (ω) = ln
∣∣∣∣Re(SY˜Y˜ω ooT SX˜X˜ω
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Re(SY˜Y˜ω SY˜X˜ωSX˜Y˜ω SX˜X˜ω
)∣∣∣∣ (4.35)
GX
Y (ω) = GX,Y (ω)−GX·Y (ω) = ln
∣∣∣∣Re(SY˜Y˜ω SY˜X˜ωSX˜Y˜ω SX˜X˜ω
)∣∣∣∣/∣∣∣∣Re(SY˜Y˜ω ooT SX˜X˜ω
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣SY˜Y˜ω SY˜X˜ωSX˜Y˜ω SX˜X˜ω
∣∣∣∣/ ∣∣∣∣SY˜Y˜ω ooT SX˜X˜ω
∣∣∣∣ (4.36)
These non-linear dependence measures can be associated to phase synchronization measures and
Eqs. 4.37-4.39 define the relationships. In particular, Eqs. 4.37-4.39 show the general expression of the
phase synchronization, the instantaneous phase synchronization, and the lagged phase synchronization,
respectively, between two multi-variate time series.
φ2X,Y (ω) = 1− e−GX,Y (ω) = 1−
∣∣∣SY˜Y˜ω − SY˜X˜ωS−1X˜X˜ωSX˜Y˜ω∣∣∣∣∣∣S˜Y˜Y˜ω∣∣∣ . (4.37)
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φ2X·Y (ω) = 1− e−GX·Y (ω) = 1−
∣∣∣∣Re(SY˜Y˜ω SY˜X˜ωSX˜Y˜ω SX˜X˜ω
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Re(SY˜Y˜ω ooT SX˜X˜ω
)∣∣∣∣ (4.38)
φ2X
Y (ω) = 1− e−GX
Y (ω) = 1−
∣∣∣∣SY˜Y˜ω SY˜X˜ωSX˜Y˜ω SX˜X˜ω
∣∣∣∣/ ∣∣∣∣SY˜Y˜ω ooT SX˜X˜ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Re(SY˜Y˜ω SY˜X˜ωSX˜Y˜ω SX˜X˜ω
)∣∣∣∣/∣∣∣∣Re(SY˜Y˜ω ooT SX˜X˜ω
)∣∣∣∣ (4.39)
To sum up before proceeding, coherence and phase synchronization can be used as a measure
of connectivity between two brain areas (more in general cortices) described by the time series of
scalp electric potential differences, i.e., EEG. In this context, volume conduction effect might induce
significantly high coherence or phase synchronization even if the two underlying cortices are not
actually connected: the activity at any cortical area will be observed instantaneously (with zero-lag)
by all scalp electrodes. To deal with this problem using EEG signals and eLORETA as imagining
technique, it is necessary to estimate the electric neuronal activity distributed throughout the cortex.
In particular, a 3D component vector corresponding to the current density vector with dipole moments
along the X, Y, and Z axes is computed. This tomography has zero location error and it is linear,
but at the same time it has low spatial resolution. This means that the time series will suffer from
non-physiological values of zero-lag coherence and phase synchronization.
The analysis previously shown has been done considering two multi-variate time series, however it
can be easily extended to estimate the similarity between groups of multi-variate time series. Indeed,
it would be sufficient to consider the cross-spectra matrix between each time series and, then, a
higher dimension for the matrices, i.e., corresponding to the number of time series considered, for the
evaluation of the total, instantaneous, and lagged coherence and/or phase synchronization.
In the literature, it can be found several recent examples of application of the LORETA procedures
to evaluate brain networks connectivity. It is worth noting that several version of the LORETA-based
software exist each of them aiming at solving the source localization problem. For our future works
we are interested in using eLORETA described in this Chapter. In [166], the use of group-ICA (i.e.,
independent component analysis) to decompose resting state EEG signals into a certain number of
independent components (ICs) is proposed. The authors use LORETA to find the cortical location of
these ICs into spatially well-defined sources (or nodes). Through the estimation of the spectral power
cross-correlation between different ICs within subjects, they obtain a functional relationship between
such EEG source nodes. As a results of their work it is possible to state that since changes in α-band
connectivity between eye close and eye open can be observed, it’s feasible to study neuronal resting-
state networks considering the existence of functional connectivity between ICA components in EEG
data. Furthermore, the detection of EEG resting-state independent networks (EEG RS-independent-
Ns) and their interactions in all frequency bands have been also investigated [167]. In this paper, the
author apply eLORETA and ICA to resting-state EEG data in healthy subjects considering δ, θ, α,
β, and γ frequency bands and they find five RS-independent-Ns in the α, β, and γ frequency bands.
A similar analysis is carried in [168], in which the authors do not consider resting state EEG data,
but EEG data recorded during listening of music. The goal is to process sleep spindles with ICA in
order to investigate the opportunity of extracting spindle components (SCs) corresponding to different
EEG activity patterns during a spindle. This has been done by means of visual analysis of the spindle
EEG and visual selection of ICs. Furthermore, LORETA is used to define the intracranical current
sources underlying these SCs.
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4.2.2.3 eLORETA and multiplexing approach
It is clearly evident looking at the literature that the quantitative analysis of networks is fundamental
for the study of systems throughout the biological, social, information, engineering, and physical sci-
ences. Indeed, several examples of networks analysis can be found across different disciplines: networks
have been used to represent interactions between proteins, friendships between people, hyperlinks be-
tween Web pages, and much more. In addition to this, several features arise in a diverse variety
of networks. Networks constructed from empirical data exhibit heavy tailed degree distributions,
the small-world property, and/or modular structures. These structural features can have relevant
implications, e.g. for information diffusion and robustness against component failure.
Traditional networks studies assumed that nodes are connected to each other by a single type of
static link that encapsulates all connections between them. Most of the time this assumption can
be a gross oversimplification, and it can led to misleading results and even the inability to address
certain problems. As an example, consider the transmission of diseases [169]. If time dependence
is ignored with the consequence of loosing the order of pairwise human contacts, the presence of
multiple layers would be ignored making it difficult to unravel the relevance of multiple transportation
and communication modes [170]. To incorporate multiple channels of connectivity in a system, a multi-
layer (and, more specifically, multiplex ) network model is needed [171]. For this reason, nowadays,
an increasing number of researchers with diverse expertise have turned their attention to studying
multiplex networks [172, 173, 174, 175, 176]. This kind of networks provide a natural description
for systems in which entities have a different set of neighbors in each layer, which can represent, for
example, a task, an activity, a category. An important aspect in describing multilayer networks is
defining and quantifying the interconnectivity between different categories of connections. Multiplex
networks could also be suggestive for extended holistic representations of the whole network, where the
underlying connectivity structure is abstracted by multiple layers and where specialized (functional)
behaviors may emerge, a feature that is typically attributed to neural and social systems. As an
instance in a telecommunications context, this can lead to advanced representations of smart cities as
complex systems with bio-inspired approaches.
In [162] the author gives a review of the main achievements obtained from interdisciplinary re-
search based on fMRI and establishes the birth of multilayer network analysis and modeling of the
human brain. According to the definition of multilayer network that he gives, it consists of several
distinct classical networks, each one encoding a specific type of information about the system. There
are different types of multilayer brain networks where layers’ connectivity, measured with respect to
a specific definition of similarity (e.g., cross-correlation, spectral coherence, phase synchronization)
might encode: (i) activity in different frequency bands; (ii) time-varying activity; (iii) activity with
respect to different tasks; (iv) structural and functional connectivity. Moreover, some examples of
applications of frequency-based decomposition related to fMRI and MEG data are discussed. It is
shown that the choice of the frequency band might have a relevant impact on the functional repre-
sentation of the brain, result that are in agreement with what we discussed Sub-section 4.2.1. As
a consequence, considering a multilayer approach might be useful to distinguish the contributions
coming from different frequency bands.
In the literature, other interesting investigations focusing on the study of the brain connectivity
in different frequency bands using fMRI data can be found. In particular, in [177], the authors
show that, in investigating the coherence spectrum among 87 brain regions using fMRI data, two
frequency bands, 0.01–0.03 Hz (very low frequency, VLF, band) and 0.07–0.09 Hz (low frequency, LF,
band), mainly contributed to functional connectivity. Comparing graph theoretical indices for the
VLF and LF bands reveals that the network in the former case has a higher capacity for information
segregation between identified communities than the latter case. Hubs in the VLF band are mainly
located within the anterior cingulate cortices, whereas those in the LF band are located in the posterior
cingulate cortices and thalamus. In [178] and [179], the authors show that each functional layer in a
121
range between 0.01 Hz and 0.25 Hz, in steps of 0.02 Hz, provides unique information and should be
neither aggregated with other layers nor neglected. The result is based on the analysis of structural
reducibility, a modern technique grounded on information entropy. The irreducibility of the multilayer
functional representation of human brain raises the necessity for multilayer analysis of the underlying
architecture and a few first results have been recently reported about the identification of hubs. It has
been shown that hubs in a multilayer network might be dramatically different from hubs in each layer
of the system. In this context, hubs can be used to distinguish, with high accuracy and sensitivity
(above 80% in both cases), the brain of a schizophrenic patient from a healthy brain in resting state.
In [180, 181, 182, 183], MEG data are used in a similar way as previously said regarding fMRI
data. In particular, layers are used to encode the connectivity between neural oscillations within
four frequency bands, namely alpha (8 − 13 Hz), beta (13 − 30 Hz), low gamma (30 − 50 Hz) and
high gamma (50− 100 Hz) [180]. In this context, the mean connection strength, averaged across the
network where the functional connectivity between schizophrenic patients and controls differs most,
has been used to gain new insights about within and between oscillatory frequencies. In [181], two
regimes of multilayer network behavior have been identified in a system with 5 layers (bands 1 − 4
Hz, 4− 8 Hz, 8− 13 Hz, 13− 30 Hz and 30− 48 Hz): in the first regime layers are independent, while
in the second regime they are highly dependent. Results suggest that healthy human brain operates
at the transition point between these two regimes. These studies provide evidence for and support
the hypothesis that functional layers do not act as independent entities, suggesting the existence of
mechanisms for integration and segregation of brain activity within and across different frequency
bands [182]. Moreover, MEG recordings during resting states in subjects affected by the Alzheimer’s
disease have been used to build a multilayer network where layers represent functional connectivity in
different frequency bands (2−4 Hz, 4−8 Hz, 8−10.5 Hz, 10.5−13 Hz, 13−20 Hz, 20−30 Hz, 30−45 Hz).
The study provides evidence that regional connectivity in unhealthy subjects is abnormally distributed
across frequency bands (a feature with no counterpart in healthy individuals) revealing an abnormal
loss of inter-frequency centrality in memory-related association areas. The proposed methodology has
led to high classification accuracy (78.4%) and sensitivity (91.1%) of subjects, confirming the superior
performance of multilayer analysis as compared to more traditional approaches [183].
However, to the best of our knowledge any investigations based on multiplexing/multilayer anal-
ysis applied to EEG data can be found in the scientific literature. Some works analyze EEG data
considering different frequency bands, but without any reference to a multiplexing approach. In [184]
authors combined simultaneous MEG and EEG (MEEG) recordings with minimum-norm-estimate-
based inverse modeling to investigate the structure of oscillatory phase synchronized networks that
are active during visual working memory (VWM) maintenance. The resulting networks are charac-
terized with a number of network metrics that are then compared between delta/theta, alpha, beta,
and gamma frequency bands. Several salient differences between frequency bands have been found.
Alpha- and beta-band networks are more clustered and small-world like but have smaller global ef-
ficiency than the networks in the delta/theta and gamma bands. Alpha- and beta-band networks
also have truncated-power-law degree distributions and high k-core numbers. The data converge on
showing that during the VWM-retention period, human cortical alpha- and beta-band networks have a
memory-load dependent, scale-free small-world structure with densely connected core-like structures.
These data further show that synchronized dynamic networks underlying a specific cognitive state can
exhibit distinct frequency-dependent network structures that could support distinct functional roles.
In [185], the authors examine changes in functional brain networks during normal development
in young children using graph theoretical concepts. Resting-state eyes-closed EEG was recorded (14
channels) from 227 children twice at 5 and 7 years of age. Synchronization likelihood (SL) is calculated
in three different frequency bands and between each pair of electrodes to obtain SL-weighted graphs.
Mean normalized clustering index, average path length and weight dispersion are then calculated to
characterize network organization. Repeated measures analysis of variance test for time and gender
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effects. For all frequency bands mean SL decreases from 5 to 7 years; clustering coefficient increases
in the alpha band; path length increases in all frequency bands; mean normalized weight dispersion
decreases in beta band. Moreover, it has be found that girls show higher synchronization for all
frequency bands and a higher mean clustering in alpha and beta bands.
In [186], considering EEG data during sleep, the relationship between the activities in different
frequency bands is evaluated calculating the cross correlation coefficient. The procedure used allows
an objective and automated quantitative analysis of the sleep EEG. The purpose of the authors is the
characterization of the sleep cycle as a dynamic and continuous process. In [187], the effects of ten
10Hz-wide sub-bands between 0 and 100Hz on mental tasks classification are studied. An investigation
on the interaction of different EEG frequency bands and their effects on the SPM systematically by
comparing different correlation models with various numbers of degrees of freedom is done in [188].
In EEG/fMRI correlation studies it is common to consider the fMRI BOLD as filtered version of
the EEG alpha power. Therefore, in this paper the question that is addressed is whether EEG fre-
quency components may affect the correlation between alpha band and BOLD. This is done comparing
the statistical parametric maps (SPMs) and considering the EEG data in different frequency bands.
Finally, in [189], the authors compare resting-state functional connectivity derived across frequency
bands from EEG with resting-state functional connectivity derived from BOLD fMRI. They inves-
tigate the relationship between synchronous fMRI and EEG connectomes across frequency bands in
a whole-brain, using source space analysis. Based on such analysis, fMRI connectivity is dominated
by the inter-hemispheric connections between homologous areas, whereas brain connectivity derived
from EEG shows a more complex pattern of connections composed by both intra-hemispheric and
inter-hemispheric connections. Moreover, they find that EEG connectomes in low frequency bands
are the most similar to resting-state fMRI connectomes.
According to what just discussed, our purpose is to analyze brain network connectivity using EEG
signals, coherence and phase-synchronization as a measure of similarity between the different brain
areas. Our aim is to base the analysis on a multiplexing perspective as a network representation in
which each layer defines a different network, for example, constructed from a different subject, patient
group, experimental condition, cognitive task, or time point. It might be conceived to combine multiple
aspects, thus creating a network with more than one multilayer dimension; for example, a multilayer
network in which one dimension is pazient and a second dimension is time. In this kind of network
structure, a node can exist in all layers or in a subset of layers and it is linked throughout the layers by
an edge representing its identity. Different edges types can also link nodes within and between layers
representing different types of relationships between network elements. This framework is particularly
appealing in the context of understanding statistically significant similarities and differences in network
structure between experimental scenarios or across time, a traditionally difficult enterprise.
In this background, we aim at creating connectomes obtained in terms of connectivity matrices
using some source localization tools, such as eLORETA, for each frequency band of interest. Before
defining the connectivity matrices, it would be necessary to apply some pre-processing analysis to
the raw data in order to clean the signals in the sense described in Sub-section 4.2.1. Moreover, it
would be interesting to design a multi-frequency band characterization of the patients used to get
the EEG data. Some features of the connectomes obtained might be extracted for each patient and
for each frequency band, with particular reference to local community paradigm (LCP) usually used
for link prediction in bipartite network, small-world and scale-free properties, average node degree,
path length, clustering coefficient, rich-club structure, and others. To do so, we need to extend and
generalize the mathematical formulations of these network features from a monoplex point of view
(i.e., classical network) to a multiplexing perspective addressing the inherent dependencies between
networks and offering a more suitable framework for statistical inference.
We firmly believe that using a mathematical framework incorporating the interconnected nature
of the system is needed to understand the intricacies of the neuroscientific data and their utility in
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uncovering relevant principles of brain function. Indeed, this is a natural consequence of the fact that
as technology advances, the neuroscience community is becoming significantly overwhelmed by rich
data sets reflecting complex spatio-temporal interactions across multiple scales of the brain. Network
analysis, especially dynamic neural networks built on multiplexing approaches, might be a powerful
tool to describe the complex evolution and organization of the human brain and its relationship to
cognition. In this way, it might be possible to increasingly tease apart the complex relationships
between the structure and the function of the brain, make predictions on the evolution of disease
state, and understand how dynamc interactions through remote brain areas give rise to cognitive
states defining human function.
124
Chapter 5
General conclusions
The research investigations presented in this thesis are strongly related to the recent development of the
Network Science. The key factor combining all the evaluations discussed is that, despite the obvious
diversity of the systems investigated, the structure and the evolution of the networks behind each
system is driven by a common set of central laws and organizing principles. Therefore, disregarding
the nature of the components and the precise nature of their interactions, it’s possible to use a
common set of mathematical tools to explore them. The basic architecture of networks emerging in
various domains of science, technology, and nature are similar to each other. Consequently, theories
and models belonging to different fields can be used and jointly applied to investigate on networks
problems spanning different scientific contexts.
The research path discussed here started dealing with ICT issues addressed using classical telecom-
munications investigations. In particular, an error detection/correction mechanism based on the se-
lective retransmissions of erroneous packets has been designed to video flow transmissions by means
of a Markov analysis. The aim was to evaluate the system perfomance in terms of throughput, packet
dropping probability, and average number of transmissions taking care of the incremental nature of the
source coding used for video flow packets and the real-time aspect related to multimedia transmissions.
According to the numerical results, the channel correlation may be beneficial to increase throughput
and, therefore, the transmission speed. Moreover, we found that the correlation has a worsening effect
on the average number of transmissions and the dropping probability, since these quantities increase
as the channel burstiness increases. In video transmissions, retransmissions lead to undesirable delays
and dropped independent packets cause an irreversible loss of information, which, in turn, compro-
mises the quality of the video. A tradeoff between transmission speed and reproduction quality has
thus emerged.
A Markov analysis has been further applied for the management of EVs networks. In particular,
we investigated on how the so-called range anxiety can be avoid considering the impact of the battery
charge, charging time, and number of charging spots on the network performance in terms of prob-
ability of successful service completion. Indeed, the daily usage of EVs has been considered and the
previously mentioned probability refers to the case in which the car user is able to reach home at the
end of the day. In this setup, the range anxiety describes the situation in which customers are wary
of EVs practicality due to their limited autonomy, long recharging time, and the still small number
of recharging points. It has been found that the EV autonomy is the key factor to avoid the range
anxiety. In particular, a reasonable high probability of sevice completion can be achieved only if the
value of the autonomy is large enough. Moreover, the frequency of the recharging spots has a relevant
impact as well: if the number of charging points is too low, then the required autonomy might be too
high.
One of the other relevant aspects that unites any network type is that it might be made up of
several different entities. In a communications network these entities may refer to different technologies
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with the aim to provide or require different services with likely different purposes. Consequently, the
joint combination of theories and models not directly related to the telecommunications world may be
useful to solve communications network problems. In particular, some game theoretic-based analysis
have been decribed and discussed. Indeed, despite game theory is born in an economic context, it
has been used to evaluate communications network issues since it works towards goals similar to some
purposes of telecommunications methods. In particular the management of queueing system, jamming
problems, and group recognition in a telecommunications network have been addressed by means of
game theory.
Systems with multiple candidate strategic agents requiring or offering services (downlink or uplink
case, respectively) that can decide to keep them active, i.e., available to require/offer the service,
or inactive have been considered. We analyzed our systems under different cooperation and com-
munication assumptions and we applied a Bayesian game theoretic approach to evaluate the agents’
behavior. Our principal purpose was to quantify the impact of the lack of cooperation and communi-
cation among the agents in terms of system performance. The main result is that the a priori perfect
knowledge of the system is not necessary. In fact, we found that additional partial information brings
significant improvements in the system. In particular, considering a scenario in which it is allowed to
the agents to share specific information about their types involves the same NE computation as the
perfect knowledge case. Looking for a more dept reading of the results, for the uplink case we found
that staying inactive is not always advantageous, but it depends on the value of the cost of being
active payed by the agent. On the other hand, for the downlink case it holds that the results related
to the scenario in which the client is acting selfishly are the same as the results obtained considering a
setup with complete and perfect knowledge. Therefore, acting selfishly is not always a negative choice,
but it depends on the environment considered for the evaluations.
To futher support the idea that theories referring different environments can be jointly combined
towards a common goal, the security issue known as jamming problem has been investigated by
means of game theory. Two possible scenarios have been investigated: wireless sensor network and
underwater acoustic sensor network. The difference between them is in the communication channels.
Indeed, it is well known that underwater channels have a small bandwidth compared to terrestrial
channels, meaning lower bit rates. Then, the speed of acoustic waves in water is several orders of
magnitudes lower than that of the electromagnetic ones in air, consequently, this results in a huge
propagation delay. Threfore, some medium access adjustments may be necessary to deal with these
two different environments. However, in general, it was possible to draw the same final observations
in both cases. We investigated the dependence of the NEs and the resulting payoff on the distance
between a legittimate receiver and a jammer. The main result is that, depending on the propagation
parameters, there are some range of values for this distance for which the NE solution implies that
the jammer adopts a pure strategy, meaning that a given channel is jammed with probability 1. As
a matter of fact, the network manager should especially control those situations where this does not
happen. Those cases are the ones in which the jammer occupies a position according to which at the
equilibrium its strategy mixes multiple jamming actions. Such scenarios have been classified as critical
positions for the jammer. It can further be stated that any security enforcement should especially
check those areas for jammers.
In addition to this, we showed how a game theoretic approach can be employed to characterize
interactions in social online networking, with particular reference to the several challenges pose by
terminals mobility in terms of identifying malicious players aiming at damaging the network opera-
tion. In this context, we considered a Bayesian game between a server and a client where the server is
operating with incomplete information and only has a prior belief on the client actual type. The anal-
ysis confirmed practical aspects of network surveillance. It has been found that malicious clients are
hard to defeat without a proper detection and confirmation that they are indeed malicious. Moreover,
given the high cost of surveillance operation, the best strategy for the server would not be forcing the
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identification of malicious clients, but rather to force a malicious client to strategically play some less
harmful strategies. An implicit surveillance without the need of actually putting them into operation
would be led. The numerical results confirm this trend: under certain circumstances, it is more ad-
vantageous for the client (even a malicious one) not to harm the network in fear of retaliation. This
may happen if a strategic client does not apply just a myopic optimization of its own payoff, but
rather tries to avoid being identified. To do so the malicious client might occasionally cooperate with
the network, leading to a transparent surveillance in which the client itself has the right incentive to
behave correctly.
Strongly related to the previous works investigated, but on a different matter, we considered a
problem of group detection in social mobile networks, where network mapping by each individual
node is assumed to be limited to its neighbors. Our aim was to show how traditional clustering
procedures fail to efficiently identify the existing group structures, while a simple heuristic procedure
based on the concept of social spreading of information achieves a much higher efficiency of cluster
recognition. The system efficiency could be further enhanced by combining our proposed procedure
with a standard clustering technique. The relationship with the previous investigations lies on the
fact the malicious agents can be in the network with the purpose of disseminating corrupted social
information. In this case, it would be useful to identify the malicious nodes before the exchange of
social information is hopelessly corrupted.
In addition to the several extensions of the analysis described in details, some future reaserch
interests have been discussed as well. In particular, if on one hand these interests aim at continuing
on the path traced by the already tackled research topics, on the other hand they represent the will to
start a new research path where an ICT point of view might be used to address problems not directly
related to telecommunications networks.
Following the same path of the current research, we considered a mobile computing context. The
key aspect of the system model considered is that there are advantages and disadvantages in oﬄoading
towards the remote cloud or the network edge. In particular, the edge server usually is nearest with
respect to the remote cloud to the final user, however it has less computation capabilities in comparison
with it. In this setup, our purpose was to address the management of computational oﬄoading in a
three-tier hierarchical architecture comprising mobile devices, edge computing, and cloud computing.
Although edge and cloud devices have lower data processing time than mobile devices, the simultaneous
transmission of heavy data streams may overload the local wireless network, resulting in an overall
larger delay. Therefore, a game theoretic framework is proposed for the distributed decision making in
a scenario where mobile users share the same network resource and do not have a priori information in
the wireless links. We evaluated at first the rational gameplay of the nodes in a scenario with complete
knowledge, and we compared it with a scenario with incomplete information modeled as a Bayesian
game. In particular, we considered network positions, and consequently channel gain and distance-
related parameters, to be uniformly distributed within a given range, and the nodes only have this
knowledge available as a prior. The analysis demonstrated that rationality (implying selfish behavior)
of the mobile users does not necessarily lead to a more efficient allocation and actually the scenario of
incomplete information leads to a socially better outcome, thereby suggesting an interesting guideline
for the design of computational oﬄoading strategies in realistic scenarios. Future investigations on this
topic aim at empowering the analysis done considering more sophisticated game theory approaches.
It might be conceived to take into account, for example, the human aspect behind the mobile device.
This can be done through evolutionary games according to which the actions choices are influenced
by the dynamics of the system in terms of choosing, e.g., the action that has been more frequently
chosen. Furthermore, a combination of reinforcement learning, with particular reference to dynamic
programming, and game theory can be considered. The former can be used to investigate on the
internal system dynamics, the latter to define the set of possible policies.
In the light of the scientific evolution and the key concepts of the Network Science, we further
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suggested the investigation on brain connectivity using a ICT standpoint. It is generally accepted
that the brain can be modeled as a complex network and, in the literature, there can be found several
descriptions of the relationship between the brain system and a complex network. In particular, some
preliminary investigations that we have done confirmed the idea that the brain connectivity can be
evaluated using a multiplexing approach. Indeed, using fMRI data, we found that considering the brain
signals in different frequency bands implies having different connectivity matrices. As a consequence,
according to a multiplexing point of view, our purpose is to analyze the brain connectivity in terms
of features and properties that the brain shows as a network of networks, where each layer can be
associated to a different frequencies band. It is worth underline that other ”meanings” can be assigned
to the layers obtaining several networks of networks the combination of which might allow a more
detailed evaluation of the brain connectivity. For these future investigations, several data sources can
be used, with particular reference to EEG data.
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